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Abstract 
 
At the Threshold:  
Edgard Varèse, Modernism, and the Experience of Modernity 
 
by 
 
Robert Jackson Wood  
 
Adviser: Richard Kramer 
 
 The writings of composer Edgard Varèse have long been celebrated for their often 
ecstatic, optimistic proclamations about the future of music. With manifesto-like brio, they put 
forth a vision of radically new instruments and sounds, delineate the parameters for spatially 
oriented composition, and initiate the discourse of what would become electronic music. Yet just 
as important for understanding Varèse is the other side of the coin: a thematics of failure 
concerning the music of the present—a failure of old instruments to transcend their limitations, a 
failure of technique to achieve certain compositional ideals, and a failure of music to connect 
listeners adequately to the vital current of the times.    
 This dissertation explores the connection of Varèse’s visions of transcendence, together 
with his continual refrain of art’s metaphysical failure, to one of modernism’s utopian and 
impossible demands: that the artwork somehow seize upon or make contact with modernity 
itself—that it be, in the words of Rimbaud, “absolutely modern.” In Varèse’s case, this will mean 
a desire—stemming partially from the sense of always being left behind by the coursing 
temporality of post-war modernity—for works (and through them, listeners) to enter into an 
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intimate communion with the modern world, providing a kind of unmediated contact with the 
creative-destructive drive of the new.   
  Chapter 1 will explore this desire by way of Varèse’s interest in the siren, whose 
continuous parabolic curves will come to symbolize an unmediated realm of the musical real 
beckoning just beyond the clumsy reach of the tempered scale. In chapter 2, Varèse’s desired 
immediacy will take the form of the absolute present, which the artwork will attempt to 
apprehend both through its collaboration with science and through what Varèse will call its 
necessary “permanent revolution.” In chapter 3, immediacy will be explored by way of Varèse’s 
highly physical, at times violent, notion of sound, which will become a means of making actual 
contact with the listener’s body while dissolving the barriers separating them from modernity’s 
coursing vital stream. 
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Preface 
 
Edgard Varèse, modernism, and the experience of modernity: it is likely that nothing 
about this grouping will seem new or unexpected in a dissertation on the composer. Modernism 
is that aesthetic bracket we tend to place around the angular, unforgiving sound world typical of 
works like Arcana, Amériques, and Intégrales, while modernity is that sociocultural 
phenomenon, never more a subject of discourse than during Varèse’s time, to which modernism 
was supposedly a response. So what about this threshold? What defines it? Why talk about it? 
What does it have to do with any of these terms?  
A threshold implies a point or a place past which one thing becomes another, something 
to be crossed in order for a qualitative change to occur. It can have spatiotemporal associations, 
as a kind of transitional point encountered on a journey; physiological or psychological 
associations as a moment of loss associated with pain or paroxysm; or mystical, metaphysical 
associations, as a moment or place at which matter becomes transmogrified into something 
beyond its mere self. In reading Varèse’s writing throughout the course of this project, I could 
not help but constantly think of these and other thresholds. Everywhere, we seem to be just 
around the corner from something aesthetically or metaphysically game-changing, something 
monumental. We are brought to a precipice delineated by music’s current technical capabilities 
and limitations and allowed a glimpse at what resplendent things that—with only this 
technological advancement and that new instrument—it would surely become. The wind from 
the coming electronic music revolution is already in our hair. The future is always almost here.    
But we cannot say, of course, that this sense of a threshold is entirely unique to Varèse’s 
writings. This is, after all, the age of the manifesto in which countless pronouncements about 
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art’s future—what it should be, what it could be, what it almost is—make the reader feel, on the 
one hand, as though surely utopia is immanent, but on the other, that for some reason, those 
pronouncements themselves bear more interest than their representative works, or that the works 
themselves fail, or that they can do no more than stand out as mere tokens of a theorized type. 
Thus, Marinetti’s Futurist Manifesto becomes a document of determined desire—“we want to 
sing the love of danger,” “we want to glorify war,” “we want to demolish museums and 
libraries”—but also of desire deferred: “we have therefore at least ten years to accomplish our 
task.” Never has music history seen such an ecstasy of writing matched with such a sidelining or 
underplaying of individual works.  
Varèse, ever teetering on the brink of merging theory and practice, ever exclaiming about 
what was almost able to be done, was no exception. What I have tried to do in this dissertation is 
to rethink Varèse from the perspective of different thresholds of transcendence, or at least isolate 
certain tendencies in his works that seem to evoke them. On the far side of those thresholds is 
always a musical metaphysics that Varèse will call various things and approach in various ways, 
but always implicating music in a certain failure to do what he wants it to do. There will be the 
threshold of beauty (Varèse’s own coinage), for example, capable of being crossed (if crossed at 
all) only by way of the most dedicated collaboration between art and science. There will be the 
threshold of the musical real, which will beckon from beyond the reach of the clunky fingers of 
the tempered scale. There will be the threshold of the absolute present, a utopian place beyond all 
mediation that will be able to be conjured only obliquely by what Varèse will call the artwork’s 
“permanent revolution.” There will be other thresholds as well, all of them providing us with 
new perspectives on Varèse’s urgent rhetoric and exuberant sonic visions. And as we explore 
them, we will have occasion to approach a number of other facets of Varèse’s music and rhetoric 
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in ways that have not been done before. Science, for example, will become less the stuff of rigid 
objectivity and cold calculus and more something akin to art itself: a vehicle of revelation in the 
service of providing renewed images of the world, of imagining the world otherwise. Apollinaire 
will enter here as a criminally overlooked influence on Varèse, providing the composer with a 
persuasive framework from which to understand art’s ideal relationship with various modalities 
of innovation and discovery. Sound will become something highly physical, even violent, 
capable of breaking open the recalcitrant shell of the listener’s subjectivity to enable an 
unimpeded congress with modernity’s coursing temporality. And sirens will become not merely 
new instruments used to enliven a worn-out palette of sounds, but the embodiment of an entirely 
new discourse of the real born from an overlooked domestic primal scene. All of these things 
will provide new perspectives on Varèse’s musical visions, and all will be implicated in some 
way in defining the boundaries of thresholds.  
 But a note on my approach: because it is so often writing that is responsible for 
articulating the threshold’s coordinates and setting its stakes, it is largely Varèse’s writing that I 
will be focusing on here. This is not, of course, to consign his actual music to secondary status. It 
is, rather, to explore the ambitious discursive shadow under which that music was conceived. It 
is also to pay heed to a crucial historical juncture at which writing takes on a heightened 
importance as something that helps provide art with new visions of how, during the disorienting 
period of high modernism, it might reconstitute itself. We will understand this period largely by 
way of what Walter Adamson has called the “modernist window,” a “transitional period in which 
the relation between market forces, lingering aristocratic standards of taste, individual ingenuity 
and craftsmanship, and a newly enlarged mass audience was being renegotiated.” There will be 
time enough to explore this below. Here, we merely note that the class and public to which art 
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had formerly addressed itself and whose values and ideologies it had long perpetuated had, by 
the time of Varèse’s modernism, become a shell of its former self. This left art to either 
reconstitute itself for what it imagined to be a new form of that public or turn away from the 
public altogether to entertain radically new forms of self-understanding. We will see how so 
many aspects of Varèse’s music—the great cataclysms of sound, the acerbic dissonances piled 
atop one another—could have resulted from this turning away from a reliable social base. But we 
will also see how writing asserts itself at this same moment as something that art needs more 
than ever—needs as something that might provide it with new forms of bindingness as it is 
forced to reassess its social place ane function.
1
 This is the service Varèse’s writings will provide 
throughout this dissertation, exuberantly conjuring the boundaries of a threshold past which a 
new art beckons for new times. 
  
                                                 
1
 The proliferation of various “isms” during this period, together with their various manifestos, is nothing if not a 
symptom of just this loss of art’s self-evidence and its related need to organize itself in new ways. 
xi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction:          1 
Chapter 1: Varèse, the Siren, and the Sonic Real     27 
Chapter 2: Varèse at the Threshold: Time and Transience   72 
Chapter 3: Varèse, Contact, Sound      130 
Bibliography:          179 
  
xii 
 
List of Illustrations and Examples 
 
1.1 Diverse interval spans and pitch/space saturation in Arcana, m.26-7  55 
1.2 Block-like complementarity of sections in Arcana     56 
1.3 Detail of one of Varèse’s sketches for Déserts specifying pitch by frequency 58 
2.1 Varèse’s sketch of a logarithmic spiral      92 
2.2 A “projected” spiral on a sketch for Déserts      93 
2.3 Projection of IC 13 in the opening measures of Arcana    95 
3.1 Colliding twelve-tone sound masses in mm.34-39 of Arcana   154 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In May of 1933, Luigi Russolo wrote to Varèse: 
A work of art of genius is characterized by a technique which has been highly perfected, 
as in, and even more than in, already existing works of art, but even beyond this, which 
might be called the external structure or wall, there are the windows that permit one to 
see, beyond the wall, the infinite. And this “infinite” is like a panorama of the artist’s 
interior world, that is, the substance of what he has to say. The wall is there only to 
provide these windows and reveal through them the artist’s interior world. Technique, no 
matter how complex, beautiful, or perfect, can never be an end in itself but serves as a 
foundation to support those windows and towards the end of opening up that interior 
world.
2
 
There is little here that immediately strikes one as having come from the pen of a 
modernist.  Russolo’s “genius,” privileged because of his or her ability to conjure the cherished 
infinity of the elusive interior, is an image seemingly more suited to aspects of Romanticism or 
Idealism than it is to, say, the brutal dissonances and quasi-scientific rhetoric of Varèse’s 
modernism. For a proponent of the former, Russolo’s metaphor might be read something like 
this: wall and window relate not as two separate entities in mutual support of one another—as 
positive and negative space, respectively—but as different degrees of the ideality of spirit 
obtained by the artwork. The wall would exist to dissolve into, not merely support, the 
transparency it enabled. In its brute materiality, it would represent the labor whose end was its 
own disappearance into the ineffable and immaterial “something more” of the soul. Romantic 
sign would transmogrify into symbol, leaving behind no trace of the profane material world.   
But Russolo’s metaphor also invites a radically different interpretation, and one that, I 
would argue, is as well-suited to a modernist as anyone—or at least that strain of modernist 
interminably frustrated with the limitations of their medium. If the work is a wall constructed 
                                                 
2
 Luigi Russolo to Varèse, May 21, 1933, Edgard Varèse Collection, Paul Sacher Stiftung.  
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solely for the sake of its window, then by definition, the work is in some sense damned to remain 
the mere inversion, the mere negative space, of what it would most like to be. It would always be 
something other than its ideal content, oblique to what it could imply but never actually account 
for objectively within the stuff of its making. Our questions, then, would be these: even if the 
wall did offer some glimpse into infinity, even if structure did allow some intimation of its 
beyond, in what sense could the work ever be said to be identified with it? Would the work not 
remain the mere material ruin of an unrealizable dream?    
I offer this metaphor as a way of introducing a theme that will appear time and again in 
the pages to come, one that is critically important for our understanding of both modernism and 
Varèse: the sense of a disconnect between what the artwork wants to be and what it is, the notion 
that, weighed down by the profane stuff of its coming-to-be, it is unable to transcend the 
contingencies of its making to manifest or make contact with something real.
3
 What even a 
cursory glance at Varèse’s writings reveals is just such a frustration: the composer as failed 
alchemist for whom musical gold is always a technological innovation, a beam of sound, a 
fourth-dimensional projection, a strategically placed portamento, or sonic cataclysm away.  “No 
matter how consummate a work of art may seem,” writes Varèse, “it is only an approximation of 
the original conception.” “Music, like all the arts, is but a means of expression; only the 
conception counts. As perfect as it may be, never will technique be able to rise to its level”4 
This is quite the bittersweet claim. What do we make of an artist’s self-defeating 
assertion that, from the very beginning, his work is doomed to failure, never to achieve its 
cherished ideal? One might first appeal to personal psychology—Varèse as the quintessential 
                                                 
3
 By “real” I mean something that escapes the mediation of signs, something that isn’t an imitation but an actual 
embodiment or seizure of a “real thing.” What that “real thing” is will take on various meanings for Varèse and is in 
large part the subject of this dissertation.   
4
 Edgard Varèse, quoted in Olivia Mattis, “Varèse’s Multimedia Conception of Déserts,” Musical Quarterly 76/4 
(1992): 573.  
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tortured composer frustrated with his work and his abilities, unable to “get it right,” to achieve 
“the thing,” to come up with a form of expression adequate to the elusive content of his 
innermost soul. But such readings inevitably treat only the symptom, and what I will be much 
more interested in exploring here are the historical conditions and social circumstances that 
allow these frustrations to exist as a possibility in the first place. Specifically, I will be interested 
in the disorienting experience of early twentieth-century modernity as the milieu that lends those 
frustrations their particularly urgent tenor, the sense that somehow, with these particular 
frustrations at this particular time, something much greater is at stake. What does it mean, for 
example, when in the wake of a composer’s constant frustration with his technique, he repeatedly 
cites as his preferred model the world-disclosive power of the new physics? What does this say 
about the types of things now expected of art? What does it say about the precarious status it 
might have? 
Before proposing an answer, and in order to set the stage for a particularly historical way 
of thinking about Varèse’s modernism and modernism in general, I want to suggest that we see 
these frustrations with art’s metaphysical failure, with the wall’s inability to become a pure 
window, as being intimately related to the larger desire for artistic transcendence that has had a 
place within the discourse on art since long before modernism.
5
 It is a desire so familiar to us as 
to be taken for granted, and yet for our purposes, it will be important to see it as a historically 
produced phenomenon characterized at its simplest by art’s discontent with itself and its powers, 
with its wish that it could transcend its ontological status as the mere artifice, mere play, or mere 
                                                 
5
 One could argue, for example, that a work as old as Dürer’s Melancholia exemplifies such a frustration. As Gabriel 
Josipovici has argued, informed by the iconographic readings of Panofsky, the engraving depicts Melancholy as 
paralyzed by thought, “reduced to inactivity and despair by the awareness of the insurmountable barrier separating 
her from the realm of Truth.” Writes Dürer himself: “The lie is in our understanding, and darkness is so firmly 
entrenched that even our groping will fail.” Art here does not partake of truth or of the divine in an a priori fashion, 
in other words, and it might never be able to do so. As Josipovici outlines, such a position is emblematic of the 
Weberian “disenchantment of the world” that will be further discussed below.  See Gabriel Josipovici, What Ever 
Happened to Modernism? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011): 26.   
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imitation that, in a disenchanted age, it is destined to have. That this is not a new desire is 
evidenced, of course, by the litany of names that have been associated with it over the years—
nature, truth, god, spirit, expression, and infinity, to name only a few. Together with Varèse’s 
own language of transcendence, which will be one of our subjects in the pages to come, all of 
these words betray an art that feels as though it has a right to bigger things, along with the 
possibility that, by way of a particularly rarefied kind of making, it might be able to achieve 
them. Or at least come close. 
To be sure, each of those aforementioned manifestations of artistic transcendence arose 
from a unique historical situation to resonate in very specific ways with the life-world of a 
specific group of artists. It could be argued, then, that we risk being radically ahistorical by 
lumping Varèse’s rhetoric in with that of other composers whose language actually reveals very 
distinct ways of understanding art’s relationship with the world. To seek God in art—the  
Hegelian god, for example, as the highest form of a distinctly human-centered spirit—is 
potentially quite different from seeking something as impersonal and oblique to conscious 
experience as the psychoanalytic real, for example, to name the particular incarnation of 
transcendence that we will be exploring in chapter one. Yet as important as it is to maintain these 
distinctions, it is also important that we take a step back and see this same language on a larger 
historical level—the level upon which the real historical contingency is the fact that 
transcendence in art is needed or desired—or can be needed or desired—at all. This level would 
be roughly that of modernity, and it will be against the backdrop of that modernity that we will 
come to understand the urgent rhetoric of Varèse’s modernism in the pages to come. 
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Modernity and Disenchantment 
 
 
 Modernity can be defined from any number of angles. But for our purposes here, let us 
take it to mean an epoch, beginning no later than the seventeenth century and extending to our 
own, that is characterized primarily by three things: the erosion of tradition as a guarantor of 
meaning in the present, the celebration of that present as an ever new site of value creation, and 
the sense of contingency and linear time consciousness that accompanies both. Let us further 
specify it to mean a period in which art and human beings alike, each confined to their own 
rationalized spheres (for art, the aesthetic; for human beings, subjectivity), increasingly exist 
with no a priori connection to the world, no sense of being prefigured in its making. It is an age 
marked by what has been called disenchantment, a process whereby superstitious, magical, and 
mystical understandings of the universe are gradually displaced by their rational equivalents, and 
also whereby a way of life that drew its self-understanding from inherited rituals and other 
traditions is displaced by one in which day-to-day meanings are subject to the constant revisions 
demanded by modern science and the market.
6
 In such a milieu, that aforementioned sense of 
connectivity to the world can no longer be simply inherited from the past as a given but must 
instead be continually sought out in the present (in art, for instance), always in the name of 
progress and yet one never far removed from the lingering sense of a certain compromised 
experience. It is an age, as Nietzsche wrote, in which “the consuming desire for knowledge” has 
led to “the loss of a mythical home.”7 
                                                 
6
 Max Weber writes: “The increasing intellectualization and rationalization […] means that principally there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by 
calculation.  This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order 
to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and 
calculations perform the service.”  See Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 139, 155. 
7
 Nietzsche, quoted in Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987): 
87. 
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That “mythical home,” as the story goes, was one of ubiquitous connectivity of music, 
soul, and world, a world that, in Lukács’ words (again, referencing the domestic), is “wide and 
yet it is like a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the 
stars.”8 It is an idea exemplified on the cosmological level in the notion of the harmonium mundi, 
for example, in which music is but a metonymically related instance of the more general music 
that binds together all things. For Boethius, this connectivity was put in terms of an essential 
congruity between the music of the spheres (musica mundana), the music that unifies body and 
soul in human beings (musica humana), and instrumental music as such (musica instrumentalis), 
a unity which we also find in Plato’s (and later, Ficino’s) doctrine of the universe as a single 
indivisible soul. This is in many ways to say that the isolated work concept with which we are so 
familiar today, shut off from world and soul alike, could have no place in such a milieu in which 
the relationship between music proper and the larger music of the universe was so diffuse.
9
  
But it is with the emergence of subjectivity and modern science that this connective 
thread is cut, so to speak, and its binding metaphysic, formerly passed down as tradition, is 
subjected to a scrutiny that ultimately sequesters music, soul, and world into their own isolated 
rationalized spheres.
10
 Music is here no longer metonymically connected to this inherently 
meaningful world, no longer an elaboration of its pre-given truths, but instead comes to serve as 
its secularized afterimage, to use Adorno’s word, a residue of the magical world kept apart from 
                                                 
8
 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974): 29. 
9
 For more on the work concept in general, see Lydia Goehr’s The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay 
in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford University Press: 2007). Also see Daniel Chua, Absolute Music and the 
Construction of Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Gary Tomlinson, Metaphysical Song: 
An Essay on Opera (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
10
 Consider Hegel’s vivid description: “The statues are now only stones from which the living soul has flown, just as 
the hymns are words from which belief has gone. The tables of the gods provide no spiritual food and drink, and in 
his games and festivals man no longer recovers the joyful consciousness of his unity with the divine. The works of 
the Muse now lack the power of the Spirit, for the Spirit bas gained its certainty of itself from the crushing of gods 
and men.” See G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 
455. 
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more properly rational activity as mere vestige of that irrational past.
11
 What this essentially 
means is that, by merely existing, art preserves the memory of an alternate type of meaning that, 
with respect to modernity, cannot but be implicitly critical. “Art always says ‘And yet!’ to life. 
The creation of forms [via the autonomous aesthetic],” Lukács offers, “is the most profound 
confirmation of the existence of a dissonance.”12 In the modern era, art is no longer about 
elaborating a meaning that already exists but about creating a meaning, a connectivity, that 
doesn’t. It has become an activity through which the world is not repeated and reaffirmed but 
instead imagined otherwise, a type of labor on the world in which a vestige of that old magical 
connectivity can, in however compromised a form, be perpetuated.
13
  
I want to propose, once again following Adorno, that we see much of art’s rhetoric of 
transcendence as having everything to do with this disenchanted state, namely, as an index of the 
desire to recover something of that meaningful way of participating in or cozying up to the world 
that was lost to the progressive rationalization endemic to modernity. As we said, the 
autonomous aesthetic can be seen as a kind of remnant of enchanted times, and one that, while 
cut off from the world in its own rationalized sphere, preserves the memory of that alternate form 
of meaning.
14
 Thus, what god, spirit, infinity, the real, and those other manifestations of 
transcendence seem to indicate is a desire of artworks from throughout modernity to escape 
themselves in order to enter into an intimate communion with an other, a desire to make contact 
with and participate in the larger world. They index an art that is frustrated with its autonomy, 
                                                 
11
 See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998): 
18. By “truths” here, I simply mean the agreed-upon ways that the world and cosmos are understood for a particular 
group of people. In this section, those truths are largely of the neo-Platonic variety.   
12
 Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 72.   
13
 I have found Hans Robert Jauss’s discussion of this matter in terms of poiesis to be particularly helpful. See his 
“Poiesis,” Critical Inquiry 8/3 (Spring 1982): 596.  
14
 “Art is a stage in the process of what Max Weber called the disenchantment of the world, and it is entwined with 
rationalization; this is the source of all of art's means and methods of production; technique that disparages its 
ideology inheres in this ideology as much as it threatens it because art's magical heritage stubbornly persisted 
throughout art's transformations.” Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 54. 
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we might say, and with the reality of being shut off from the world within the hermetically sealed 
bounds of its form, able to participate in the world only by mimetically imitating it from afar or, 
like Russolo’s wall, evoking it as the representation of a kind of lack. The rhetoric of 
transcendence, I am suggesting, has long been at least in part about the work escaping this prison 
of form so that it might actually participate in the world. 
This will be our starting point, at least, for understanding Varèse’s own rhetoric of 
transcendence and metaphysical failure, which will have everything to do, I will argue, with this 
desire to establish some sort of intimate communion with the world. I have been implying that 
such a desire cannot help but bring to mind art’s magical heritage, and if this strikes one as being 
too great a leap across the centuries, then it will help to recall that Varèse himself implied as 
much by his frequent resort to the pre-rational notions of magic, alchemy, and the quadrivium 
when articulating his dream for music. The title of Varèse’s Arcana refers to the sacred secrets of 
alchemy and its epigraph was by none other than the Renaissance alchemist Paracelsus, whose 
work Varèse owned and studied.
15
 One of alchemy’s chief dictums was that the spiritual and 
physical realms were intermixed, an idea strongly resonant with our depiction of the pre-modern 
enchanted world above in which music itself was thought to permeate and bind together all 
things, from the airiest vapors to the most profane earthly materials.
16
 In his lecture “The 
Liberation of Sound,” Varèse refers to “an entirely new magic of sound” immediately after 
outlining his thoroughly modern vision for a science-informed art, as though to imply that 
ultimately science alone would be insufficient without an element of its irrational other to help it 
achieve the desired effect.
17
 As for the quadrivium, Varèse often spoke of wanting music, which, 
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 Varèse outlined in pencil several passages from Paracelsus in his personal copy of the alchemist’s works. 
16
 See John D. Anderson, “Varèse and the Lyricism of the New Physics,” Musical Quarterly 75/1 (1991): 38.  
17
 Edgard Varèse, “The Liberation of Sound,” in Contemporary Composers on Contemporary Music, 
ed. Elliott Schwartz and Barney Childs (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967): 198. 
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as we said above, had become divorced from the sciences in the modern age, to be considered 
alongside them once again.
18
 Such an idea is particularly resonant when we recall that it was 
Boethius who coined the term quadrivium, the same Boethius who, in his own alchemical way, 
wrote of that congruence between musica mundana, humana, and instrumentalis.  
What is implied by all of Varèse’s references to the pre-rational, I would argue, 
particularly when used by a composer who also spoke so enthusiastically about modern science, 
is an underlying frustration with the world that such a science defines: a rationalized, 
differentiated, atomized world carved out and delineated by a kind of knowledge that can know 
and describe but only at the expense of imposing the distance between things characteristic of 
alienated subjects and objects (we remember Hegel from above: “the Spirit has gained its 
certainty of itself from the crushing of gods and men”). The kind of participation in the world 
that science offers the subject is, as Benjamin wrote in his “On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy,” impoverished and insufficient. 19 In the case of the new physics and other matters to 
be discussed below, it could also be unendingly exciting. The new physics in particular was in 
many ways its own form of alchemy, so remote were its assertions from the sober rationalism of 
the outdated Newtonian worldview. And yet at the end of the day, to dream of alchemy in this 
context is to dream of overcoming that impoverished form of knowing and being with the world, 
and also to imagine a music that might be able to overcome its sequestered autonomy and 
                                                 
18
 “The philosophers of the Middle Ages separated the liberal arts into two branches: the trivium, or the Arts of 
Reason as applied to language-grammar, rhetoric and dialectic-and the quadrivium, or the Arts of Pure Reason, 
which today we would call the Sciences, and among which music has its place in the company of mathematics, 
geometry and astronomy. Today, music is more apt to be rated with the arts of the trivium. At least, it seems to me 
that too much emphasis is placed on what might be called the grammar of music. At different times and in different 
places music has been considered either as an Art or as a Science. In reality music partakes of both.” See Varèse, 
“Music as an Art-Science” in Contemporary Composers on Contemporary Music, ed. Elliott Schwartz and Barney 
Childs (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967): 198. Heidy Zimmermann notes that Varèse misunderstood 
the degree to which music was still studied as part of the trivium. See her “Recycling, Collage, Work in Progress: 
Varèse’s Thought in Speech and Writing,” Edgard Varèse: Composer, Sound Sculptor, Visionary, ed. Felix Meyer 
and Heidy Zimmermann (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2006): 270.  
19
 Walter Benjamin, “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 1913-1926 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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mimetic status (sequestered precisely because of that impoverished form of knowing) to actually 
participate in that world.
20
  
 
Modernism and Early-Twentieth-Century Modernity 
 
 
Thus far, I have been discussing the experience of modernity on a relatively general, 
abstract level—modernity as a centuries-spanning historical experience increasingly marked by 
these themes of separation and disenchantment. But this has largely been to set the stage for and 
better contextualize the concrete social and existential experiences of the more specific 
modernity of the early-twentieth-century in which Varèse’s modernism will actually find form. It 
is this acutely disorienting milieu, I will argue, characterized by great upheavals in nearly every 
domain of experience and marked by a radical intensification of the experience of time, that will 
contribute to Varèse’s sense of diremption from the social fabric and provide a key as to the 
particular urgency with which he deployed the artwork as an attempt at some sort of intimate 
communion with the larger world.   
If the goal of art was to achieve, as we have been proposing, a kind of vicarious 
participation in the world, then no milieu could have complicated that task more than the 
breathless whirlwind of post-war New York, so alive with the creative destructive vigor of 
modernity at its most blindly determined. With the arrival of the twentieth century, in which the 
upheavals of world war, the paradigm shifts of the new physics, and the urbanization of an 
emergent bourgeoisie all contributed to such an intensified experience of time, it is the very 
notion of a world that suddenly seems inadequate to art insofar as even the world now seems so 
                                                 
20
 This is Adorno’s argument. “The trace of memory in mimesis, which every artwork seeks, is simultaneously 
always the anticipation of a condition beyond the diremption of the individual and the collective.” See Aesthetic 
Theory, 131. 
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susceptible to being swept away. This would be that milieu in which “all that is solid melts into 
air,” to borrow Marx’s phrase, including stable forms of meaning, which come and go with the 
wind of technological innovation and social revolution alike. Any attempt at a vicarious 
participation in the world through art has now been further hindered by the fact that the world 
will not sit still long enough for this to happen. There is still the time of the individual, time as a 
function of the concrete, ritualistic workaday activities of daily life. But this time increasingly 
rubs against another more “official time,” an emphatically linear time marked by the rapid 
progression of world-historical events and happenings that the individual can witness but in no 
way hope to see themselves as participating in. It is a situation in which “we feel dizzy,” as 
Octavio Paz has written, and where “what has just happened already belongs to the world of the 
infinitely remote.”21 Time has become fractured and alienated from the subject. Modernity has 
become a train constantly leaving the station before anyone is aboard.  
Temporality, then, will be another of this dissertation’s most important themes. Earlier, 
we spoke of Varèse’s rhetoric of transcendence as indicating a desire for the artwork to 
overcome its sequestered autonomy to achieve an intimacy with the larger social fabric. But in a 
situation in which the world itself is so elusive and constantly new, we will find the desired 
contact to be less with the world proper and more with the time that seems to constantly remake 
it. This is to say that if Varèse’s desire to transform his wall into a window was a desire to make 
something that escaped the contingency of the merely made, imitative thing to actually 
participate in the world in a more meaningful way, to be something true and real, then we must 
see how, in a situation in which paradigm-shifting developments like quantum physics were 
displacing even the most tried and true foundational concepts of experience, the realest thing of 
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 Octavio Paz, Children of the Mire: Modern Poetry from Romanticism to the Avant-Garde (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1974): 6. 
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all might have seemed to be the fundamental nature of change, movement, and time themselves. 
Particularly in the last chapter, I will be proposing that what Varèse attempted to seize hold of 
and participate in via his works—or from another angle, what he wanted his works to actually 
become—was just that elusive creative-destructive force: the libidinal drive of modernity, blindly 
groping its way towards the new. 
We know that this exhilarating, disorienting environment contributed not only to 
Varèse’s music but to the obsession with the new characteristic of modernism in general. And 
undoubtedly, we must see the forms that resulted—so often opaque and alienating—as being 
somehow qualitatively distinct from those that came immediately before. Yet from a different 
perspective, I want to suggest that we see these same radically new forms as representing not so 
much a radical break from those of a recent artistic past as much as a culmination, admittedly 
pushed to its extreme, of the much larger social phenomenon of modernity in general. 
Modernism’s obsession with the new, that is—modernism as that commonly-referred-to 
circumscribed historical period from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century —has its 
model in the inaugural past-rejecting, contingency-embracing gesture of modernity itself, a 
gesture that indexes a realization that a meaningful connectivity to the present can no longer be 
passively inherited from the past but must instead be actively cultivated and renewed along an 
(increasingly) ever-moving stream of time.
22
  
Such a permeable understanding of modernism—modernism as both the radical art of the 
early 20th century as well as a certain tendency of so much art that came before it—can be 
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 It should be becoming clear by this point that my aim is not to differentiate Varese’s modernism from other 
modernisms, but to better understand Varese precisely by way of an understanding of modernism that we can, for 
the most part, understand as univocal. It goes without saying that many different so-called modernisms can be 
accounted for, and indeed, modernism is notorious for being  able to accommodate both Fascism (Marinetti) and 
Socialism (Malevich), to name but one exemplary pair. But we can also speak of those disparate strains as searching 
for answers to the same problem, I think, arising from social circumstances that are discussed shortly below and 
throughout this dissertation.    
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confounding, in part because modernism is by many accounts about nothing if not a radical break 
from those very older eras. Conceived of in a purely stylistic vein, it is about a “crisis in 
language” or a “turn towards abstraction,” we are told, phrases that imply either an exceptional 
and traumatic historical moment or a shunning of history altogether.
23
 But by understanding 
modernism as a mere style rather than seeing it as a more general attitude towards the present 
tied intimately to a much larger historical project, both of these interpretations hinder our ability 
to understand its larger historico-philosophical significance as an artistic phenomenon whose 
greatest subject is actually modernity itself and the sometimes exhilarating, sometimes terrifying 
consequences of its rejection of the past.
24
 We are not far here from Adorno’s understanding of 
early-twentieth century modernism as not an isolated stylistic period so much as a kind of 
culmination whose cryptic products betray the dark consequences of the process of 
rationalization in which art has, to various degrees, always participated.  
And yet, we cannot move too quickly here. Because something special did happen along 
that continuum around the turn of the century, something that did in fact result in a crisis of 
language and turn towards abstraction. The key, however, is to see that crisis as being every bit a 
product of that larger aforementioned historico-philosophical processes, even if its consequences 
were in many ways different in kind. We will have much more to say about this below, but for 
now we need only note that the crisis was not so much in art as it was in art’s public. If up until 
the end of the 19th century, an ever-evolving art could still be said to have had a relatively stable 
social base to address, one consolidated by normative aristocratic values trickled down into the 
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 Robert Morgan, for example, perpetuates this much more circumscribed view. See his “Secret Languages: The 
Roots of Musical Modernism,” Critical Inquiry, 10/3 (March 1984): 444.  
24
 I take this notion of modernism as an attitude towards the present from Baudelaire, namely the latter’s “The 
Painter of Modern Life.” See The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, trans. Jonathan Mayne (New York: 
Phaidon Press, 2008). For a gripping elaboration of this position, see Foucault’s “What is Enlightenment” in The 
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larger public sphere (those seemingly timeless concepts such as Spirit, Nature, Beauty, and 
such), the revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century ended all of that. The 
aristocratic social base that had long lent consistency to art was waning, if not entirely gone. 
Thus, modernity had, as part of its past-rejecting adventure, also rejected the foundations from 
which that adventure had long been viewed and understood. What was left was an art still 
beholden to those grand dreams of transcendence associated with the recently ousted ancient 
regime and yet without a regime—a cohesive world-image or collective point of departure, we 
might say—into whose image to make itself over. If it is here that art turns towards abstraction, it 
is because it is here that art turns away from a now-missing public and towards itself where, by 
whatever fantastic means of reaching, testing, and searching, it might somehow remake that 
negativity, that lack of a concrete social base, over into form.
25
 Varèse once spoke of “groping 
towards the music [he] sensed could exist.” 26 We will take modernism to be the sound of that 
groping, the sense of blind reaching for new forms of bindingness in the wake of the dissolution 
of an older organizing ideology.   
But why such terminological hairsplitting in a dissertation on Varèse? Why the need to 
marry modernism with modernity in such an explicit way? Simply because without doing so, we 
fail to grasp the degree to which larger historico-philosophical issues are implicated in the way 
Varèse chooses to speak of artistic transcendence. We risk depriving a reference to something so 
seemingly inconsequential as alchemy, for example, of its potential critical power, dismissing it 
as yet another metaphor—however anachronistic—for art’s ineffable quality, rather than seeing 
it as a negative presence within the work, as a goal that art in the modern age could never hope to 
                                                 
25
 In T.J. Clark’s words, “Modernism is the form formalism took in conditions of modernity—the form it took as it 
tried to devise an answer to modernity,” by which he means precisely that shift in the nature of the public. T.J. 
Clark, “Modernism, Postmodernism, and Steam,” October (Spring 2002): 186. 
26
 Edgard Varèse, interview transcription in Composers’ Voices from Ives to Ellington, ed. Vivian Perlis and Libby 
Van Cleve (Yale University Press, 2005): 103. 
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achieve. “Modernism,” T.J. Clark has written, “turns on the impossibility of transcendence.”27At 
the dawn of the modern era, art enters the scene as a vestige of the magical connectivity of the 
pre-modern, and yet it is a magic that, in the context of the disenchanted world, can now exist as 
little more than illusion. The entire history of art in the modern period could perhaps be read as 
the gradual process through which art becomes increasingly self-aware of this ersatz status, 
culminating in the crisis period known as modernism in which art’s claims to facilitating a 
renewed intimacy with the world must confront, as never before, the similar yet qualitatively 
different claims of science.
28
 Art’s growing suspicion of its own metaphysical failure, coupled 
with its intense desire to circumvent this failure by new means, is born out of just this situation. 
Its “violent quest for verisimilitude,” its “frenzy to uncover the thing beneath the semblance of 
the thing,” to quote Dan Albright, “stems from its desperate effort to enhance its dignity and self-
reliance.”29 Varèse’s music exhibits nothing if not this violent frenzy. And as we will see, that 
dignity and self-reliance for Varèse will come in the form of an art that in many ways casts off 
the exoskeleton of art, so susceptible to being rendered obsolete by modernity’s whims, to seize 
upon the real of modernity itself. 
 
Survey of Literature 
 
 
As I have been suggesting, this dissertation is, if only implicitly, as much about 
modernism in general as it is about the specific modernism of Varèse, and it originated out of a 
simple desire to understand both in the broadest possible sense: as phenomena that draw deeply 
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 T.J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 22. 
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 See Gabriel Josepivici’s Whatever Happened to Modernism?(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).  
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 Daniel Albright, Representation and the Imagination: Beckett, Kafka, Nabakov, and Schoenberg (University of 
Chicago Press, 1981): 5. 
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on the concrete social experiences of a particular time but that also bring to light certain 
consequences and truths of historical contingencies—namely, those of modernity in general—
that are long in the making. This latter point might seem obvious; all art has a history and all 
artworks are clearly the precipitates of values, ideologies, and social forces that originated long 
before they found form. But nowhere is it easier to forget this than in an art so beholden to the 
idea that the present might be just that place where those contingencies might be transcended. As 
Varèse so vividly exemplifies, modernism wants so badly to escape the ravages of time and 
history and transform its walls into windows, and in most cases, it wants us to believe that it has 
done so. And yet the more it waxes ecstatic about and urgently needs the new, the more it 
dialectically betrays a secret horror in the face of (and continued dependence upon) its 
alternative. Varèse’s often euphoric enthusiasm for the new, that is, draws our attention away 
from the other side of the coin: what is surely a terror before the abyss of the recent past that nips 
at the heels of the new, and in which aged chestnuts like tonality and the tempered scale, robbed 
of their meaning by time, go to die.  
What I am saying is that, from a certain existential point of view, modernism’s obsession 
with the new needs to be seen in part as an obsession out of necessity. From the perspective of 
art, whose business of meaning-creation is in many ways so opposed to the notion of the 
constantly new, we can see modernism’s complicity with the new less as a partnership bred from 
a genuine excitement and more as its capitulation to a kind of unspoken social command. That 
breathless temporality of modernity, in which time is encountered as an other that one must keep 
up with, presents itself as an overpowering inevitability that, through a kind of subjection, 
becomes internalized into the creative super ego of composers themselves. Lest one succumb to 
that abyss of the recent past, the time consciousness of modernity becomes a force to which one 
17 
 
has no choice but to submit. Crucially, such a reading allows us to see how Varèse’s obsession 
with the new might have arisen not simply out of an enthusiasm for science and such for their 
own sakes, but rather out of a very real sense, however unconscious, that meaning—that sense of 
participation in and intimacy with one’s own time—simply could not be created by other means.  
It should go without saying, then, that any study of modernism that focuses exclusively 
on the ecstatic side of the coin—on that unmitigated enthusiasm for machines, technology, and 
the like—does so at its peril. And yet this is precisely what most scholarly studies of Varèse have 
done. They have taken Varèse’s rhetoric at face value, in other words, or have sought refuge in 
uncritical games of “hunt the slipper,” doing little more than attempting one-to-one 
correspondences between Varèse’s scientific/technological ideas and their supposed analogs in 
his music.
30
 This would be more unfortunate were it not the case that so little scholarly work has 
been done on Varèse in general. But the fact remains that in confining itself to the mere 
recounting of biographical facts and other very local matters, Varèse scholarship has ignored the 
larger issues that are at stake in his music. For my purposes, the most important of those is what 
music has to say about the existential experience of modernity in general. 
There are a few studies that have gestured in a more positive direction. Carol Oja’s 
Making Music Modern is notable for the way it connects the music of Varèse and others to the 
exhilarating atmosphere of post-war American modernism, and also for beginning the work of 
bringing important figures like Henri Bergson into the discussion of the music that was produced 
therein. I also credit Oja’s work for turning me on to the criticism of Paul Rosenfeld, whose 
nuanced, if at times hyperbolic, readings of Varèse’s music through the lens of the experience of 
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modernity remain unendingly persuasive. Olivia Mattis’ writing, particularly her article 
“Varèse’s Multimedia Conception of ‘Deserts’,” has begun the work of combating the image of 
Varèse as a mere two-dimensional technophile by creating a picture of the composer as someone 
torn between a myriad of often conflicting influences and ideas. For my purposes, the most 
important of these is the Dionysian rhetoric of Nietzsche and Artaud, which is important for 
understanding not only the creative/destructive tendency of modernity itself but also a certain 
ambivalent, contradictory thread in Varèse’s modernism, both of which we will discuss in the 
concluding chapter. Similarly, Larry Stempel’s work has made an attempt to dig beneath the 
composer’s strong-headed rhetoric to reveal moments of complex humanity ranging from deep-
seeded oedipal resistance
31
 to touching awkwardness.
32
  And no less important for these same 
reasons is the biographical work of Varèse’s wife Louise, which offers an invaluably candid 
account of her husband that does much to temper the often times grandiloquent nature of his 
public face.  
From an analytical perspective, my readings of Varèse’s scores are indebted to the 
spatially oriented graph analyses of Jonathan Bernard, which, in an attempt to better account for 
the way Varèse talked about his own music, treat notation less as a way of representing isolated 
points of sound and more as a way of delineating the outer boundaries of strictly measured 
blocks of musical space. This spatial perspective will prove enormously useful in illustrating 
tendencies of pitch space saturation, parataxis, and other phenomena in Varèse’s scores that will 
in turn resonate in important ways with extra-musical notions such as disenchantment and the 
real.
33
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I will quickly mention a few other studies that have done much to influence my thinking: 
Julian Johnson’s Webern and the Transformation of Nature, for reconnecting the thorny 
modernist project with its roots in romanticism by showing the ideological underpinnings of its 
concept of nature, a notion that we will discuss in our first chapter
34; Daniel Chua’s Absolute 
Music and the Construction of Meaning, for clarifying the philosophico-historical substratum 
(including the Weberian disenchantment mentioned above) of a conception of music we tend to 
take for granted and which is so crucial to any understanding of the hermetic nature of the 
modernist work
35; Gary Tomlinson’s Metaphysical Song, for its vivid elucidation of that 
aforementioned musical connectivity within the neo-Platonic world of Renaissance cosmology
36
; 
Lydia Goehr’s “Radical Modernism and the Failure of Style: Philosophical Reflections on 
Maeterlinck-Debussy’s ‘Pelléas et Mélisande’” for its nuanced discussion of the way modernist 
artworks undermine their own attempts at transcendence
37; and Daniel Albright’s Representation 
and the Imagination: Beckett, Kafka, Nabokov, and Schoenberg, for its compelling discussion of 
the modernist desire for works to slough off their mimetic character to actually be the thing 
itself.
38
    
 In the end, however, this is as much a dissertation about the experience of modernity in 
general as it is about music, which means that many of its frames of reference will come from 
outside of musicology proper. Of these, the most important (if not always explicitly referenced) 
will be the notion of experience itself as theorized by writers such as Benjamin, Adorno, Lukács, 
and others. In Benjamin’s notion, modernity and its particular forces of production bring with 
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them a decline in the qualitative dimension of experience, which is to say that experiences in 
general are less likely to bear a kind of meaning that resonates with or can be integrated into the 
larger social or imagined totality. Experiences take on the form of shock, to use an example we 
will encounter in Chapter 1, a phenomenon intimately tied to urban life in particular and its 
surplus of sensory encounters that can never be adequately processed or assimilated. For 
Benjamin and Adorno, the poetry of Baudelaire is notable for the way it explicitly embraces 
these experiences as its content, an important move with respect to modernism in that the 
artwork thus proclaims its contingency upon the extra-artistic—in a sense making experience 
itself a key theme of the work—even as it attempt to transcend that contingency by way of the 
aforementioned “secularized magic” of form.39 In many ways, my dissertation builds on this 
foundation, examining Varèse’s music as something that absorbs and encodes a particularly 
inassimilable experience while seeking at the same time to redeem it. It also builds upon many of 
Adorno’s elaborations and emendations of that discourse, including his nuanced discussions of 
the relationship between meaning, the new, and capitalist temporality; and his explications of the 
mimesis concept and its rootedness in art’s magical heritage.40 
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 Lastly, I should mention the work of art historian T.J. Clark, whose Farewell to an Idea: 
Episodes from a History of Modernism has also provided something of a jumping off point for 
this project. Clark’s forays into the complex relationship between modernism’s intense desire for 
meaning creation and transcendence within a milieu of disenchantment, modern time 
consciousness, and contingency are exemplary and they have informed this work, I am sure, in 
more ways than I know.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
 
 
Albright, speaking of modernism, writes: 
When representation is forced to its limits, when the artist taxes his ingenuity not merely 
to simulate his object but to capture it, embody it, a violent strain is placed on the whole 
apparatus of his technique; what he will present to his audience is precisely that strain, 
that tension of reaching, since what he seeks forever eludes his grasp.
41
 
 
We are reminded here of Varèse’s comment from above: “Music, like all the arts, is but a 
means of expression; only the conception counts. As perfect as it may be, never will technique be 
able to rise to its level.” We will not need to look deeply within Varèse’s writings to find more 
references to this failure of technique to grasp what forever seems just out of reach. Varèse’s 
writings reveal nothing if not precisely this “strain,” this sense of a constantly deferred 
gratification in which a dreamt-of music is ever neared but never quite achieved. It is a strain that 
can be heard in the music as well, particularly in the early orchestral music and its tendency to 
lurch repeatedly upwards in those manic expressions of will tinged equally in ecstasy and 
desperation. At times, we get a sense that, by way of the sheer force of volume and saturation of 
pitch space, Varèse felt as though he could somehow force his way through the mediation that 
kept his music from achieving those desired alchemical transformations, each surging 
                                                 
41
 Albright, Representation and the Imagination, 12. 
22 
 
culmination of pitches resembling a profanely material tower of babel willing its way towards a 
communion with a rarefied immaterial world. In the pages to come, I will be exploring Varèse’s 
language of transcendence as it relates to the breathtaking experience of modernity, and I will do 
so by way of three ideas or things around which this “strain” seems to precipitate.  I am 
interested in exploring how the artwork, as a made and thus profoundly material thing confronted 
with the task of apprehending and making contact with something so ephemeral as modernity, so 
often ends up asserting itself as that mere “tension of reaching,” to use Albright’s expression, as 
a kind of allegorical limit or threshold past which the essence of modernity always lies just out of 
reach.  
In chapter one, that point of condensation will be the figure of the siren. A quintessential 
symbol of modernity at its most chaotic and used by Varèse in a number of compositions 
(including Hyperprism, in which he seems to have unconsciously transcribed the pitches of an 
actual siren heard from his bedroom window), the siren represented at once the bustling 
cacophony of urban life and the more violent conflagrations of world war. It was a sign that the 
bounds of subjectivity had been (ambulance) or were about to be (air raid) breached, and a 
general symbol of experiences too overwhelming to be assimilated into conscious life. Neither 
the subject nor subjective meanings were entirely safe before the creative-destructive whims of 
modernity, the siren seemed to say, consigning that subject to a place of vulnerability while 
enshrining modernity as an impersonal force whose blows could never fully be parried.  
But even as the siren represented this impoverished form of experience, so resistant to 
meaningful assimilation into subjective life, it also represented a new, albeit disenchanted, realm 
of transcendence: the realm of the impersonal, intransigent real. As a quasi-mystical space that 
existed beyond the mediation of mere symbols, symbols which an intensified time consciousness 
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had revealed to be so contingent upon past ages and circumstance, the real represented the truer 
fundament obscured by but always coursing beneath those symbols—a fundament that, in its 
elusive, inassimilable character, was in some ways hardly distinguishable from that of modernity 
itself. What’s more, the siren was an embodiment of the real in its very form: a smoothly 
parabolic continuum yet to be parsed into discreet notes that could do little but block access to a 
more essential reality.  
What will be at issue in terms of our theme of metaphysical failure, then, will be the 
musical work’s inability to convincingly seize upon and embody that real strictly by way of the 
mediating and outworn musical technologies of the symbolic. The chief of those technologies 
will be the tempered scale, which Varèse deemed modernity to have long ago rendered obsolete. 
We will examine this problematic in the light of what Friedrick Kittler has termed the “discourse 
of 1900,” a general fascination with the real made possible by the emergence of data storage 
technologies such as the seismograph (which Varèse mentioned often) or gramophone that could, 
for the first time and unlike writing, record the meaningless noise that the symbolic had to 
suppress to remain intelligible. After comparing Varèse’s disdain for the obfuscating tendencies 
of that symbolic (the now-disenchanted tempered scale) to that of his mentor Busoni, we will see 
how the musical real, unmediated by tonal or other interpolations, could be seen to directly 
register the seismographic traces of modernity at its most impersonal and inassimilable. 
Additionally, we will examine the more concrete social situation that could allow such an 
impersonal realm to take on the meaning it did.      
In chapter 2, we will explore this notion of contact with modernity more in terms of the 
work’s relationship to time, namely, the absolute present as an ideal and essential content of 
modernity that is always slipping from the work’s grasp. Of importance here will be the acute 
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awareness of a particularly linear, irreversible time characteristic of the experience of modernity 
and responsible for what we might call its allegorical historical sensibility. This would be the 
awareness, generated largely out of modernity’s persistent search for the new, of meaning’s 
inevitable decay into the meaningless to reveal the contingency of all meaning on particular 
circumstance.
42
 But it would also be a sensibility that brings with it the messianic hope that each 
new present might nonetheless be able to deliver the stable form of meaningfulness that the new 
promises but can never quite deliver. It is within this milieu that we will situate Varèse’s 
discourse on the present and his attempts to establish some sort of meaningful relationship with it 
through art, particularly by way of one of the present’s most potent symbols: science.  
As a point of departure, we will begin with Baudelaire, considered by many to be a father 
of modernism and whose theory of beauty from “The Painter of Modern Life” will provide a 
helpful conceptual framework for understanding Varèse’s own relationship to the fleeting new. 
For Baudelaire, art was an attempt to overcome the profane time of modernity by way of that 
very time—an attempt, in Matei Calinescu’s words, to go “beyond the flow of history through 
the consciousness of historicity in its most concrete immediacy, in its presentness.”43  
Beauty was an evocation of the “eternal in the transient,” by which he meant that the eternal—a 
kind of redeemed meaning seemingly free from contingency, immanent in the structures of its 
making—could only be conjured by way of an element of the fleetingly present, perhaps the 
most contingent thing of all. We will trace aspects of this paradox through the writings of Busoni 
and into those of Varèse himself, where we will find it to be heightened by the fact that that for 
the latter, that essential element of the present is now symbolized by science. “On the threshold 
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of beauty, science and art collaborate,” Varèse wrote. Our questions will be these: what becomes 
of art’s dream of eternity and world-creation when it is so beholden to progressive discoveries 
that exist, as they do in science, merely to be surpassed?  Moreover, what happens to that notion 
of overcoming time by way of time when “art like science must live,” as Varèse said, “in a state 
of perpetual unrest and revolution”? To answer, we will explore Varèse’s rhetoric of revolution 
and its ambivalent resonance with both capitalism, in which the new is sought simply for the 
sake of itself, and actual social revolution, which we will find to be at the forefront of Varèse’s 
creative imagination and which implied not a further perpetuation of the new but a final release 
from its profane temporality.  
In chapter 3, our theme will once again be Varèse’s attempts, made through art, to 
achieve a more intimate relationship with modernity’s profane temporality, except that here our 
subject will be the notion of contact proper, both as a pervasive theme throughout Varèse’s 
writings and as something desired in a surprisingly literal way from artworks themselves. Much 
as in chapter two, the time of modernity will assert itself as a kind of inassimilable other 
radically indifferent to the more circular temporality of private experience, except that here, that 
modernity will also become aligned in Varèse’s creative imagination with a kind of vitalism—a 
life-giving stream—that the subject, art, and institutions alike could ignore only at their own 
peril. “Art is subject to the same laws as life,” Varèse wrote. “Life is effort, movement, progress. 
For the mind as for the body, to cease struggling is to begin to die.”44 To obey the laws of life—
which as we will see, were conflated with a general ontology of modernity itself—was to 
maintain a kind of unmediated contact with the absolute present, whether through social forms 
that promoted that contact or art works that, in one way or another, provided it. 
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We will begin by examining Varèse’s charged rhetoric of contact in relation to his 
frustration with old musical forms, stagnant political structures such as the nation state, and any 
type of atomized, outmoded mode of experience that seemed to shut people off from the life-
gving monism of modernity’s elan vital. From there, we will move to a discussion of music 
proper and to the particularly curious relationship between Varèse’s rhetoric of contact and his 
highly physical, at times even violently invasive, notion of sound. After tracing that notion 
through the writings of Hermann von Helmholtz, in which music is singled out among the arts 
for the intimate (and quite literal) contact it maintains with the listener’s body, we will consider 
what Varèse might have meant by his desire for music to do such things as “hit the hearer on the 
back of the head” and serve as a “bomb that would explode the musical world.” Ultimately, I 
will argue that these somewhat disturbing notions, together with the Dionysian rhetoric 
surrounding works such as the unfinished The One All Alone, indicated a desire to overcome the 
recalcitrant shell of the listener’s subjectivity and open them up to the possibility of a more 
redeemed type of contact with modernity. With echoes of a disenchanted version of the music of 
the spheres, the Varèseian sonic will be a kind of prosthesis of touching, an ersatz pneuma torn 
between metaphysics and mechanism that at once fulfills and parodies the modernist desire for 
immediacy. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Varèse, Sirens, and the Sonic Real  
 
There is a story often told about the origin and premiere of Varèse's chamber work 
Hyperprism. The event took place on March 4, 1923 with the composer conducting, and was, 
even for the age of the succès de scandal, hardly an uneventful affair. According to W.J. 
Henderson, the audience broke out into a cacophony of laughter, hisses, and catcalls,
45
 fistfights, 
according to another
46
, all instigated at least in part by the work's strident, incessantly repeated 
C-sharps. As it turns out, those c-sharps had an unlikely origin. Critic Paul Rosenfeld recounted 
in his Musical Chronicle:  
 
During the first performance of the work, [the c-sharps] produced convulsive laughter in 
the audience. But when the composer returned to his home that evening, and sat working 
into the night, he heard from somewhere over the city, a very familiar sound, a siren; and 
realized that he had been hearing it for many nights, over six months; and that the tone 
was exactly a very shrill high c-sharp.47 
  
From the peak of a distant parabola, yawning somewhere in the night, Varèse had 
unknowingly derived part of the content of one of his more contentious compositions. For 
listeners on March 3, that content was disturbing, and it would be reasonable to assume that its 
source of inspiration might have been no less so for a composer attempting to compose in the 
solitude of his own home. But Varèse was not any other composer, Varèse for whom the sounds 
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of the city were not noises from which music was to be vigilantly differentiated, but rather the 
index of a vital energy of modernity that music could ignore only at its peril. It is more than a 
coincidence, then, that on other occasions, Varèse actively embraced sirens, experimenting with 
them in the manner of Helmholtz's magisterial work On the Sensation of Tone before using them 
as actual instruments in works such as Amériques, Arcana, and even Hyperprism itself. And yet, 
despite the fact that Varèse ultimately embraced the siren as a crucial part of his musical world, 
on that night in March, it wasn’t Varèse who had chosen the siren but the siren that had chosen 
him.    
It is possible, of course, that the siren anecdote is largely apocryphal. But its veracity 
should not concern us. Whether true or contrived, Rosenfeld chose to talk about it, and in 
choosing to talk about it, implied that there was something special, something utterly 
meaningful, about the particularly invasive way modernist works were conceived as well as 
about their relationship to their immediate environment. He provides us, in other words, with a 
kind of uniquely modernist primal scene, and one that any historian interested in modernism’s 
discursive modes would be foolish to ignore. Curiously, though, the story has rarely received 
more than a cursory mention in secondary literature on Varèse, most often as evidence in support 
a larger mythology of the modernist-composer-as-magician, capable of transfiguring even the 
most invasive city noises into redeemed constellations of sound.
48
 Rosenfeld's account discussed 
above is no exception, occurring during a section of his An Hour with American Music in which 
he attempts to differentiate Varèse's sonic incantations from the Futurist's supposedly inferior, 
crudely imitative style.
49
 If the Futurists were excessively literal in their employment of sounds 
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such as the siren, the argument goes, then Varèse “used his new sonorous medium in interests 
other than those of descriptivity,” revealing through music the city as motley symphony, a 
transcendent whole in which “rasping, blasting, threatening machinery [became] strangely 
fraternal […] full of character and meaning […] revealed as integral parts of some homogenous 
organism breathing, roaring, and flowing about.”50  
What rests at the core of this interpretation and others like it is in part an attempt to 
rescue Varèse's music from the barbarism of the literal, to paraphrase Adorno, an effort to 
preserve, even within a music wrought from the forsaken landscape of the modern city, some 
glimmer of the metaphysical.
51
 Unlike the Futurists, Varèse is here a true musical alchemist who, 
like his model Paracelsus in Arcana, transmutes crude sounds coming in through his window 
into musical gold, domesticating them all the while into something “strangely humanized and 
fraternal.” As a result of this siren transmogrified, listener and composer alike are thus able to 
“feel the conditions under which objects exist,” all while becoming “part of forces larger than 
[them]selves.”52 
As we will see in the last chapter, this last remark is in many ways as fit a description of 
how Varèse might have viewed his own music as any. But we are nonetheless nearing here the 
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well-tred and undoubtedly Romantic cliché of the composer-as-vessel who unconsciously 
channels the elusive spirit of the profane modern world into the redemptive form of artworks. 
We find this trope in E.T.A. Hoffmann, for example, for whom the composerly unconscious is a 
kind of privileged resonator, perfectly tuned to a “secret music of nature,” which vibrates in a 
fortuitous “sympathy with the composer's spirit.”53 For Rosenfeld and Hoffmann alike, what 
seems to enter into the composer's unconscious is not raw otherness or inassimilable experience 
as such, but rather, an intuition of something transcendent of that experience, a sense of its 
content “raised to a higher power.”54 The siren registers not as a siren, that is, but as a siren-
already-become-spirit; not as something invasive and external—something undeniably other—
but as an always-already distilled, a priori condition of the artwork.   
To be sure, there is a sense in which Rosenfeld’s reading is exactly right. In speaking of 
how Varèse’s music carries “us out of ourselves and beyond ourselves, into impersonal regions, 
into the stream of things,” he is describing a musical intimacy not with some sort of Romantic 
Elysium but with the alienated temporality of modernity—perhaps the ultimate Other—of the 
sort described so vividly by writers like Nietzsche and Bergson.
55
  And yet what remains 
problematic about Rosenfeld's account and others like it is that it seems to ascribe the condition 
of modernity to the siren while denying that same condition to the way the siren enters into the 
unconscious. Perhaps because the composer's unconscious is deemed already predisposed 
towards the “secret music of nature,” no account is needed of its initial encounter with that 
nature, of the moment when siren essentially breaches mind. Far from being the discourse of the 
Other, the Romantic composer's unconscious is here a region seemingly already one with the 
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world from which it takes its sounds, needing only to store those sounds at the composer’s 
unknowing disposal until they emerge transformed in the musical work. 
What is at issue, then, is the particular discourse needed to make sense of artistic 
materials such as the siren, materials so tied to a specifically 20th-century experience and 
modernity, that don't so much as suggest themselves to the composer's creative unconscious as 
force their way in. To be sure, the notion of art as a product of some sort of outside agent, 
temporarily inhabiting or taking control of the artistic imaginary, is not at all new. It can be 
found in the age-old trope of artistic inspiration, for example, which, at least since Socrates, has 
viewed artists as figures temporarily robbed of their agency—possessed even—by forces both 
inexplicable and outside their conscious control.
56
 And yet most often, the outside world in those 
models doesn't as much erupt into the unconscious as it does simply resonate with it as though 
from a distance, ultimately revealing that aforementioned “secret harmony with [a] nature” 
otherwise thought to be hostile. Of the romantic unconscious, Henri Ellenberg writes: 
[The Romantic unconscious] was the very fundament of the human being as rooted in the 
invisible life of the universe and therefore the true bond linking man with nature. Closely 
related to the notion of the unconscious was that of the ‘inner’ or ‘universal sense’ (All-
Sinn) by which man, before the fall, was able to cognize nature. [It] enabled [the 
Romantics] to gain some direct understanding of the universe, be it in mystical ecstasy, 
poetic and artistic inspiration, magnetic somnambulism, or dreams.
 57
 
 
        What we lose in understanding Varèse's encounter with the siren through such an 
anachronistic historical lens is our ability to understand those encounters by way of a discourse 
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more fitting to early 20th-century experience and thus more sympathetic to the conditions in 
which its works are conceived, disseminated, and rendered meaningful. Indeed, we resort to a 
crude ahistoricism which, even as it finds useful parallels across the boundaries of historical 
experience, fails to consider the changing historico-philosophcial conditions that determine what 
can be defined as an experience at all. In the case of Varèse and the siren, I am thinking of a 
more materialist reading of the unconscious, to give but one example, whose insistence on the 
primacy of matter lends the idea of invasive inspiration a particularly ominous quality for which 
more metaphysically-oriented romantic theories cannot account, and which also seems to speak 
to a kind of experience defined less by meaningful resonances and more by sensory experiences 
that cannot be assimilated into any kind of meaningful whole.
58
  In the context of an age that 
lived through World War I—and Varèse himself served near the front lines—we quickly see how 
difficult it becomes to interpret the siren episode as signifying anything but a decisive moment 
when the outside world breaches the bounds of the subject to enact a slightly darker type of 
inscription. 
 
Modernity and Shock  
 
 
As a whole, the New York of the 1920s was a place of sonic transgression. If anyone 
knew this, it was Paul Rosenfeld himself, whose mere description of the city—even the city as 
rendered “strangely humanized and fraternal” by the music of Varèse—almost overwhelms the 
reader with sensation:  
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the streets are full of jangly echoes. The taxi squeaking to a halt at the crossroad recalls a 
theme. Timbres and motives are sounded by police whistles, bark and moan of motor 
horns and fire sirens, mooing of great sea cows steering through harbor and river, chatter 
of drills in the garishly lit fifty-foot excavations. You walk, ride, fly through a world of 
steel and glass and concrete, by rasping, blasting, threatening machinery [...] revealed [to 
be] integral parts of some homogenous organism breathing, roaring, and flowing 
about.59     
 
If the role of music was to temper these “rasping, blasting” sounds, then the everyday 
experience of them was anything but domesticated. Yet to be transfigured by the composer's pen, 
the city was instead a place of sonic eruptions which, far from resonating in “sympathy with the 
composer's spirit,” could have just as likely been seen to threaten it. In other words, this was not 
a place conducive to the romantic unconscious, consonantly tuned to Hoffmann's “secret music 
of nature.” Like Kant's dynamic sublime stripped of its final moment of cognitive mastery, 
nature here all but overwhelms, breaking through sanctified borders with blows that cannot be 
parried. 
        It is scenarios such as the one Rosenfeld describes that led Walter Benjamin to characterize 
the experience of modernity in general as one of shock, a sensation fitting, he felt, for an epoch 
marked by the increasing inability to assimilate the overwhelming data of sensory experience 
into something meaningful and whole. Typified by raw collision over comprehension, the 
experience of modernity was for Benjamin an impoverished type of experience, best exemplified 
by the difference in the historical mediums used to convey it: storytelling and the newspaper.
60 
If 
the act of storytelling represented not only the communicability of experience—experience as 
immanently meaningful and therefore conveyable in all of its lived poignancy—but also the 
ability of the listener to find itself reflected back in those experiences, then the newspaper 
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represented a world in which such immanently meaningful experiences had been degraded to 
mere information. That is, in its presentation of random, isolated news stories, the totality of 
which a reader could never experience as directly lived, the newspaper symbolized an alienated 
world in whose image the reader could no longer imagine itself as a constitutive part. The 
experience of shock was precisely such a non-experienced experience, we might say, an 
inassimilable encounter with information prior to all meaning.   
Undoubtedly, this experience of shock was intensified for Varèse's generation, who, 
raised with at least one foot rooted in more provincial times, could experience the eruption of 
New York's modernity against the backdrop of a distinctly slower temporality. “A generation 
that had gone to school on a horse-drawn street car now stood under the open sky in a 
countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds,” wrote Benjamin of this age.61 
Varèse himself had been born in Paris but soon after moved to the little village of Le Villars in 
Burgundy, deep in the French countryside, where he grew up with his beloved grandfather. 
Always identifying as a Bourguignon, and with grandpère in particular, Varèse wrote of how he 
hated having to return to Paris to attend school at the Conservatoire, and would vacation in Le 
Villars whenever possible.
62
   
This is to say that the Varèse of the siren—Varèse the “ultramodern"—was in many ways 
not always so. Hardly born an uncompromising technophile, Varèse's background was instead 
one of Romanesque churches and vineyards, not quantum physics and fourth dimensions. 
Moreover, it is only against this more provincial background, I would argue, that Varèse's 
experience of the shock of technological modernity can be properly understood. That is, rather 
than seeing the siren as the endpoint in a simple chronological progression through which a 
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French provincial is gradually seduced by and assimilated into the new, we must understand that 
more pastoral background as being precisely what lent Varèse's later encounters with modernity 
their particular intensity. In Fredric Jameson's words, “the familiarity of [...] the pre-modern, or 
underdevelopment, confers on the violence of the new its capacity for arousing fear or 
excitement.”63 Thus, for Benjamin as for Jameson, the unchanging clouds in the countryside sky 
become what enables an experience of comparative violence and even bodily vulnerability, to 
say nothing of shock itself: “Beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and 
explosions,” continues Benjamin, “was the tiny, fragile human body.”64  
        Benjamin's “field of force of destructive torrents” was in every way Varèse's modernity. As 
much a “world of rasping, blasting, threatening machinery” as it was the battlegrounds of World 
War I, it was typified by an experience of rupture, of new powers and productive forces 
exploding onto the scene. The siren, then, as what both breached and signified a breaching, as 
what both erupted into private domestic space and signaled that the borders of bodies had been 
(ambulence, police siren) or soon would be (air raid siren) violated, was perhaps the symbol of 
that invasive modernity par excellence. As such, Varèse, at that primal scene of Hyperprism's 
inception, comes to be seen less as a romantic subject, actively assimilating the disenchanted 
modern world into art, and more Benjamin's tiny, fragile human body upon whom the siren 
inscribes its non-experiencable message.  
What is at issue here is, in a sense, a kind of subjection. Rosenfeld seems to have sensed 
something of this vulnerability when he mused that "if the auditory sensations of modern life 
have developed the musical medium under [Varèse's] hands, it is merely because they have 
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sought him out.”65 But all the while, Rosenfeld’s comment once again seems to have more to do 
with a lingering pseudo-romanticism than with a discourse capable of accounting for the often 
shock-like character of these encounters. In this instance, it is the psychoanalysis of Jung that 
Rosenfeld seems to channel—Jung who once said of artistic ideas that “we do not create them; 
they create us.”66 But hardly referring to a process of violent interpolation or invasiveness, Jung 
was instead referring to the means by which archetypes shared by the collective unconscious 
involuntarily enter into the work of the artist, materialized there to allow the collective populace 
a way of participating in something larger than themselves—a distinctly Rosenfeldian idea.67 In 
proper Hegelian fashion, Jung's artist “uplifts the idea he is trying to express above the 
occasional and the transitory into the sphere of the ever-existing, [exalting] personal destiny into 
the destiny of mankind to find rescue from every hazard and to outlive the longest night.” 
Rosenfeld most certainly knew Jung’s work, and this “suprapersonal” view of art, 
resounding with idealism, could not be closer to Rosenfeld's understanding of art as a kind of 
vessel through which the public taps into the collectivized “stream of things.” But like the trope 
of romantic inspiration, its unacknowledged kindred spirit, it could not be further from the 
unassimilable blows experienced by the tiny, fragile human body. Sirens, after all, do not outlive 
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the longest night; they often times perpetuate it. And so divested of its invasive otherness and 
materiality, filled with the “strangely humanized and fraternal” archetypes of the collective mind, 
the romantic unconscious, to repeat yet again, proves insufficient for understanding the 
experiences that concern us here.  
 
The Freudian unconscious was a different matter. Parallel to the revolutions that marked 
the first decade of the twentieth century and anticipating the traumas of the first World War, 
Freudian psychoanalysis redefined the subject as a site of inscription, impotent in many ways to 
defend against the sensory onslaught of modernity. Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle was 
first published in 1920, two years after the end of the war and three years before the premiere of 
Varèse's Hyperprism. Rife with accounts of barriers “breached,”68 of “quantity[s] of excitation 
[that cannot] be bound,”69 and “traumatic forces [...] powerful enough to break through the 
protective shield [of consciousness],”70 Freud's work describes a subject vulnerable through and 
through, constantly bombarded with sensations against which it could not always properly 
defend itself. The site that recorded these unassimilable shocks was the unconscious, conceived 
by Freud not as a seat of collectivizing archetypes but as a vast archive of encounters registered 
but not properly experienced, permanently etched into the underbelly of being.
71
  
Though the romantics could speak of a similar notion of the unconscious as a kind of 
registry of experiences anterior to the waking mind, it is in Freud that this region comes to be 
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seen as largely constitutive of consciousness itself. That is, with Freud, the subject comes to be 
identified not by its autonomy and powers of synthesis but as a ledger of violent inscriptions and 
unassimilable experiences from which consciousness rises as a mere effect.
72
 Even memory, the 
very essence of the psyche, comes to be seen by Freud not as a repository of ineffable, 
disembodied images, but as something entirely physical, the product of violent breaches 
(Bahnung) made by the stimulation of “non-permeable neurons” which had “a capacity for being 
permanently altered.”73 In his “A Note Upon the ‘Mystic Writing-Pad’,” published thirty years 
after the infamous Project for a Scientific Psychology, these non-permeable neurons are 
reconcieved as a type of writing surface with “unlimited receptive capacity,” indiscriminately 
recording “permanent memory traces” etched by the “pointed stylus” of the outside world.74   
        In a word, the subject and its unconscious had become disenchanted, transformed from an 
autonomous soul into an inscribable body—a site of indiscriminately received sense impressions 
understood primarily through materialist notions of force and energy and only secondarily 
through those of subjectivity and meaning.
75
 What we have in the Freudian unconscious and its  
“quantities of excitation [that cannot] be bound,” then, is a model much more conducive to the 
vulnerable body of post-war experience, and to the sirens under discussion here. 
 
                                                 
72  “According to an advanced mechanistic theory, consciousness is a mere appendage to physiologico-psychical 
processes and its omission would make no alteration in the psychical passage [of events]. According to another 
theory, consciousness is the subjective side of all psychical events and is thus inseparable from the physiological 
mental process. The theory developed here lies between these two. Here consciousness is the subjective side of one 
part of the physical processes in the nervous system, namely of the ω processes; and the omission of consciousness 
does not leave psychical events unaltered but involves the omission of the contribution from ω.” Sigmund Freud, 
“Project for a Scientific Psychology,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Volume I (1950): 311. 
73
 Freud, quoted in Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass 
(University of Chicago Press, 1978): 200. 
74
 Freud, Sigmund. “A Note Upon a ‘Mystic Writing-Pad'“ in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX (1923—1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works: 226-231. 
75
 Freud often used the phrase “psychic apparatus.” See Friedrich Kittler, Grammaphone, Film, Typewriter, trans. 
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford University Press, 1999): 89. 
39 
 
I want to be clear that I am not interested in making some sort of empirical, historico-
physiological claim on the Varèseian unconscious as such. What interests me, rather, is the 
particular discourse that unites the siren and the unconscious, a discourse not only shared in 
many ways by Varèse’s music but one that, as we will later see, allows that music to be possible 
at all. What we must see is that the siren wasn’t just any stylus etching itself into the subject from 
the outside world. Rather, in its continuous, parabolic makeup, the siren represented in form the 
very place that its inassimilable, piercing quality destined it to be inscribed. That is, as a 
continuum of indistinct pitches, yet to be parsed into the differentiated symbolic, the siren was an 
ideal representation of the indiscriminately recorded archive of information that arose as an 
effect of the linguistically structured Freudian unconscious itself.
76
 In the following section, we 
will see how this discourse of the continuum and of the real, of boundaries breached and 
messages inscribed, registers in the music of Varèse.  
 
A Discourse of the Real  
 
 
If Freud’s notion of “quantities of excitation [that cannot] be bound” gave form to a 
certain inassimilable experience of modernity, then it was also indicative of a larger and 
emergent discourse of the real which, around the turn of the century, erupted into the collective 
creative and scientific imaginations alike. We can understand this in part by way of what 
Friedrich Kittler has called the discourse of 1900, an historico-cultural disenchantment of 
language (and here, I believe we can include musical languages as well) brought on largely by 
innovations in media technology and the electronic storage of information. For Kittler, the arrival 
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of devices such as the gramophone define a moment at which, for the first time in history, 
writing loses its status as the sole means through which sense data could be serially recorded.
77
 
Prior to the decades surrounding 1900, writing and soul had yet to, as he puts it, fall apart.
78
 The 
former could still be said to conjure the imaginary fullness of bodily presence, like a transparent, 
window opening directly onto the mellifluous regions of the authorial soul. After the emergence 
of the gramophone, however, which could record not only the transparent symbolic language of 
the expressive subject but its material underbelly as well—the scratches, hisses, and pops that 
that language, in the interest of its legibility, attempted to repress—the unity of writing and 
speech was effectively dissolved. Writing was “no longer the handwritten, continuous transition 
from nature to culture” but something wholly material, a “countable, spatialized supply” which 
could now be studied as something anterior and indifferent to the waking mind.
79
  
Evacuated of the imaginary, drained of its primary status as a vehicle for conveying an 
ersatz subjectivity, writing was now just as implicated in what that subjectivity concealed from 
view: a material real whose peculiar allure now existed in curious competition with writing’s 
more traditional symbolic function.
80
 The Freudian unconscious, the gramophone, the siren—all 
of these things were nothing if not implicated in this allure of the symbolic’s beyond. Just as the 
unconscious seemed a kindred spirit of the gramophone as an indiscriminate archive of slips and 
stutters that belied the intentions of transparent speech, so too was the siren its own record of a 
sonic real that resisted circumscription into the articulate symbolic, seeming to embrace the 
whole of sound even as it did so at the expense of music proper.
81
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As it turns out, musical technologies were no less implicated in this irruption of the real 
into the collective imagination. Before the emergence of the discourse of 1900, we might say 
that, in a manner similar to the relationship between writing and the authorial soul, music 
provided a transparent embodiment of the temporal life of the spirit. Around the turn of the 
century, however, it is as though the vehicle of that spirit—the tempered scale as absorbed into 
tonality—becomes strangely opaque, transformed from serving as the soul’s ineffable adjunct 
into an arbitrary, axiomatic construct seen to conceal as much as it revealed. We find evidence of 
this transformation in Ferruccio Busoni’s highly influential treatise Entwurf fur einer neuen 
Musik, published in 1911, in which the composer writes: 
What we call our tonal system is nothing more than a set of “signs”; an ingenious device 
to grasp somewhat of that eternal harmony; a meager pocket-edition of that encyclopedic 
work; artificial light instead of the sun.
82
 
 
No longer the given, sacred center of all musical expression, the tonal system is 
here, as it was in the writings of Schoenberg and so many others, reduced to little more 
than a collection of brute signifiers shorn of their signifieds, unmasked as mere things 
among other things (Kittler’s “countable, spatialized supply”) and, as such, deprived of 
their former metaphysical power. In contrast to this embodied musical finitude stood the 
truer object of music—the infinite—against which the paltry twelve notes of the scale 
could only pale in comparison. Busoni continues: 
We have divided the octave into twelve equidistant degrees, because we had to manage 
somehow, and have constructed our instruments in such a way that we can never get in 
above or below or between them. Keyboard instruments, in particular, have so thoroughly 
schooled our ears that we are no longer capable of hearing anything else—incapable of 
hearing except through this impure medium. Yet Nature created an infinite gradation—
infinite! Who still knows it nowadays?
83
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As the makeshift stand-ins (“we had to manage somehow”) for a much truer essence of 
music, the atomized notes of the scale had been reduced to crude objects that did little more than 
obliquely hint at the infinity of nature. The signifier had been revealed for what it truly was: a 
mere object among objects, standing in for a lack. That Busoni could discuss the notes of the 
scale in such a manner—as mere quantities or things significant solely in their number-ness and 
not as the components of an indivisible metaphysical given—speaks  to a process of musical 
disenchantment not unlike the aforementioned one of writing.
84
 As itself a type of serial data 
storage, the scale had become irreparably impaired in its ability to conjure the infinite, rendered 
no less strangely material than a body-become-skeleton, devoid of blood between its bones. 
What captured the musical imagination instead was now the interstitial and in-between, a sonic 
beyond that flourished in “infinite gradations” beneath the reach of signifiers making up the 
tempered scale.  
If anyone was a torchbearer of these ideas, it was Varèse, for whom Busoni was nothing 
less than a musical prophet. Varèse had already read and absorbed the composer’s Enwurf—a 
self-declared milestone in his musical development—by the time the two first met in 1907, and it 
was from then on that the two men nurtured an intimate friendship that would last until Busoni’s 
death.
 85
 In the Sketch, Varèse had found a prophetic confirmation of his own beliefs, a true 
kindred spirit whose frustrations with the arbitrary limitations of musical materials matched his 
own. This is evident, among other places, in the extensive annotations Varèse made in his 
personal copy of Busoni’s book, which included brackets made around the very passage cited 
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above in which Busoni speaks disparagingly of the limits imposed on hearing by keyboard 
instruments.
86
 
Like his mentor, then, Varèse’s writings betray a certain perturbed sensitivity to the note-
as-thing and to the scale as an impoverished construct woefully inadequate to capturing the vital 
experience of modern life. In his first public statement made upon arriving in New York, Varèse 
complained that “our musical alphabet is poor and illogical. Music, which should pulsate with 
life, needs new means of expression, and science alone can infuse it with youthful vigor.”87 
Hardly any longer the transparent window into a metaphysical beyond that it was for the 
romantics, the scale now seemed to be little more than an “alphabet,” a mere “set of signs,” to 
recall Busoni, notable as much for asserting what those signs weren’t than for conjuring what 
they so badly wanted to be.    
Varèse seemed to have found another kindred spirit in the poet Stephane Mallarmé, 
whose writings betray a comparable frustration with the materiality and opacity of the artistic 
sign. In his essay “The Book: A Spiritual Instrument,” those signs are, in a manner comparable 
to the notes of the tempered scale, the discrete letters of the alphabet: “words [lead] back to their 
origin, which is the twenty-six letters of the alphabet […] The Book, which is a total expansion 
of the letter, must find its mobility in the letter.”88 It was a sentiment expressed once again in the 
poet’s poem “The Blue,” in which a poet dreams of blocking out the sky so that its ideal infinity 
might no longer mock the comparative material crudity of the poet’s verse.89 Along with 
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Goethe’s poem “Kennst du das Land?,” whose subject is itself the yearning for a distant ideal, 
Varèse referenced the poem in a letter to his friend Carlos Salzedo in which he spoke of the 
tragedy of man’s “inability to escape himself.”90 We cannot help but envision Varèse as a 
similarly mocked poet who, confronted with the limitations of his all-too-material medium, 
dreamt of transcending their limitations to reach some sort of musical beyond. 
 Among Busoni, Mallarmé, and Varèse, then, we find a common acknowledgement that 
the materials of art had lost something crucial. No longer capable of conjuring that hallucinatory 
fullness so redolent of art in other eras, the scale and sentence alike had been drained of the 
imaginary, leaving behind little more than the Symbolic as Symbolic, that is, opaque signs that 
signified nothing but themselves. 
We can easily see how the siren, with its graceful parabolic curves so seemingly 
disdainful of “alphabetization,” could have appeared as an answer to this disenchanted 
atomization. A ready-made sonic epitome of the “infinite gradation,” the siren was one of 
Varèse’s many solutions to Busoni’s challenge. In a lecture at Yale University in 1962, Varèse 
explained his interest in the siren: 
I have always felt the need of a kind of continuous flowing curve that instruments could 
not give me. That is why I used sirens in several of my works. Today such effects are 
easily obtainable by electronic means. In this connection, it is curious to note that it is this 
lack of flow that seems to disturb Eastern musicians in our Western music. To their ears, 
it does not glide, sounds jerky, composed of edges of intervals and holes and, as an Indian 
pupil of mine expressed it, "jumping like a bird from branch to branch [emphasis 
mine]."
91
  
 
Like a plot of cracked, sun-baked earth, starved for water, the scale was here little more 
than a petrified thing deprived of any life-sustaining connectivity between its parts. The spans 
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separating its notes were no longer the move from one soul state to the next but a leap over an 
abyss into which all dreams of infinity would undoubtedly fall. The siren, by contrast, bound 
together the skeletal notes of the scale with an infinity born of the real, a real that circumscribed 
the entire world, omitting nothing.
92
 
 
 “From now on, the symbolic encompasses linguistic signs in their materiality and 
technicity,” Kittler writes of the discourse of 1900, “letters and ciphers” that “form a finite set 
without taking into account philosophical dreams of infinity.”93 The “letters and ciphers” of the 
tempered scale had been downgraded to mere things among other things, disenchanted objects 
that could no longer conjure a sense of a greater meaning, transcending the sum of their parts in 
which the listener could recognize something of their greater spiritual selves. In a way, we could 
say that the siren, with its smooth parabolas embodying precisely what it was that the symbolic 
now lacked, embodied an attempt to revive these “philosophical dreams of infinity” by 
transposing them to its alternative realm of the real.  But when dreams of the infinite are 
transposed to a place that is wholly anterior to the soul—an anterior whose infinity is less one of 
spiritual recognition and more of what is precisely beyond that recognition, of data yet to be 
parsed into the filtered meaningfulness of the symbolic—can this infinity still be considered in 
the same light?  Are we not dealing with a difference in kind?  
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We have seen how Busoni and Mallarmé were both so sensitively attuned to the 
disenchantment of their respective mediums. The scale for Busoni substituted for nature’s 
infinity a mere “pocket edition” of the real thing, while the infinity of the sky for Mallarmé 
mocked the profane nature of his earthly creations. But despite both men’s acknowledgement of 
the compromised ability of their mediums to realize their respective dreams of infinity, I would 
argue that they pined for those utopias nonetheless, utopias whose infinity was less a Varèsian 
infinity, enamored with the real, and more an older, subject-centered infinity based in symbolic 
recognition. In other words, Busoni and Mallarmé’s rhetoric of infinity remained within the 
discourse of 19th-century idealism in which art, as a kind of pseudo-philosophy, came to embody 
the subject at its near apogee: as pure, immaterial interiority. Here, the soul reigned fully over 
body, the infinity of human thought over the finitude of matter, and art, like writing before the 
gramophone, came to serve as a direct window onto what was most quintessentially human.  For 
Symbolists such as Mallarmé, it was exactly this cherished interiority that the encroachment of 
the new discourse—exemplified in his case by materialism and positivism—threatened to 
eradicate. We need only recall Mallarmé’s impotent poet, disdainful of and yet on the way to 
becoming reconciled with crude matter, to grasp the extent of this discursive ambivalence.   
Compellingly, much of Busoni’s writings, too, find recourse in this older, more explicitly 
subject-centered aesthetic, as evidenced by his rather romantic description of art as “nature 
mirrored and reflected in the human breast.” Art, in other words, embodied nature not as it 
existed in itself, but as it existed precisely for the subject, as Hegel might say, a subject who at its 
essence was a pure interiority no longer contingent upon the finitude of matter.
94
 Thus, Busoni 
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could write of music that it was the “most complete of all reflexes of Nature by reason of its 
untrammeled immateriality,”95 something that, like the inner life of the soul,  
floats on air! It touches not the earth with its feet. It knows no law of gravitation. It is 
wellnigh incorporeal. Its material is transparent. It is sonorous air. It is almost Nature 
herself. It is—free.96 
 
Resistant to the discourse of materialism, which seemed to rob music of all that made it 
uniquely incorporeal and thus concordant with the human soul, Busoni maintained that 
music’s essence was in its immateriality, one in whose reflection the listener could 
ultimately be reminded of their own ideal content.   
In his essay “The Essence of Music,” Busoni had written that “the musical gods are 
dead,” a phrase we could take to indicate the composer’s awareness of a kind of Nietzschean 
shift in discourse away from an older metaphysics of the subject and onto something more like 
that aforementioned discourse of 1900.
97
 But even if the musical gods had died, even if the 
normative musical subject congealed within the tempered scale had lost its metaphysical power, 
the philosophical subject with which that scale had traditionally been associated—the subject for 
whom nature existed and in which that subject could recognize itself—seemed to persist for 
Busoni regardless. Caught between two discourses, then, Busoni could fearlessly advocate 
radical musical innovations in musical material while still desiring musical affects intimately 
connected to the very techniques those innovations would displace.
98
    
But the same cannot be said about Varèse. For a composer of Einstein’s generation, one 
for whom there was “more musical fertility in the contemplation of the stars [...] and the high 
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poetry of certain mathematical expositions than in the most sublime gossip of human passions,” 
infinity could be sought elsewhere than in any cherished immaterial interiority or in nature as 
reflected in the human breast.
99
 That is, now that metaphysics’ former unity with musical 
technologies such as the tempered scale had dissolved, dreams of infinity were free to 
reconstitute themselves elsewhere, in spaces anterior to metaphysics, in the interstices of 
meaning hostile to more traditional forms of humanism.
100
 
The discourse of 1900, best represented by the unfiltered streams of data etched 
indiscriminately by the needle of the gramophone, was this place. It was rooted, after all, in a 
fascination not with the ineffable reaches of human subjectivity but with what that subjectivity 
kept at bay in order to exist as such. It was an embrace of the non-sense beyond sense, and 
similarly, of the materiality of the languages—artistic and otherwise—subjectivity displaced in 
order to conjure itself into existence. In a fundamental way, then, the discourse of 1900 leaned 
heavily on the ideas of scientific materialism, whose goal had long been to replace metaphysical 
explanations of life and human subjectivity with those rooted in the universal laws of the 
physical world.
101
  
We find both a source for and symbol of this alternate infinity and materialism in the 
work of  Helmholtz, whose previously mentioned On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological 
Basis for the Theory of Music was both a chief inspiration for Varèse and the source of the 
composer’s infatuation with—what else?—the siren. On the first page of that work, Helmholtz 
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announced his project as an attempt to “connect the boundaries of […] physical and 
physiological acoustics on the one side, and of musical science and esthetics on the other,” a task 
inspired by the fact that “the horizons of physics, philosophy, and art” had “of late been too 
widely separated.”102 It is interesting to note that the early Freud, whose materialist notion of 
consciousness was itself in many ways the result of an infatuation with Helmholtz, described his 
own project in similar terms, stating his desire to “furnish a psychology that [would] be a natural 
science,” representing “psychical processes as quantitively determinate states of specifiable 
material particles.”103 In short, what sound was for Helmholtz, the soul was for Freud. The 
metaphysical and vitalist residues associated with both were to be downplayed in favor of an 
understanding that viewed sound and soul as entities subservient to the laws governing the 
physical world.  Whereas sound had previously been seen as merely a means for the conveyance 
of that ineffable soul, it could now be studied and appreciated as an entity itself, and one whose 
coextensive relationship with the material soul-become-body was now of only of secondary 
importance.  
To be sure, we must be careful to not take this narrative of disenchantment too far, and 
we would be grossly mistaken to read Helmholtz’s On the Sensation of Tone as a work that was 
without its own metaphysical substrate. It was only later in his life that Helmholtz became what 
we might call a positivist, and even then—and unlike fellow scientists Fechner and Mach—he 
never saw the natural world as a mere sum of appearances, purged of all metaphysical mystery. 
In the years surrounding On the Sensation of Tone, Helmholtz’s views were as neo-Kantian as 
they were anything. He viewed the concept of force, for example, much as Kant viewed his a 
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priori concepts: as an ungraspable metaphysical reality that was at once the very fundament of 
scientific experience as a whole.
104
 What is important here is not so much the purging of 
metaphysics altogether from his and other texts of the time as the subordination of metaphysics 
to a more rigorously scientific and inevitably materialist way of studying sound’s existence in the 
world. It is in the face of this change in focus, then, that we can see how little room there could 
be for something so elusive as Busoni’s “wellnigh incorporeal […] sonorous air,” which touched 
“not the Earth with its feet.” For Helmholtz and Varèse, music most certainly touched the earth 
with its feet, and it did so not as something mellifluous and ineffable but as the “rapid periodic 
motion of the sonorous body” conducted through “particles of air.”105 As sonorous air-become-
body, sound had been rendered opaque by Helmholtz, transformed from an immaterial analog of 
the human soul into a physical thing to be studied in its own right. In the words of John Picker, 
the work of Helmholtz and others had initiated a “demythologization of hearing,” transforming 
what had previously been conceived as a “sublime experience [of sound] into a quantifiable […] 
object or thing.”106  
As we will see in more detail in chapter three, Varèse shared Helmholtz’s highly 
materialistic notion of sound, frequently referring to, among other things, sound’s crucial 
physical relationship to the ears of the listener.
107
 But what is more important here is once again 
the  particular discourse in which that physicality could become meaningful. As the example of 
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someone such as Hanslick shows, a materialist conception of sound did not necessarily rule out 
an idealist or romantic conception of music—that is, a notion of music still implicated in an ideal 
content whose meaning came from its resonance with the immaterial human soul.
108
 But within 
the discourse of 1900, for which the musical symbolic, drained of the Imaginary, was much less 
compelling than the material real it was now seen to conceal, sound could now take on a life of 
its own. No longer merely the transparent means through which the resonant infinity of the 
human breast could hit its mark, sound—corporeal sound—now had an infinity of its own, and 
one as indifferent to the subject as had been those indifferent grooves of the gramophone.   
What this meant for a composer whose motto was the “liberation of sound” and who was 
more interested in the “high poetry of certain mathematical expositions than in the most sublime 
gossip of the human passions” was this: the discourse of 1900—a  discourse of the real—allowed 
for nothing if not the liberation of music from the subject. As Kittler has written, 
Cultural technologies could be attributed to Man only as long as they were marked off 
along the abscissa of biological time, whereas the time of the apparatus liquidates Man. 
Given the apparatus, Man in his unity decomposes, on the one hand, into illusions 
dangled in front of him by conscious abilities and faculties and, on the other hand, into 
unconscious automatisms.
109
 
      
With its new means of storing and recording serial streams of data, what the discourse of 
1900 allowed, and what the gramophone so well exemplifies, is the ability to record sounds and 
data in a manner indifferent to biological time. It is without question the notion of frequency, a 
way of specifying pitch based on measurements that only a machine could accurately determine, 
with which Varèse stepped decisively over this divide.
110
 We can understand how by first 
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looking to Busoni’s contrasting concept of the interval as discussed in his Sketch for a New 
Aesthetic of Music. Towards the end of that work, Busoni himself referred to frequencies 
(“mathematically exact number of vibrations”) in connection to Thaddeus Cahill’s Dynaphone, 
an instrument which had only recently been invented and which he conjectured would one day 
be able to deliver that  sought-after “infinite gradation” of the octave discussed above. But rather 
than immediately embrace the Dynaphone and its peculiar infinity, Busoni cautioned that the 
“infinite gradation” of the octave could come only after listeners’ ears had been properly 
acclimated to the new sounds. What Busoni proposed instead was a series of scales, each with 
progressively greater divisions of the semi-tone, as a means of gradually creeping closer to the 
“infinite gradation” that was inevitably to come.111   
And so even as Busoni’s new scales were intended to displace the traditional intervals 
that he had elsewhere dismissed as tired and arbitrary, he nonetheless expressed concern that to 
abandon these intervals too quickly would be a mistake. “Were we to adopt [third-tones] without 
further preparation [of the ear],” Busoni writes, “we should have to give up the semi-tones and 
lose our ‘minor third’ and ‘perfect fifth;’ and this loss would be felt more keenly than the relative 
gain of a system of eighteen one-third tones.” When we read this passage in the light of Busoni’s 
desire for music to serve as “nature as reflected in the human breast,” we cannot help but 
interpret this loss as a loss of the soul’s ability to comprehend and thus recognize itself in the 
structures of the scale, the scale as ratio. Though they professed to “draw a little closer to 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the harmonies is actually degraded by referring their origin to something purely quantitative.” See Hegel, Hegel’s 
Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 924. There 
is something of this in the following passage from Hanslick as well: “Must not the babbling of the brook, the slap of 
waves on the shore, the thunder of avalanches, the raging of the gale have been the incentive to and prototype of 
human music? Have all the murmuring, squaling, crashing noises had nothing to do with the character of our music? 
We must in fact reply in the negative. All these natural manifestations are nothing but noise, i.e., air vibrations of 
incommensurable frequencies [all emphasis mine]” See Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, trans. Geoffrey 
Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1986): 71.  
111
 See Busoni, Sketch for a New Aesthetic of Music, 92—95.  
53 
 
infinitude,” as Busoni wrote, his scales were ultimately still built upon fractions, upon notes 
related not by their positions on a continuum of the musical real (i.e. as frequencies) but as 
embodiments of human logic— “musical speech” as Busoni aptly called it.112 Busoni’s scales, in 
other words, occupied a position on the near side of Kittler’s “abscissa of biological time.” New 
notes of the scale—third tones or otherwise—would  be derived progressively, and yet all the 
while, the cherished minor third and perfect fifth could indirectly remain to exert their familiar, if 
now-obfuscated, pull. 
It is interesting that in much of his early instrumental music, Varèse, too, betrayed 
something of this desire to “draw a little closer to infinitude” by gradually filling in the gaps of 
the scale. Because his dreamt-of instruments had yet to be invented, instruments whose content 
seemed to point to the far side of biological time, Varèse had only his all-too-human musical 
alphabet with which to work, destined, as was Busoni’s, to approach the musical real only 
asymptotically. We find throughout Varèse’s music moments that betray an almost obsessive 
desire to saturate the pitch and interval fields and to delineate overlapping continuums of musical 
space, and I wonder if we can’t understand both of these tendencies as having something to do 
with this desire to close in on the musical real by way of an ill-equipped musical technology. It is 
tempting, of course, to try to read this through the guise of a pseudo-twelve tone technique, as 
some have already done.
113
 But such an interpretation becomes much more tenuous when we 
realize, among other things, the spatial dimension upon which Varèse’s pitch and interval 
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saturation plays out.
114
 Looking at mm.26—7 of Arcana, we see that not only are the pitches 
used entirely distinct from one another, ultimately accounting for all twelve notes of the 
chromatic scale, but that the intervals delineated by their rises and descents are all different as 
well. Each of the twelve tones has been selected based on its ability to articulate an interval not 
yet used within the section.
115
  With their E-flat-A-G-sharp-B motive, trombone 1 and 2 
delineate a semi-tone content of 6-1-3, while trombone 3 and 4 outline a semi-tone content of 10-
13-5-14 with their E-F-sharp-G-C-B-flat motive. Not long after, the B-flat-E-flat of the 
contrabass tuba spans 7 semi-tones, the regular tuba an 8, horns 1, 3, 5, and 7 a span of 9, and on 
an on—all together articulating the semi-tone spans 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14 in the space 
of only a measure: 
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Example 1.1: Diverse interval spans and pitch/space saturation in Arcana, m.26-7. Numbers 
indicate the number of semitones between pitches. 
 
What the whole of this procedure seems to indicate is an almost obsessive desire to 
progressively fill in gaps and plug holes, and to do so while amassing a diverse range of intervals 
that themselves work to overlap relentlessly, as though no two edges could be the same for fear 
of letting the slightest bit of light through.  
We can also see a similar procedure of saturation enacted on a larger formal scale in 
Arcana. In Example 1.2, three of the work’s opening sections fit together like complementary 
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blocks which effectively fill in the gaps left by preceding sections while maximizing pitch 
diversity:  
 
Example 1.2: Block-like complementarity of sections in Arcana. Pitches in red indicate repeated 
pitches across sections, while dashed lines are used simply to clarify the sections’ complementary 
structure. 
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But there is a better reason why the twelve tone technique is a poor way to explain these 
obsessive moments of pitch saturation. In its pretense towards fulfillment and completion, the 
twelve tone technique ignores what I see as a crucial allegorical dimension of Varèse’s early 
works that lives in a dialectical relationship between the limit of what was musically possible 
and what was thought to lie just on the other side of it, between the infinity of the human breast 
and the infinity of matter. In other words, faithful to the relationship between the symbolic and 
the real, the impoverished, disenchanted structures of the scale cannot be understood apart from a 
desire to move beyond them, particularly at such an historical point of discursive transition, 
when the musical technologies available lagged behind the discourse in which they attempted to 
participate.
 
What we find in early works such as Arcana, which feature the siren alongside more 
traditional 19th century orchestral instrumentation, is perhaps something of a compromise, then, 
as though the siren’s sinuous curves were deployed to supplement or smooth over what Dane 
Rudhyar described as the “edges of intervals and holes” caused by the musical symbolic’s 
differential structure.  
What we have in the notion of frequency, then, was way of talking about pitch that better 
matched the discourse from which those pitches could emerge as being meaningful. But not 
meaningful in the sense that traditional music derived from the tempered scale was meaningful. 
As determinations of pitch based not on proportions and ratios between pitches but on cycles per 
second determining singular pitches themselves, frequencies in many ways symbolized an 
indifference to the subject, invisible vibrations that, unlike the visible nature of proportions, had 
little to do with either the realities of human hearing or the rhetorical structures of music itself. 
Frequencies, then, such as Varèse specified in his sketches for Déserts and other works (see 
Example 1.3), were the ultimate embodiment of sound as it existed not for the subject but for 
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itself, having little to do with any sort of nature as reflected in the human breast. With 
frequencies, “the measure of length [as the determinant of ratio] is replaced by time as an 
independent variable,” Kittler writes. “It is a physical time removed from the meters and rhythms 
of music. It quantifies movements that are too fast for the human eye, ranging from 20 to 16,000 
vibrations per second. The real replaces the symbolic.”116 
 
Example 1.3: Detail of one of Varèse’s sketches for Déserts specifying pitch by frequency. Image 
courtesy of Paul Sacher Stiftung. 
 
                                                 
116
 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 24.  
59 
 
If frequencies quantified movements too fast for the human eye, then they also stood for a 
way of thinking about pitch that was largely indifferent to human hearing. Varèse, the self-
professed “worker in rhythms, frequencies, and intensities,” could boast of having obtained 
through the Theremin “sounds as high as eleven thousand five hundred cycles per second,” 
which translated into a pitch roughly an octave and a half above the highest note on the piano, 
fast approaching the limit of what could be picked up by the human ear.
117
 A 1933 letter from 
Varèse to the Guggenheim Foundation echoed this interest in extreme frequencies, describing 
yet-to-be-performed experiments on the Dynaphone which would attempt to “increase the range 
of the instrument so as to obtain high frequencies which no other instrument can give.”118   
In sum, if Busoni’s scales remained contingent upon an infinity that still had romantic 
baggage to shed, then Varèse’s frequencies, sanctioned by Kittler’s “time of the apparatus,” 
embodied the very different infinity of matter itself. That the two were radically 
incommensurable is nowhere more evident than on the path, itself infinite, along which one 
might have attempted to travel from one to the other.  To try and “draw a little closer to 
infinitude” by way of Busoni’s progressively exponential division of the scale was to travel 
along an asymptote upon which no intersection with frequency would ever occur. And this is 
because the difference between the two, between ratio and frequency, was not one of degree but 
of kind. Regardless of how near to infinity Busoni’s pitches might have come, there would 
inevitably remain another infinity sprawled out between the notes of those finite sets.  Busoni 
was a composer committed to the “three-mirror Tube of Taste, Emotion, and Intention,”119 
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Varèse was a “worker in rhythms, frequencies, and intensities,” and ne’er would the twain 
meet.
120
   
And nor would they meet in their visual representation on paper. It stands to reason that if 
the intransigent real of Varèse’s frequencies represented a difference in kind from the ratios 
embodied by Busoni’s scales, then that difference would have to be reflected in their respective 
notations. As a necessary component of such a music, Varèse remarked that  
the time will come when the composer, after he has graphically realized his score, will 
see this score automatically put on a machine that will faithfully transmit the musical 
content to the listener. As frequencies and new rhythms will have to be indicated on the 
score, our actual notation will be inadequate. The new notation will probably be 
seismographic. And here it is curious to note that at the beginning of two eras, the 
Mediaeval primitive and our own primitive era (for we are at a new primitive stage in 
music today), we are faced with an identical problem: the problem of finding graphic 
symbols for the transposition of the composer's thought into sound. At a distance of more 
than a thousand years we have this analogy: our still primitive electrical instruments find 
it necessary to abandon staff notation and to use a kind of seismographic writing much 
like the early ideographic writing originally used for the voice before the development of 
staff notation. Formerly the curves of the musical line indicated the melodic fluctuations 
of the voice; today the machine-instrument requires precise design indications. [emphasis 
mine]
121
 
 
No longer indexing the time of the human body, Varèse’s “machine-instrument” turned 
its back on that body to index the time of an apparatus whose “precise design indications” only a 
machine could determine and control.  Though this was ultimately in the service of giving 
absolute fidelity to the composer’s intentions, we must see those intentions as themselves 
involving a fidelity to a Real in which only oblique traces of that original intention could remain. 
We cannot forget that the music to be notated here was the music of the siren, the same siren 
that, we will recall, left behind seismographic traces of its own in the beyond of Varèse’s 
subconscious.  In this way, Varèse’s metaphor could not have been more perfect: as an apparatus 
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whose content was the real, the seismograph inscribed a continuum of tectonic minutiae far too 
subtle for human detection.  Just like the Varèsian unconscious, poised before the open window 
of the noisy city, it registered shocks that evaded circumscription into the symbolic universe 
even as they left behind their undeniable traces in some anterior realm.
122
 If Varèse’s 
seismographic notation wasn’t exactly a projection of those very unconscious curves etched by 
the siren, then it was at least informed by the type of experience sedimented within them.     
But how to translate those curves back out into music? Only by a “machine that [would] 
faithfully transmit the musical content to the listener,” as Varèse said. What is unique about any 
instrument whose job it is to inscribe the real is, of course, that its inscriptions aren’t so much 
representations of an object but marks “authenticated by the object itself.”123 A needle both 
inscribed vibrations directly onto the plate of the gramophone and, by way of those same sinuous 
paths, translated those vibrations back out into sound.  Similarly, if Varèse’s music was to 
remain faithful to its own notated real, then it would have to be derived from that real directly. 
Varèse’s seismographic notation would have to be read by a machine capable of achieving the 
kind of fidelity to precise frequencies that no human performer could ever hope to achieve.
124
  
That this kind of absolute fidelity was important to Varèse is nowhere better evidenced 
than in his frustration with performers, who represented an irritating level of mediation between 
the listener’s reception of the musical real. Ideally, for Varèse, music would    
reach the listener unadulterated by "interpretation." [The new system of composing] will 
work something like this: after a composer has set down his score on paper by means of a 
new graphic notation, he will then, with the collaboration of a sound engineer, transfer 
the score directly to this electric machine. After that, anyone will be able to press a button 
to release the music exactly as the composer wrote it—exactly like opening a book.125 
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What Varèse meant by “opening a book” is made clear elsewhere, in a conversation with 
the painter Alcopley. It was a matter of being 
in immediate communication with [the] audience. A painter hangs his canvas on a wall—
a finished work. Anyone with eyes can see it. A score is only a blueprint, and cannot be 
said to be finished until it is played. It is at the mercy of performers and risks the 
distortion of their ‘interpretations’. They are, after all, actors (I include conductors) 
before an audience and therefore tempted to show off.
126
 
 
The real loses its status as the real the minute it is interpreted, filtered, and removed by 
performers from the site of its authentication. If Varèse’s music symbolized the type of 
inassimilable experiences of modernity represented by his experience before the siren, then 
human subjectivity could have no more say over its translation back into sound than it did in 
mediating the siren as it forced its way into the composer’s unconscious.  
 
The Real and Modernism 
 
 
Having spent a bit of time now looking at the subtle differences in the rhetoric used by 
Busoni and Varèse, we can now see how, despite being kindred spirits in many ways, the 
discourses that supported those seemingly similar visions actually stemmed from structurally 
incommensurable ways of seeing the world. Cognizant on one level that the musical gods had 
died but still unable to remove the linchpin that kept their metaphysics faintly whirring, Busoni 
was perched on the precipice over which Varèse would take a dive. Only by such a leap could 
one move from a “logic to a physics of sound,” and, consequently, to a discourse in which sound 
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could take on a meaning apart from the soul.
127
 Busoni himself had written in the Sketch that one 
might have to leave the Earth in order to arrive at a music that embodied the full extent of his 
prophesies. We can read Varèse’s music, I think, with its infinity on the far side of biological 
time and poetry based in the stars, as making precisely that decisive journey.    
But as should now be clear, we must see “leaving the Earth” here as symbolizing far 
more than a mere change in the subject matter embodied in Varèse’s music. If that subject matter 
had something to do with the blind and indifferent real, then what remains is to go a step further 
and to consider the social configurations that allowed for the possibility of that real becoming 
meaningful at all. I want to briefly consider how “leaving the Earth” towards a discourse of the 
real was intimately connected with the larger cultural shift towards modernism itself and all of 
the disorienting developments associated therein.   
In regards to modernism, Busoni’s metaphor is a perfect one: on the one hand, it betrays a 
latent technological optimism and sense of futurity that would go on to define so many of 
modernism’s early manifestations; on the other, it implies that an inevitable consequence of such 
developments would be artworks that, adrift from the earth as they were, would be radically 
alienated from their own creators, remote from the very spirits that brought them into being. I 
would argue that there is something of this contradiction subtly implied by the two most 
prevalent catchphrases used to describe Varèse himself: Varèse as the “liberator of percussion” 
and Varèse as the master of “organized sound.” The contradiction begs the question: exactly 
what type of freedom is achieved by this type of control? A liberation from what or whom? 
For Adorno, the root of this dialectic was in the logic of capitalism. In its relentless, 
technological pursuit of the new, the modernist work betrayed its complicity with capitalism’s 
injunction to innovate at all costs, costs which, in the form of the work’s alienating character, 
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revealed themselves to be the complete sacrifice of usefulness or “use value”—the work’s ability 
to affirm and consolidate a peoples’ image of itself128—to the blind perpetuation of exchange.129 
The liberation of music from the earth was precisely music’s dark parody of this autonomy, an 
experience of the commodity’s solipsistic indifference to the needs of the subject.   
But we can also speak of this solipsistic nature of the modernist work—this  moment in 
which art goes from addressing a public to addressing only itself—as a symptom of a more 
general crisis in that public itself. Busoni had wanted an art that explicitly affirmed the public, 
representing nature reflected in the human breast. Varèse cared less “about reaching the public” 
than he did about reaching “certain musical-acoustical phenomena.” In the span between the two, 
we can locate a moment of transition, so invaluable to understanding the conflicted nature of 
modernism, during which the homogenous public that art could once take for granted as its 
audience began to gradually disappear.
130
 If that older public was constituted largely by the 
cultural remnants of the aristocracy and its narrow, seemingly eternal values and aesthetic codes, 
then its successor was an industrial capitalist bourgeoisie whose “everlasting uncertainty and 
agitation” 131 meant nothing but instability for the ontological security inherent in the former’s 
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supposedly timeless codes of meaning.
132
 We need only remember the chronology of Varèse 
himself, born and raised in what we might call the circular time of the French countryside and 
only later acclimated to the linear time of the industrial city, to see how real this experience 
could be even on the level of the individual.  
 The consequences had for musical forms were in no way slight. Previously, that stable, 
pseudo-aristocratic public had its analog in the agreed-upon forms of common practice music, 
forms whose lifeblood was their ability to gratify the public’s image of itself and reaffirm its 
ideology. Busoni’s “three-mirror tube of taste, emotion, and intention” bears at least traces of 
such a vehicle, the means for affirming an unproblematically centered subjectivity with roots as 
much in the 18th and 19th centuries as they were in a Europe on the verge of World War. With 
the gradual displacement of that older order by the industrial bourgeoisie, the social base that had 
sustained those ideologies for centuries was no longer available, absorbed into a dizzying, self-
conscious modernity whose constant destabilization made normative values such as “taste” and 
“intention” seem hopelessly anachronistic.133 As Clement Greenberg put it, western society 
became “less and less able […] to justify the inevitability of its particular forms” and thus to 
sustain the “accepted notions [the ideology] upon which artists and writers [depended] in large 
part for communication with their audiences.”134 We have already considered one example of 
such a seemingly inevitable form in tonality and the tempered scale. If earlier, we spoke of its 
waning moments as resulting from a process of disenchantment caused by the arrival of new 
storage technologies centered around the real, then now we can see how this newfound interest in 
the real was itself partially enabled by the fact that the unspoken obligations art had had to an 
aging public had all but disappeared.   
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But we can also speak of this transition as the weakening of a certain ideological 
relationship to and construction of nature. The difference between that relationship, linked to the 
pretenses of harmony and universality espoused by the ancient regime, and a later, fractured 
conception implicitly evoked by the problems of modernism, is nowhere better captured than by 
Louise Varèse, who referred to her husband as a “‘a poet of nature—not of landscape.’”135 The 
landscape was, as we might expect, Busoni’s nature, one already mediated by and packaged for 
the spirit, pacified and prettified as a mere projection of human morals and aspirations onto the 
non-human. It was an optimistic yet ideological conception enabled in part by the hubristic faith 
in rationality characteristic of the positivist science of the nineteenth century, a science so 
confident in its ability to know nature that, near the close of the nineteenth century, it had 
deemed its project nearly complete. Adorno referred to a similar conception of nature in art using 
Hegel’s phrase “ideological art religion,” the satisfaction in a reconciliation symbolically 
achieved in the artwork, and we can now see how that reconciliation was presumed to exist 
between the public and nature as well.
136
  
By contrast, Varèse, “poet of nature,” shunned the landscape, stepping out instead into a 
nature not already prepackaged for the subject. Louise noted how it was the “terribly impersonal 
aspects” of that nature that “moved him passionately,” aspects that, like the unfiltered data of the 
gramophone, did not already represent a level of mediation by the subject.
137
 If the science of the 
landscape was of the confident, positivist variety, then the science of this impersonal Varèsean 
nature was non-Euclidean geometry, relativity, and quantum mechanics whose Copernican turn 
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represented the limits of rationality and of a nature that, to artists at least, seemed immune to 
circumscription. What is crucial to see is the way the disorienting, destabilizing experience of 
these world-altering paradigm shifts elided so well with the continual innovation, constant 
revisioning, and tradition-destroying drive of capitalist modernity and its respective, newly-
emergent bourgeois public.
138
 Writing of the eve of modernism in his book Webern and the 
Transformation of Nature, Julian Johnson suggests that “perhaps [art’s role of mediating the 
reception of nature] was never more critical than at the time when it became problematic, as the 
contradictions between the modern city and art’s myth of man and nature in harmony became 
insupportable.”139 
 
To “leave the Earth,” then, was to not only turn away from an ancient regime and its 
stable codes of meaning but from the very conception of nature that undoubtedly helped to 
sustain it. We can see how these changes, then, could allow for the radical cultural decentering to 
which musical forms were not at all immune. The discourse of 1900 and its new storage 
technologies symbolized this perfectly in the way it externalized experience onto machines, a 
development which would find echoes in the Freudian unconscious, the disorienting paradigm 
shifts of science we have already discussed, and the limits of rationality in general which would 
become so apparent with the arrival of World War I. Additionally, the real was itself symbolic of 
what the older regime, in the interest of preserving its power and perpetuating classical ideals of 
beauty and order, kept repressed from view. It was the perfect content for a time in which “art,” 
as Adorno writes, “no longer has the task of representing a reality that is preexisting for everyone 
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in common, but rather of revealing, in its isolation, the very cracks that reality would like to 
cover over in order to exist in safety.”140 
 
In concluding, I want to briefly consider an admittedly slippery aspect of this discussion 
that I have yet to address directly, and that is the relationship of this new discourse to meaning. 
As I hope the latter part of this chapter has made clear, the modernist work is anything but free 
from contradictions. And yet it is admittedly still tempting to read Varèse’s impersonal rhetoric, 
filled as it is with sirens, frequencies, and such, as symptoms of a purely linear process of 
disenchantment by which the metaphysics of music gradually gives way to a profane physics of 
sound. As the narrative goes, the soul is displaced by the body, the human breast is displaced by 
the poetry of higher math, and the “worker in rhythms, frequencies, and intensities” is left in his 
laboratory to create sounds indifferent to human hearing. “I don’t care about reaching the 
public,” Varèse wrote, “as much as I care about reaching certain musical-acoustical phenomena. 
In other words, to disturb the atmosphere—because, after all, sound is only an atmospheric 
disturbance!”141 Yet if sound truly were only an atmospheric disturbance and metaphysics truly 
had been fully displaced by the blindness of physics—in other words, if no meaning came from 
what was done with this content—Varèse would have not been Varèse. He would have been a 
scientist—not a composer. He would not have been looking for something in that mere 
atmospheric disturbance and yet so clearly beyond that atmospheric disturbance in the form of 
the artwork, something that made nature, to use Adorno’s phrase, “open its eyes.”142 “On the 
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threshold of beauty, science and art collaborate,” Varèse wrote in a passage that will be 
important in our next chapter, as if sensing that science alone was only part of the picture and 
that it would indeed remain blind unless supplemented by something more. What Adorno meant 
by his phrase, and what I think Varèse also meant by “beauty,” is precisely meaning. Not 
meaning in the guise of the landscape—a meaning forced on nature by human beings—but a 
meaning of things in themselves, of a nature that, even while freed from subjective imposition, 
still speaks to that subject. In its most abstract sense, this is, of course, where art’s dream of 
autonomy converges with that of the commodity. The latter claims to have an inherent value, 
freed from subjective determination, while secretly being a product of nothing but. But that art 
wants to keep the promise of what is in many ways its opposite is precisely the point: Varèse was 
a modernist because he knew that it could only be through modernity, through the particular 
representational practices that defined the present, that those practices could be transcended, that 
meaning could be possible. “For the attitude of modernity,” Foucault writes, “the high value of 
the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to […] to imagine it otherwise than it is, 
and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is.”143 
But this simple polarization between science as the material of the present, and art as the 
act that imagines it otherwise is still too simple. This is because at the turn of the century, science 
itself could in many ways be said to have embodied precisely this sense that reality was in the 
process of being imagined otherwise. We can understand this best by comparing it with the 
science of Mallarmé’s time. We have already seen how science, still largely defined by 
positivism and by a hubris yet to be shaken by the paradigm shifts of the twentieth century, could 
see its goal of understanding the universe as nearly complete. For Symbolists such as Mallarmé, 
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this did not bode well for the privileged life of the soul, whose value rested in the quality of 
ineffable mystery and cherished interiority traditionally thought to be beyond the reach of 
science’s circumscription.  
For Varèse, on the other hand, science was the solution, not the problem. As an antidote 
to the impoverished musical “alphabet,” we remember, it was precisely science that could, as he 
put it, “infuse it with youthful vigor.” Such an about-face was made possible in part because 
materialism, one of the driving engines of positivism, had by Varèse’s day largely been absorbed 
into the artistic imagination.
144
 We find evidence of this, as well as a definite source of 
inspiration for Varèse, in the writings of Guillaume Apollinaire, whose ideas still stand as a 
hugely under-acknowledged influence on the composer. From the symbolist legacy of Mallarmé, 
Apollinaire had inherited a disdain for any discipline that deprived life of its quality of intangible 
mystery. But if for Mallarmé, that discipline was positivist science, for Apollinaire, it was what 
of positivism had crept into art itself, namely, literary realism and naturalism. In a fascinating 
reversal, what Apollinaire praised in distinction to positivist literature was science itself. As he 
had written in his book on Cubism, “it is the social function of great poets and artists to 
continually renew the appearance nature has for the eyes of men.” And yet, as the examples of 
realism and naturalism had shown, poets and artists had, up until the great efflorescence of 
modernism, thoroughly failed in this task.
145
 It was scientists, not writers, who had truly 
“renewed the appearance of nature,” imagining reality otherwise through their explorations into 
every corner of existence. Scientists “ceaselessly scrutinize the new universes that bare 
themselves at every crossroads of matter,” he wrote in “The New Spirit and the Poets,” filling the 
skies with “strangely human birds, machines, motherless daughters of men,” and other things 
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that challenged the idea that there was nothing new under the sun.
146
 Varèse’s turn to 
frequencies, seismographs, and other scientific miscellany was a turn towards the inhuman and 
impersonal, as we have been saying. But as we will see in the next chapter, his embrace of 
science was also a turn towards a newly revelatory power for which the categories of the 
inhuman and impersonal cannot fully account.   
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Chapter 2 
Varèse at the Threshold 
 
Your minutes, foolish mortal, are the ore 
From which you must extract the gold you’re searching for!147  
 
—Baudelaire, “The Clock” 
 
 
In the last chapter, our subject was Varèse’s turn to the discourse of the real in the context 
of the increasingly inassimilable, overwhelming experience of modernity. From the perspective 
of psychology, the real was that deeply dug unconscious inscription whose inaccessibility 
testified to what in experience was incapable of being experienced, a site of shock-like 
encounters that indexed the overwhelming maelstrom of modern urban life. And yet we also saw 
how, with the arrival of media storage technologies like the gramophone capable of actually 
recording that unparsed beyond of language and experience, the real was just as much an object 
of fascination, representing a new, albeit decidedly alienated, site of aesthetic investigation.  
But whether seen as an object of fascination or an index of trauma, the real—as a domain 
of experience apprehensible only in a mediated fashion, through machines like the gramophone 
or through that more obscure machine known as the Freudian unconscious—represented a 
certain disenchantment of consciousness whereby experience could now be apprehended only 
obliquely rather than through the immediate lens of a more traditionally conceived subjectivity. 
Seen as a kind of precipitate of that inassimilable experience, the artwork was thus no longer a 
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transparent window onto the subject’s romantic “dreams of infinity,” as Busoni had called them, 
but rather a kind of machine in its own right, registering the traces of shock-like experience that 
would always remain provocatively anterior to consciousness, and ultimately, to the fumbling 
fingers of the work itself. The essence of modern experience, it seemed, whether manifested in 
art or consciousness, was always elsewhere.   
 It is this “elsewhere” that will concern us in the present chapter, but less in the guise of 
the real and more in the context of a concept with which the real is intimately related: time, or 
more accurately, the notion of an absolute present within time. If the real could represent a kind 
of utopian space beyond the mediation of the symbolic, then it also represented a space outside 
of the time through which the symbolic, through its own process of disenchantment, could assert 
itself as such, as something that had been drained of the imaginary by way of historical decay. 
The real that Varèse sought beyond the mediation of the tonal system, that is, was in some sense 
also a real beyond the temporality through which that once-meaningful tonality had decayed into 
something recalcitrant and dead. What I am suggesting is that we see the real in Varèse’s 
creative imagination as eliding with a certain allegorical historical sensibility, and one that 
cannot be considered apart from the heightened consciousness of a particularly linear, 
irreversible form of time characteristic of life in the early 20
th
 century. In this milieu, which is 
characterized by the relentless decay of the imminently meaningful into the meaningless, the 
“always elsewhere” of the real takes on the temporal designation of a remainder that forever 
beckons from out of a promissory future. We find something of this dynamic in the dialectic of 
desire revealed in modernity’s infatuation with the new, in which novelty is constantly displaced 
by the even newer in a search for stable forms of meaningfulness that the new promises but can 
never actually deliver. What the real converges with in such a context is the dream of escaping 
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this profane temporality into an absolute present, a utopian moment prior to the onset of 
disenchantment, prior to the separation of material symbols from whatever modicum of the 
beyond they might be able to evoke. But it also converges with another dream: the dream of 
apprehending temporality itself, of seizing on time not as the ravager of history but as the very 
means through which modernity expresses its utmost creative spirit.      
We will have a chance to elaborate on both notions below, and all the while, our guiding 
questions will be these: what is the nature of the relationship of that peculiar symbol known as 
the artwork to the overwhelming time consciousness we associate with modernity? And what is 
its relationship to these fantasies of presence? While we saw in the last chapter how Varèse’s 
work could serve as a kind of seismograph, for example, registering the traces of the real and 
transmitting it directly to the audience, we said little about what the artwork might have offered 
in a more existential sense, offered as a peculiar act of symbolic labor within, or perhaps on, a 
modernity in which time was synonymous with decay and stable forms of meaning were 
resultantly in short supply. In the context of the two utopias mentioned above (the dream of the 
absolute present, the dream of the perpetual present), then, we will need to ask the following: if, 
for Varèse, the newer is guaranteed to replace the new and meaning is so contingent upon time, 
then must the role of the work not be to carve out a space within that time so as to prolong 
contact with the fleeting meaning associated with the elusive present? Or must the work not 
instead assert time so as to become, and thus create some sense of ameliorative identification 
with, modernity itself?    
The way we answer will ultimately depend on how we interpret one of Varèse’s truly 
distinguishing traits: his obsession with science. But before we get to science proper, we will 
want to establish a basic framework for thinking about these problems in general, and we will do 
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so by turning to Baudelaire, whose writings on the relationship between modernity, art, and 
temporality will provide an ideal point of entry into the subject. After a brief introduction to the 
latter, we will briefly consider a Baudelairean Varèse, for whom the artwork serves to concretize 
some sense of what Baudelaire called the “eternal in the transient.” Here, the scientific side of 
Varèse’s works will play the role of what Baudelaire, in his famous definition of modernity, 
termed the “ephemeral”: it will be a crucial symbol of the passing present without which the 
eternity of beauty, in its distinctly modern conception, would not be possible. But this 
Baudelairean Varèse will only be a waypoint to a more nuanced reading of the composer that 
takes into consideration, among other things, the new physics and science in general in its 
uniquely 20
th
 century form. Ultimately, we will see how the work’s peculiar identification with 
science allows it to assume what Varèse called its natural state of “permanent revolution,” a state 
that both affirms the constant, disorienting  newness of modernity while suggesting a certain 
proximity to what is promised, if only implicitly, beyond that interminably restless project.  
 
Baudelaire, Art, and Time 
 
 
By most accounts, it is Baudelaire’s “The Painter of Modern Life” that inaugurates in 
literature the vivid consciousness of time that we associate with modernity. “By ‘modernity,” he 
writes, “I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the 
eternal and the immutable.”148 Bracketing the “eternal and immutable” for the moment, we see 
that for Baudelaire, the present is hardly more stable than what comes and goes in a flash. If the 
“ephemeral” implies that the present can be apprehended for a fleeting second, the “fugitive” 
implies, on the contrary, that it is forever on the loose, a dreamt-of place of being that is always 
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out of reach. Modernity for Baudelaire is thus primarily an experience of instability and 
elusiveness, of the ground constantly being yanked from beneath one’s feet.  
If the “ephemeral” and the “fugitive” testify to modernity’s inapprehensible character 
rooted in a heightened consciousness of time, then it is perhaps Baudelaire’s third term, the 
“contingent,” that implicates the first two terms in crucial questions of meaning. It was not, in 
other words, the mere experience of change, of things here in one moment and gone the next, 
that was most disorienting about modernity. More accurately, it was the experience of those 
things becoming explicitly historical, of ideas or fashions moving from seeming so sublimely 
pregnant with the life and meaning of their time to petrifying into fossilized remnants of those 
things. What in art, fashion, and the like briefly presented itself as so full of inherent meaning, so 
full of an almost theological symbolic capacity of evocation, would inevitably undergo a slow 
mortification at the hands of time, revealing the embarrassing dependency of that sense of 
meaning upon the extra-aesthetic criteria of social circumstance. 
This is what was most disorienting about modernity: the constant loosening of meaning 
from materials that would occur as cultural products aged and were replaced by the new and 
newer. It was the experience of meaning as something in no way permanently guaranteed 
throughout the lifespan of cultural artifacts, despite the seeming permanence of those works 
themselves. Once seen to emanate from the very structures of those creations, meaning was now 
a mere temporary haunting of their interstices, an apparitional arrangement of the profane into a 
fragile but resounding resonance with a particular age.  
As we will especially see in the last chapter, what we are describing here is in many ways 
an experience of separation: the subject’s inability to maintain its sense of participation in and 
connection to its own modernity, a sense otherwise confirmed by its ability to find its image—its 
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meaningful agency and subjectivity—reflected back in the structures of the world. It is an 
experience similar to the one before Benjamin’s aura, which he once described in his own work 
on Baudelaire as the sensation of having one’s gaze returned by the content of artworks. 149 If 
that moment of simulated interpersonal recognition was the moment of participation in one’s 
time, then it was one that always had the potential to decay as those gazing eyes aged and closed, 
returning the artwork to the mere matter that, for all intents and purposes, it had always been.  
For Baudelaire, this condition of separation was in many ways primary. His historical 
sensibility implied a world that, no longer possessive of an inherent spiritual quality, had been 
thoroughly disenchanted by the arrival of what we might refer to generally as the scientific 
worldview. Defined by the fruits of a purely technical type of knowledge, the world had been 
impoverished to a state of “artificial abstractions,” to use Max Weber’s phrase, “which with its 
bony hands [sought] to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with 
it”150 And yet, despite this indictment, Baudelaire’s aesthetics made it clear that that empirical 
disposition—detached, contemplative, and purged of the metaphysics that otherwise connected 
people to things—had for artists and scientists alike won out as the primary means of 
determining one’s initial relationship to the world. It is for this reason that everywhere 
throughout Baudelaire’s prose, the material world is presented as a vast, forsaken landscape, 
unformed and ill-arranged, waiting for the poet-flâneur to come along with their “blood and sap” 
and transform it into a tenuous meaning. “External nature […] is nothing but an incoherent heap 
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of raw materials which the artist is invited to group together and put in order,” wrote Baudelaire 
in 1861.
151
 Or here, in his “Salon of 1859”:  
The whole visible universe is but a storehouse of images and signs to which the 
imagination will give a relative place and value; it is a sort of pasture which the 
imagination must digest and transform.152   
 
That Baudelaire could describe the world in such alienated terms was intimately related 
to what he referred to as a corresponding “duality of man,” which was a consequence of an 
Enlightenment project that, in order to make man the master of his world through a particular 
kind of knowledge, had succeeded in separating him from it.
153
 But in less abstract terms, the 
“duality of man” was Baudelaire’s symbolic expression of a particularly alienated experience of 
nature, and one that registered most acutely in the witnessing of nature-become-history, of the 
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potentially brute indifference to the subject that matter, once pregnant with significance, could 
have.
154
  
For our purposes, the temporal aspect of this experience cannot be emphasized enough. 
The world for Baudelaire was not a priori disenchanted; it was disenchanted because it had 
become that way, or because it always had the possibility of becoming that way. In theory, 
modernity—defined at one point by Baudelaire as “the poetry within history,” and “the eternal 
within the transitory”— was the very opposite of the disenchanted, embodying that absolutely 
present moment during which the fleeting had not yet fled, and the world seemed pregnant with a 
type of meaning that, while secretly dependent upon time, seemed to wholly transcend it. 
Paradoxically, then, the dream of modernity was in many ways the very opposite of its 
contingent reality, enamored with the very self-assured moment that the contingent was always 
seeking to embarrass and undo.  And yet this contradiction was precisely the point: modernity 
was the “poetry within history,” which is to say a poetry dependent upon history, contingent 
upon history. It was both a moment and that moment’s decay—a moment, to put it more 
dialectically, that drew its vividness precisely from the possibility of its decay. Thus, 
Baudelaire’s mute landscape was forsaken only in contrast to what modernity, as that dreamed-
about “incandescent point” at the front lines of time, stood for as a possibility within that time. 
But we must clarify that this was not just any time. To talk about this fleeting time that 
leaves behind, a time that abandons the works and fashions that are made with it in mind and that 
are most meaningful only with it at hand, is to talk about the linear, irreversible Newtonian time 
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of science, development, rationality, and progress. This was the time by which the autonomous 
Kantian subject (see note 7) would supposedly emerge from its “self-incurred immaturity” to 
obtain enlightenment.
155
 But for a trenchant critic of science such as Baudelaire, however, such 
supposed progress was just as much a “great heresy of decline.”156 That is, in terms of the 
qualitative dimension of experience, the time of modernity asserted itself linearly, for sure, but in 
the direction of decay.
157
 The new asserted itself less as progress and more as the mere arbitrary 
displacement characteristic of the commodity form. Like the second hand in Baudelaire’s poem 
The Clock, articulating a series of empty, homogenous moments which retained nothing of those 
that they displaced, each incarnation of the new—of fashions, of scientific discoveries, and the 
like—marked a similar displacement in which the past was retained only negatively.158 Rather 
than being gathered together and integrated into an increasingly enriched and deepened present, 
the past was experienced as little more than the product of a mere passing moment, a having-
been with little to no connection with the now. Time was that which abandoned experience in its 
rush to arrive at the new. 
 
We can see now how this sense of participation in all its guises—participation as a kind 
of immersion in stable forms of meaning, participation as an emotional and not merely 
contemplative engagement with objects, participation as a nearness to one’s past—was a casualty 
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of the profane temporality of modernity. What we must see now is the role Baudelaire ascribed 
to art in ameliorating this experience. There was Baudelaire’s “incoherent heap of raw 
materials,” a mute nature wholly alienated from the subject; but then there was that heap of 
materials as actively reimagined by the artist into a nature that could again speak. Conceived of 
as a function of agency intent on finding that “poetry within history,” modernity was less an 
historical category and more a certain disposition towards the materials of the fleeting present, a 
particularly active disposition represented most famously by the intent-filled, beauty-seeking 
activities of the flâneur.
159
 Determined to sustain the Technicolor glow of things so characteristic 
of childhood experience, the flâneur was at once seeking a kind of participation in things in 
which an alternative, almost dream-like temporality could be carved out within the irredeemably 
profane stream of everyday life. It was life intentionally lived as art, the only type of living there 
truly was because of the way such living allowed one to, in Arthur Rhodes’s words, “come into 
more intimate contact with the absolute reality of existence.”160 To actively engage in meaning-
creating activity was not merely to satisfy the complacent aestheticism of the dandy but to mask 
an acute sense of nihilism implicit in a blindly streaming temporality that at times seemed to 
trace little more than the edges of an abyss.
161
  
The “poetry within history,” then, was in once sense an answer to the potential nihilism 
implicit in the temporality of modernity. It is this injunction that we find within our epigraph in 
which it is only by way of time that something transcendent of time might be found: “Your 
minutes, foolish mortal, are the ore / From which you must extract the gold you’re searching 
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for!”162 What we have here, then, is a description of the artwork as a form of imminent critique 
which attempts to escape time only by working through it. That this contingency was explicitly 
formative to Baudelaire’s aesthetic is nowhere more evident than in its formalization into what 
he referred to as his “historical theory of beauty.” “Beauty,” Baudelaire writes, 
is always and inevitably of a double composition, although the impression that it 
produces is single [...It] is made up of an eternal, invariable element, whose quantity it is 
excessively difficult to determine, and of a relative, circumstantial element, which will 
be, if you like, whether severally or all at once, the age, its fashions, its morals, its 
emotions. Without this second element, which might be described as the amusing, 
enticing, appetizing icing on the divine cake, the first element would be beyond our 
powers of digestion or appreciation, neither adapted nor suitable to human nature. I defy 
anyone to point to a single scrap of beauty which does not contain these two 
elements.163 
 
Poetry relied on history. Beauty, as something contingent upon the time of its making, 
could thus always be found to take its point of departure from the styles, moods, emotions, 
fashions, customs, and other things that bore the mark of one’s age. As for the second, “eternal” 
element, it was that extra something-more of the artwork—the remnants of Benjamin’s aura, 
perhaps, or a certain sense of interpretive inexhaustibility—which, while rooted in the work’s 
historical materials, seemed nonetheless transcendent of and impossible to empirically locate 
within them. “The aesthetic is materialism’s uncanny,” writes T.J. Clark, 164 and I think we get 
precisely this sense of an evocative flickering between matter and its dreamt-of, artistic other in 
the following passage: 
the external world is reborn upon paper, natural and more than natural , beautiful and 
more than beautiful, strange and endowed with an impulsive life like the soul of its 
creator. The phantasmagoria has been distilled from nature. All the raw materials with 
which the memory has loaded itself are put in order, ranged and harmonized, and undergo 
that forced idealization which is the result of a childlike perceptiveness—that is to say, a 
perceptiveness acute and magical by reason of its innocence!
165
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For Baudelaire, the world—which by itself was little more than a depraved expanse of 
raw materials, decayed or with the possibility of becoming decayed—was to be reimagined by 
way of the artist’s “forced idealizations” into something meaningful, but a meaningfulness that 
relied upon the stuff of the modern moment to have its effect.    
 
Baudelaire, Busoni, Varèse  
An acute awareness of time as a coursing vector, experienced largely via scientific 
change; a theory of beauty in which the latter is reliant upon a slice of that time to do its 
redemptive work; an acknowledgement of the profane, material substrate of art, coupled with 
visions of its transmutation into an intimate and evocative magic—with striking theoretical 
acumen, Baudelaire conceived of the possible place that art could have within a modernity 
defined in so many ways by disenchantment.  It is as a theoretician of this modernity that we can 
mention him alongside Varèse, whose writings betray such a similar preoccupation with the 
relationship of the artwork to both the profane materiality of the world and to the fleeting modern 
moment. In his pervasive rhetoric of petrification and death regarding the art and styles of the 
past, for example, a rhetoric we encountered in his disdain for the worn-out tempered scale and 
which we will examine in detail in the following chapter, the composer shared Baudelaire’s 
sensitivity to the all-too-real connection between modernity’s breathless temporality and the 
potential for meaning to decay, a potential that could be overcome only by the repeated return of 
the artist to the materials of their own time.  
Varèse was connected to Baudelaire through at least two sources: his wife Louise, who 
was a renowned translator of French symbolist poetry, and his mentor Busoni, who is known to 
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have translated one of Baudelaire’s essays on Edgar Allen Poe. Moreover, we find in Busoni’s 
Sketch of a New Aesthetic of Music passages that very closely echo Baudelaire’s bipartite theory 
of beauty, the most vivid of which Varèse, it is important to note, penciled brackets around in his 
personal copy of the book.  
The spirit of an art-work, the measure of emotion, of humanity, that is in it—these remain 
unchanged in value through changing years; the form which these three assumed, the 
manner of their expression, and the flavor of the epoch which gave them birth, are 
transient, and age rapidly. Spirit and emotion retain their essence, in the art-work as in 
man himself; we admire technical achievements, yet they are outstripped, or cloy the 
taste and are discarded.
166
 
 
The similarities to Baudelaire are undeniable: there is, on the one hand, that elusive and 
seemingly ahistorical emotional aspect of the artwork—its “spirit”—which recalls Baudelaire’s 
“eternal, invariable element” of beauty “whose quantity it is excessively difficult to determine.” 
Then there is the form that this spirit must take, the material vehicle upon which it is contingent, 
comprised of the transient character of an epoch evocative of Baudelaire’s similarly fleeting 
circumstantial element. For both, art’s intangible beauty is something ever available, but only 
insofar as it is revealed through the fickle material guises of a particular time.   
 As we said, Varèse took note of Busoni’s passage, and it is worth considering it alongside 
one of the composer’s own:   
There is solidarity between scientific development and the progress of music. Throwing 
new light on nature, science permits music to progress—or rather to grow and change 
with changing times—by revealing to our senses harmonies and sensations before unfelt. 
On the threshold of beauty science and art collaborate.
167
 
 
There is much here that might initially strike the reader as having diverged from Baudelaire and 
Busoni. For one, Varèse’s comment seems at first to be as much a discussion of two completely 
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different domains as it is of what transpires to create beauty within the domain of art itself. And 
yet we note the last sentence, which sheds light on the rest of the passage: “On the threshold of 
beauty, science and art collaborate.” What Varèse seems to offer us here is his own bipartite 
theory of beauty similar to those of Baudelaire and Busoni.  If for Baudelaire, beauty was a 
realization of the eternal accomplished through the absorption of the transient into the formal 
principle of art, I am suggesting that it was equally so for Varèse, except that for the latter, it is 
science specifically that provides art with its transient content.
168
 Beauty, he might have said, is 
reliant upon science—upon the procession of discoveries that symbolize newer and newer 
presents—to have its effect.  
As has been discussed elsewhere, science in Varèse’s scores is often as much poetically 
implied as it is actually represented in some concrete way by compositional procedures. The 
processual form of Intégrales, for example, in which simulations of spatialized sound attract, 
repulse, and interact with one another, was inspired by Varèse’s study of crystals.169 The title 
itself is a reference to integral calculus, and the rhetoric of projection that Varèse used to 
describe the experience he wanted to evoke for the listener by way of the music’s huge surges of 
sound elided in his creative imagination with the idea of a musical fourth dimension.
170
 But 
however tenuously representative of actual science Varèse’s works really were, I think that we 
can see the scientific references therein as providing the work with a crucial symbolic content—
symbolic of nature in the present moment—that the work would then transfigure into some 
ineffable sense of the eternal. “Science permits music to progress [emphasis mine],” which is to 
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say, provides it with the crucial ephemeral content (those “harmonies and sensations before 
unfelt”) upon which its beauty is inevitably contingent and which the work needs to accomplish 
its own continually evolving revelatory task.
171
 That science in Varèse’s creative imagination 
was directly aligned with this notion of the transient is evident in the many places he directly 
equates scientific development with “the vertiginous changes taking place in the world,” and it is 
no mystery as to why.
172
 It is the discoveries of science that increasingly mark and provide the 
rhythm to the historical time consciousness of modernity, both creating the new and aging it, 
conferring upon the past the sense of obsolescence against which the present stands as a 
redeemed destination. As such, we can see science as the source of so much of the ontological 
insecurity implied by Baudelaire’s “the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent,” and in Varèse, I 
would argue that science has become almost synonymous with the concept of modernity itself.  
What remains to be discussed in this section is more about how Varèse might have 
understood that other side of the Baudelarian equation, the “eternal” side of art as manifested in 
beauty. We find a cryptic answer to this in a remark Varèse made in a 1928 article in Le Figaro: 
“truth exists only insofar as art gives it a meaning.”173 We will only be able to speculate as to 
exactly what Varèse meant here, but for the sake of following this Baudelarean thread to its end 
and of positing a certain theoretical framework to push against and test in the next section, I want 
to propose that by “meaning” here, Varèse meant a sense of concretion, or the sense offered by 
the artwork of having endowed the external world, to paraphrase Baudelaire, with impulsive life 
like the soul of its creator. Truth existed, that is, only insofar as art made it concrete, only insofar 
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as art imbued the contingent, abstract world represented by science with the glow of privately 
and directly lived, inner emotional experience outside the ravages of time. We recall here that for 
the Symbolists, art was to embrace the desiderata of the external world purely for the sake of 
evoking inner truths that could not be objectively accounted for in that world. Varèse repeatedly 
betrayed a similar concern for the inner over the outer, writing to Carlos Salzedo, for example, 
that “too little consideration is given to the human point of view [in my music]—the spiritual 
essence above the scientific and mechanical.”174 Art was to provide the truths of science with this 
human point of view, this meaning that was concretion. This interpretation is made more 
persuasive when we read Varèse’s remark about truth and meaning alongside the passage we 
explored above: “on the threshold of beauty, art and science collaborate.” Between the two 
statements, a simple syllogism can be made: if truth collaborates with art (to give it a meaning), 
and science collaborates with art (for the sake of beauty), then perhaps we could say that truth 
and science represent one epistemological space in Varèse’s creative imagination, while meaning 
and beauty represent another. We might, then, consolidate the phrases to say that abstract 
scientific truth is meaningful only insofar as it is transfigured through the concretion of art. Or 
more to our point: it is art that gives science its meaning, that strange, ineffable, interior meaning 
called beauty.  
In the following section, we will complicate this reading when we explore the ways that 
the new physics had, by Varèse’s time, allowed science to seem more art-like itself. As we began 
to see in the last chapter, notions such as the fourth dimension and quantum mechanics had 
supplied science with a renewed sense of creative revelation and mystery which its positivist 
incarnations (the only ones available to Baudelaire) could have never provided. But had 
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scientific revelation been the be-all and end-all for Varèse, then Varèse, as we have said, would 
have become a scientist and not an artist. The mere fact of Varèse’s art in the shadow of such 
revelations testifies to the peculiar form of labor that art continued to perform on those abstract 
discoveries, and to the modern-day flâneur’s  unquenchable need to create those “forced 
idealizations” of nature in which the soul of the artist could, as per Baudelaire’s want, somehow 
be accounted for in detritus the of the world.  
To put it another way, it is one thing to say that science and art had become revelatory 
kindred spirits and quite another to say that those spirits served the same social or psychological 
function. In the face of the disorienting experience of modernity, we must maintain the 
absolutely crucial difference in kind between what science, as an engine of modernity, articulates 
in the way of spiritual mystery, and what art, as the privative means of coming to terms with that 
modernity, attempts as an existential act within it.
175
 There is no denying, as we will see, that the 
new physics had a power to confer upon the world a certain art-like radiance, however fleeting 
that radiance might have been.
176
 But this world is inevitably one that cannot be directly lived or 
experienced. It has become abstract. The totality that is modernity can be intellectually 
understood in its different moments, certainly, but it is an understanding that must remain 
precisely that: an experience tied to the intellect, beyond the bounds of what the individual can 
experience directly and concretely. This is in large part because of the sheer scope of the modern 
world, in whose increasingly bureaucratic, specialized, and transnational structures the individual 
can no longer recognize the traces of his or her own labor. Art in this model would comprise an 
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attempt to concretize this abstract experience, to almost literally take matters into its own hands, 
in order to give to life the sense of lived, immanent meaning or totality it was otherwise 
without.
177
 It would be to enact a symbolic labor upon modernity in order to make that 
modernity—in Varèse, abstract concepts such as the fourth dimension, say, or hyperspace—into 
the individual artist’s image, as though to provide the ersatz recognition impossible to come by 
otherwise. It is what Baudelaire described as the “creation of an evocative magic containing at 
once the object and subject,” a sentiment expressed somewhat more pragmatically by Hegel. For 
the latter, art is practical activity arising from the fact that man 
has the impulse, in whatever is directly given to him, in what is present to him externally, 
to produce himself and therein equally to recognize himself. This aim he achieves by 
altering external things whereupon he impresses the seal of his inner being and in which 
he now finds again his own characteristics. Man does this in order, as a free subject, to 
strip the external world of its inflexible foreignness and to enjoy in the shape of things 
only an external realization of himself.
178
 
 
Varèse’s scientific art gives meaning to truth, as he said, helping to strip true science of 
its “inflexible foreignness” by creating a world, wrought from the real one, in which the subject 
can find something more of itself.  
But we have edged away from our original subject of temporality, and it is important to 
see how this problem of abstraction is as much tied to the experience of the transient as it is to 
these more spatially defined experiences. Indeed, the problem of the transient in many ways is 
the problem of abstraction insofar as it involves the inevitably elusive category of the new. Why 
is the new abstract? Simply because, by virtue of having never been, it can initially be 
experienced only intellectually rather than as intuitively or directly lived. The concretion art 
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attempts, then, is also about overcoming time in order to give the new the sense of lived 
tangibility it is otherwise without. In working immanently through the new, art becomes an 
attempt to transcend time by way of time, to go “beyond the flow of history through the 
consciousness of historicity in its most concrete immediacy, in its presentness.”179 To be sure, 
regardless of what the artwork tries to do or from which historical period it tries to do it, it is the 
very act of art itself—the simple gesture of setting down to make the artwork—that, as Paul De 
Man reminds us, already implies this dream of presence and thus separates it off from the 
activities of the scientist. Art, De Man writes, is the “unmediated free act that knows no past.”180 
It is free in the sense that it is a gesture made not as a result of history but in response to it, a 
private act that undoubtedly needs history, as we have been seeing, but that attempts to assume 
its redemptive power as something definitively apart from it.
181
 If science were “the poetry of 
today,” as Varèse said it was, then it was still not a poetry removed from the temporal stream 
marked by successive todays. Art, by contrast, was an attempt to “extract the poetry from 
history,” to use Baudelaire’s phrase, an attempt to remove history from its own interminable 
stream so that, transformed within the artwork, it might establish a redeemed relationship to 
itself.  
 To complete this section, let us consider a way that Varèse’s music might have attempted 
such a concretion in relation to one of his oft-discussed scientific obsessions: the fourth 
dimension. We note first off that in its notorious elusiveness, the fourth dimension was a perfect 
metaphor for modernity’s aforementioned abstraction in that it represented an objective reality 
that, despite being theoretically demonstrable, could in no way be experienced or represented 
directly. In the next section, we will explore how it was just this elusiveness that, like so many 
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other Janus-faced aspects of modernity, also allowed the fourth dimension to be so immensely 
seductive for artists of Varèse’s time. But for now we merely note its nature as a symbol of 
intellectual contingency in the wake of history, and further, its nature as something that, while 
tantalizing, exceeded the bounds of direct experience, begging to be reimagined in a form in 
which it was put in direct communication with the equally rarefied but much more intimate 
dimension of the soul.      
Varèse made frequent references to the fourth dimension in his lectures and interviews, 
most prominently in a 1937 New York Times piece about his never-realized “Red Symphony,” 
and also in his Santa Fe lecture “The Liberation of Sound.” 182 In both of those texts, the fourth 
dimension was articulated as something that was to be brought down to the level of music and 
given expression there by whatever new means of illusionism music could muster. Like the 
spirals that Varèse drew on his sketches for Déserts and elsewhere (see Example 2.1-2.2), spirals 
of the type that had long been associated with attempts to represent the seeming infinity of the 
new dimension; and like the geometric hyperprism itself (referenced by Varèse’s early orchestral 
work of the same name), which represented a similar attempt, made by scientists and 
mathematicians, to concretize that elusive beyond, Varèse’s musical fourth dimension surely had 
something to do with the need to tame and make more tangible this new epistemological 
space.
183
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Example 2.1: Varèse’s sketch of a logarithmic spiral.  
 Image courtesy of the Paul Sacher Stiftung, Basel. 
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Example 2.2: A “projected” spiral on a sketch for Déserts. 
Image courtesy of the Paul Sacher Stiftung, Basel.  
 
Varèse’s friend Apollinaire basically said as much. Describing the production of art 
before the arrival of the new physics, he writes:  
Until now the three dimensions of Euclidean geometry sufficed to still the anxiety 
provoked in the souls of great artists by a sense of the infinite—anxiety that cannot be 
called scientific, since art and science are two separate domains.
184
 
 
We note here the Baudelairian nature of Apollinaire’s thesis: art, operating within and through 
the epistemological framework of its own time (here, Euclidean geometry), attempts to 
circumscribe the infinite—to ameliorate the anxiety it produces—by creating a more concrete 
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experience of that beyond. It was a need to concretize that persisted as the nature of infinity 
changed with the arrival of the new physics: 
Now, today’s scientists have gone beyond the three dimensions of Euclidean geometry. 
Painters have, therefore, very naturally been led to a preoccupation with […] the fourth 
dimension. [The fourth dimension] is generated by the three known dimensions: it 
represents the immensity of space eternalized in all directions at a given moment. It is 
space itself, or the dimension of infinity. […]  
 
That Varèse conceived of his works as just such a head-on engagement with infinity is implied in 
the following passage, which perhaps reveals the influence of Apollinaire himself: 
We have actually three dimensions in music: horizontal, vertical, and dynamic swelling 
or decreasing. I shall add a fourth, sound projection—that feeling that sound is leaving us 
with no hope of being reflected back, a feeling akin to that aroused by beams of light sent 
forth by a powerful searchlight—for the ear as for the eye, that sense of projection, of a 
journey into space.  
 
We find such a “projection” in the opening bars of Arcana (Example 2.3), in which the 
interval class 13 is seemingly projected upwards and outwards as a widened version of an initial 
catalyst cell in the bass. Though we cannot speak of anything resembling “anxiety” in the 
passage above in which Varèse describes such projections, we can speak of a kind of 
metaphorical engagement happening here with the fourth dimension, one in which the elusive 
beyond is brought down to the level of the purely musical where its implications of infinity (and 
loss) can be explored in more domesticated terms. Let us say for now that, audible in the 
towering culminations of pitches that appear in so many of Varèse’s early orchestral works 
(discussed in more detail in the next chapter), these projections speak, if only hazily, to the 
meaning that art gives to truth, to a Baudelairean  poetry extracted from history through which 
the ephemeral and contingent somehow becomes beautiful.  
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Example 2.3: Projection of IC 13 in the opening measures of Arcana 
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Disenchantment and Possibility:  
Varèse and the New Physics 
  
It is perhaps helpful to remember that this issue of art’s relationship to the ephemeral is in 
many ways that of modernism in general to the extent that the latter’s great subject is this 
problem and possibility of creating meaning out of the fleeting representational codes of the 
present. Varèse and Baudelaire were both modernists, we might say, to the extent that they both 
engaged artistically with the consequences of modernity, whether those consequences were the 
effects of disenchantment, rationalization, or something else.   
But within this broader understanding of modernism, we also need to understand the 
degree to which the experiences it speaks to change when modernity’s codes of representation 
are challenged to the extent that they are in the early twentieth century. By this I mean the 
emergence of the new physics, the final replacement of paternal-aristocratic and feudal powers 
with a capitalist bourgeoisie, and the technological changes and vastly increased time 
consciousness that came along with both. To be sure, the processes leading up to most if not all 
of these changes had begun long before Varèse’s time. But here we must distinguish a continuum 
of sorts between an awareness of time in a historical sense—that is, as an experience of 
transience generated largely through an awareness of history and located largely outside the 
scope of the individual—and an awareness of time as something much more concrete, time in the 
present as something continually slipping out from beneath one’s feet. Though there are clearly 
aspects of both in Baudelaire, his  writing—particularly in comparison to Varèse—speaks more 
to the former, to a historical sense of time, rather than as a more existential time involving an 
individual’s experience of the continually decaying present. On its most abstract level, we can 
link much of this to the more stable nature of nineteenth century science, which was less about 
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violently uprooting normative conventions as it was the patient, persistent march towards the 
fulfillment of long-held foundational truths. Though inevitably an engine of temporality, science 
proper seemed to make itself known for Baudelaire more in terms of the disenchanted natural 
world into which significance would inevitably decay rather than as the historical, temporal force 
that generated both significance and decay themselves.
 We could think of Baudelaire’s 
scientifically delineated world as a world of “second nature” in Lukacs’ sense of a “complex of 
senses—meanings—which has become rigid and strange, and which no longer awakens 
interiority […] a charnel-house of long-dead interiorities.”185 
To be sure, Baudelaire in many places links science directly to the highly temporal notion 
of progress. But whereas science might have represented a dubious progress in a quantitative 
sense, the world it described remained qualitatively the same: reified and dead. What was loathed 
by the Symbolists, after all, was precisely empiricism’s inert, stagnant vision of the world.186 It is 
precisely this world, I think, that is implied by the activities of Baudelaire’s flâneur, which—
involved as they were in a kind of gathering-together of the profane material world into the 
redemptive constellations of artworks—seem to have been articulated as much in terms of space 
as of time. “External nature,” we recall Baudelaire writing,  […] is nothing but an incoherent 
heap of raw materials which the artist is invited to group together and put in order [emphasis 
mine].”    
With the advent of the new physics, however, it is as though science begins to assert itself 
to artists less as a source of reified second nature and more as a transient, creative, disruptive 
historical force. If Baudelaire’s “incoherent heap” had been coherent enough as the dialectical 
other of art, providing at least a relatively stable point of orientation from which art could stake 
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its claims, the very Newtonian-Kantian conditions underwriting that stability were now being 
rewritten, and with them the experiential foundations of the individual itself. This is to say that 
the already-scant ontological security offered up by modernity—the trust that could be placed in 
the persistence of the spatio-temporal conditions from which a sense of identity could be 
drawn—was  eroding beneath the individual’s feet, and with it any sense at all of a stable 
present. Thus, where the activities of Baudelaire’s flâneur were almost circular, as if to gather 
together a sense of meaning by way of the artwork, in Varèse, the activities of the artist assume a 
breathlessly linear character, as though meaning were something fleeting that one was doing well 
to merely keep up with. If the question for Baudelaire’s flâneur was “what can I make of the 
present?,” for Varèse, it was just as much “what will become of the present, and perhaps of me as 
someone living in the present.” “At a time,” Varèse writes, 
when the very newness of the mechanism of life is forcing our activities and our forms of 
human association to break with the traditions and the methods of the past in the effort to 
adapt themselves to circumstances, the urgent choices which we have to make are 
concerned not with the past but with the future. We cannot, even if we would, live much 
longer by tradition. The world is changing, and we change with it.
187
 
  
That Varèse was referring at least in part to the new physics is incontestable. In an 
unpublished lecture given roughly around this same time, he mentioned the aforementioned 
“vertiginous changes taking place in the world” before quoting one of his favorite passages from 
Paul Valery (the same one, it should be noted, used by Walter Benjamin as the epigraph of his  
“The Artwork in the Age of Mechanical Reproducibility”): 
For the past 20 years neither matter, nor space, nor time have been what they had always 
been before. It must be expected that such great changes should transform the whole 
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technic of the arts, affecting even the inventive faculty, going so far, perhaps, as to 
modify marvelously the conception of art itself.
188
 
 
In another unpublished lecture from around the same time, Varèse—using his 
own words this time—emphasized the fundamentally disruptive, breathless character of 
both art and science:  
In science a new language is being constantly evolved to furnish new expression for new 
concepts. […] To progress, art like science can only live in a state of perpetual unrest and 
revolution.
189
 
 
And we must also mention these words by Varèse’s friend Apollinaire, who was perhaps as 
influential as anyone in turning Varèse on to the artistic relevance of the new physics: 
The rainbow is bent, the seasons quiver, the crowds push on to death, science undoes and 
remakes what already exists, whole worlds disappear forever from our understanding, our 
mobile images repeat themselves, or revive their vagueness, and the colors, the odors, 
and the sounds to which we are sensitive astonish us, then disappear from nature—all to 
no purpose. This monster beauty is not eternal.
190
   
 
What must be taken from all of these passages is the degree to which scientific upheaval 
had translated into a very palpable feeling of instability and increasing time consciousness in the 
realm of everyday experience. Of all the consequences of this instability, none was more decisive 
than the one that pertained to the relationship between art and science. As we began to discuss 
above, so disorienting were the paradigm shifts of turn-of-the-century science that the clear-cut 
opposition between art and science could no longer be maintained. We remember that for 
Baudelaire, science and art had born a difference in kind, representing entirely antagonistic 
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spheres of knowledge. Indeed, art had drawn much of its identity precisely from its opposition to 
the spiritually impoverished world of science. It was the latter’s what-you-see-is-what-you-get 
positivism that Baudelaire had directly contrasted with art, pitting the “realists” and “positivists,” 
intent on pointlessly reproducing reality as it “really was,” with imaginative artists who were 
more interested in transfiguring the natural world with the powers of the creative mind.
191
  
But as the seemingly self-evident, Newtonian basis of that natural world began to 
crumble with the arrival of the new physics, the opposition that had sustained the identity of art 
and science became increasingly difficult to maintain. Science, in a way, had come to contain its 
own artful other, implicating such dramatically new modes of experience that its discoveries 
could suddenly seem to be kindred spirits with art after all.
192
 We need only think of the notion 
of a the fourth dimension here, which for artists and scientists alike came to symbolize an 
unfathomable beyond to the profane Newtonian time of prosaic experience, to understand how 
science could now seem to possess its own artistic implications. 
193
 What this ultimately meant 
was a temporary suspension—or at least complication—of the clear-cut dichotomy between 
their domains, and one that, as we will see, was not without its share of revolutionary 
implications.
194
 In theory at least, art remained a way of imagining reality otherwise, and yet 
what science had acquired from the new physics was a sense that it was now beginning to 
imagine its own reality otherwise, rewriting its own foundations and returning to itself the very 
sense of spiritual mystery and possibility that it long been without. Thus, an ironic reversal had 
come about: in the guise of realism and naturalism, art had, to its detriment, absorbed science’s 
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obsession with empirical reality, while science had seemingly become, in Varèse’s words, the 
“poetry of today,”195 more adept than even art at “continually renew[ing] the appearance nature 
has for the eyes of men.”196 With its forays into relativity, fourth dimensional theory, quantum 
mechanics, and such—all represented in Varèse’s private library by authors like Einstein, 
Arthur Eddington, Jeans, Harlow Shapley, and others—science had changed to become one step 
closer to art, bound together with the latter as a kindred spirit in the act of “revealing to the 
senses harmonies and sensations never before felt.”197  
 
 “Felt,” not “known.” This is no inconsequential detail. For it implied that science was 
important to Varèse less as the voice of an eternal truth speaking through an increasingly 
comprehensive network of concepts and more the vehicle for a series of ever-changing 
subjective creations as kin to the work of poets as anyone. Continually being rewritten, so 
instable as to have purported the contingency of even time and space, science could now not help 
but resemble the world-creating gestures of the most ambitious artists.   
The greatest spokesman for this viewpoint was once again Varèse’s friend Apollinaire 
(and through him, Nietzsche). If science did little more than undo and remake extant reality, 
causing “whole worlds to disappear,” as he had remarked, then what this meant, Apollinaire felt, 
was quite simply that “reality will never be discovered once and for all.” “Truth is always new,” 
he wrote, “otherwise truth would be a system even more wretched than nature itself.”198 What 
Apollinaire meant was that the new physics—with the fourth dimension being perhaps the 
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greatest example—had succeeded in showing the relative or subjective nature of our conceptions 
of reality (and by extension, truth and beauty), to some degree liberating reality from the reified, 
impoverished, eternal forms that Baudelaire and the symbolists had so abhorred.
199
 Scientific 
views of reality could now very sincerely be called “works of the art of life,” man-made 
conceptual constructs more valuable for how they reimagined and refreshed the world than for 
how they clarified it. 
Of course, Apollinaire wasn’t Varèse’s only source for these ideas; the notion of the 
human origin of truth was one Varèse encountered in the works of scientists and science writers 
as well. We find it, for example, in Eric Temple Bell’s book The Search for Truth, which Varèse 
owned and cited often. In his lecture “Music as an Art-Science,” whose title already betrays this 
creative convergence of the two disciplines, Varèse quotes Bell, writing: “reverence for the past 
no doubt is a virtue that has had its uses, but if we are to go forward the reverent approach to old 
difficulties is the wrong one!” At first, this passage seems to be about little more than progress 
for the sake of progress, a hazily-defined need to be “absolutely modern.” But when we read 
Bell’s passage in full, we see that this break from the past is warranted not because of some 
vague need to be modern, but because it allows the truth to come into its own as what it truly is: 
a subjective creative force: 
Thus we free ourselves at last of the most persistent of the stifling myths foisted on us by 
the dead traditions of a buried past. Reverence for the past no doubt is a virtue that has 
had its uses, but if we are to go forward the reverent approach to old difficulties is the 
wrong one. […] By seeing the human origin of these supposed eternal truths we shall see 
also a possible escape from any type of superstition.
200
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No longer inherited orthodoxy, scientific truth was now inseparably linked to the human 
creativity at its origins. To discover was essentially to compose, as Apollinaire made clear in his 
essay “The New Spirit and the Poets:” 
Thousands and thousands of natural combinations have never been used in a 
composition. Scientists imagine them and bring them about, composing, in partnership 
with nature, this supreme art that is life.
201  
 
With that, science and art had become kindred spirits, bound together as common acts of 
image-making oriented around the Nietzschean task of “renew[ing] the appearance nature has for 
the eyes of men,” whether that appearance was in the guise of science’s comprehensive yet 
fleeting kind of “truth” or art’s more concrete, sensual take on the same. What cannot be 
emphasized enough here is the fact that nature—and with it, science—was now inseparable from 
appearance. If there were such a thing as true nature, it was “wretched” insofar as it was without 
this appearance, without this human-made clothing, that alone could give it a sense of meaning 
or wonder. Thus, when Varèse said that “truth exists only insofar as art gives it meaning,” we 
can no doubt still see it as we did earlier: as a dictum having something to do with that enigmatic 
concreteness that art lends to science. But we must now also see science as itself a kind of art 
that lent the real an apollonian appearance of its own. If science was the first step towards the 
creation of this appearance, then art was yet another. And if the experiences they offered were 
qualitatively different, they were now a difference in degree and not kind.  
To discover was now to create: this is essentially what we have been saying. But does 
this not also mean that to create was now to discover? Let me ask this a little differently: if the 
mysteries of the new physics had so inspired the work of artists, then might not art in turn be 
able to inspire or contribute in some way to the creations of science? This is exactly the 
reciprocal relationship that seems to be implied by Varèse’s composite expression “art-science,” 
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which invites the reader to read one term in the other.  At first, this symmetry seems a bit 
strained;  it is, after all, much easier to imagine the artistic seductiveness of something like 
multi-dimensional theory than it is to conceive of how something so abstract as, say, Varèse’s 
Hyperprism could lend itself to new theories of the universe. But when we remember that 
science is now much more on the side of art, of creativity, we see that its means of building on 
itself and of progressing—that is, of being science—have no reason not to be as well. Progress 
for an art-science need no longer be—indeed, can no longer be—progressive in the traditional 
sense of cumulative rationality.  Apollinaire writes: 
These new combinations, these new works of the art of life [that we call science], are 
precisely what is called progress. In the sense [that life itself gives examples of it] such 
an art exists. But if one thinks of progress as an eternal becoming [never raising man to a 
higher level], the sort of prophetic call as terrible as those fables of Tantalus, Sisyphus, 
and the Danaids, in that case Solomon was right in opposing the prophets of Israel. The 
new does exist, however, independent of progress; it counts for everything in surprise, 
which is integral to the new spirit—what is newest and liveliest about it. Surprise is the 
greatest new spring.
202
 
 
The new in art was unmoored from the vector of a precise destination. It seems as though Varèse 
himself concurred, as revealed in a passage we have already encountered:   
There is solidarity between scientific development and the progress of music. Throwing 
new light on nature, science permits music to progress—or rather to grow and change 
with changing times—by revealing to our senses harmonies and sensations before unfelt 
[emphasis mine].
203
 
 
After asserting the “solidarity” between art and science, Varèse begins to say that the latter helps 
the former progress in a traditional sense before softening his rhetoric to realign progress more 
with mere change. It is a need to qualify the definition of progress that we see again in an 
unpublished lecture on Charles Ives:  
when a new or unfamiliar work is accepted as beautiful on its first hearing, its 
fundamental quality is one that tends to put the mind to sleep. A narcotic is not always 
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unnecessary, but it is seldom a basis of progress,—that is, wholesome evolution in any 
creative experience [emphasis mine].
204
 
 
Through this tempered understanding of progress as surprise and revelation, scientific 
and artistic creation could be seen to contribute to one another reciprocally because of their 
common rootedness in the imagination. “To reveal a new world is the function of creation in all 
the arts,” Varèse wrote.205  It was only as such that Apollinaire could speak of how the fables of 
art—things like transatlantic flight, or the X-rays first posed by books and such—had become 
scientific reality, which meant that it was “now up to the poet to imagine new ones for inventors 
to implement in their turn.”206 Art was, in this sense, to take the baton and run with it, only to 
pass it back to science once the next stage of its work was done. On and on they would go in an 
endless relay race of the new and newer, newer and newest, conceivably without end. Before 
moving on to explore some of the consequences of this cheek-by-jowl relationship with science, 
let us take a moment to explore the presence of one such nature-rejuvenating scientific idea, the 
fourth dimension, in Varèse’s writings and music.   
 Hardly could there have been a better example of science imagining the world otherwise 
than the discovery of the fourth dimension. As we have been saying, the value of science for 
artists had been its ability to provide renewed images of an otherwise petrified and disenchanted 
nature, and nothing could have done this with more conceptual elegance—or in a way that was 
more easily adaptable to the artistic imagination—than a discovery that challenged the nature of 
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perception in such a pure and wholesale way. What the fourth dimension symbolized in that 
artistic imagination was, quite simply, transcendence: a reality beyond the prosaic material given 
of everyday life.
207
 And what was art if not itself an attempt to conjure out of the finite, 
contingent conditions of existence another dimension of experience? Science had managed to do 
just this, and it was now up to artists to answer in turn.  
As we saw, Varèse made frequent references to the fourth dimension. The most extensive 
reference comes from his lecture “The Liberation of Sound,” and as the title of that talk perhaps 
attests, it was not so much the fourth dimension as such that captivated Varèse but its nature as a 
symbol of liberating release from the worn-out, petrified forms of creative and non-creative 
experience alike (a subject we will explore in greater depth in the following chapter). We see this 
fascination with the beyond in Varèse’s work titles. Though they at first seem to all point to their 
own specific scientific worlds, each presumably with their own keys to interpretation, I would 
argue that what unites so many of them is their collective reference to this other dimension, so to 
speak, to this world beyond the prosaic and everyday. Hyperprism evoked the beyond of 
geometry, representative of the actual fourth dimension discussed above. Arcana implied the 
beyond both through its reference to alchemy (the metaphysical beyond of material existence) 
and through its epigraph’s reference to imagination as a transcendent power that “begets a new 
star and a new heaven,” images that welcome comparison with a fourth-dimension-like beyond. 
The “discoveries—new worlds on Earth, in the sky, or in the minds of men” of Amerique were 
no doubt references to similar Arcana-like regions of revelatory experience. And Espace, with its 
reference to the spatial and metaphorical infinite, undoubtedly had its own metaphysical 
implications. 
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Without question, then, Varèse’s works were beholden to some idea of a transcendent 
space just beyond the threshold of this-worldy experience, and one whose most potent model 
was the very real beyond that science had articulated in its fourth dimension. But we also know 
from earlier that, in the terms of everyday experience, the fourth dimensional beyond of science 
was a woefully abstract, largely intangible one in the face of which the artwork’s greatest 
contribution seemed to be the sense of concretion it could lend. This is how we interpreted 
Varèse’s sound projections, at any rate, calling them “metaphorical engagements” with the fourth 
dimension that domesticated that bewildering notion within the much more manageable bounds 
of the artwork. But in the wake of this newfound parity between art and science, in which the 
disciplines were responsible for mutually supportive (if still radically different) acts of revelatory 
discovery, we must ask whether or not this notion of art as a mere “metaphorical engagement” 
with science doesn’t give short shrift to the importance of art’s engagement with itself. The 
function of art, Varèse said, was the creation of a world—its own world, we must presume—and 
with science newly invested with what seemed to be a renewed, even metaphysical, sense of 
revelation, the pressure was on art not to merely imitate that abstract wonder but to rediscover 
within its own autonomous domain its own world-making capacity. Concretion, then, was not 
about making science into art. It was about the absorption and complete transformation of an 
emergent epistemological space into the way art thought about the possibilities of its own 
transcendence—one which, if realized, would signify a more meaningful type of beyond than 
science could ever provide.  
And so we’re inevitably led to ask: did Varèse’s orchestral works ultimately realize 
anything resembling such a transcendent artistic beyond? We know from our introduction and 
first chapter that our answer must lean towards no. Technique, as Varèse wrote, would never be 
108 
 
able to rise to the level of that original metaphysical conception. The means of sound projection 
would remain the mere “wall” that Russolo spoke of whose “window” out onto infinity could be 
conjured only obliquely. Varèse’s attempts at sound projection thus betrayed a music that was 
trying to escape itself and failing. It was trying to escape the profane materiality of its 
disenchanted dimension in order to rekindle a metaphysical fire in another. And yet it was an 
attempt, as Apollinaire had insinuated, that would always be by its bootstraps. “[The fourth 
dimension in art] is generated by the three known dimensions,” which is to say that it was 
forever contingent upon precisely the profane world that it was trying to escape. And yet it 
would keep trying—and exuberantly so—because to realize a new artistic dimension would be to 
return to art a certain dignity that it had for too long been without. Referring to Picasso’s work in 
the wake of the new physics, T.J. Clark writes: 
It was not a devising of a new description of the world—one in which, to take the most 
widely touted example, the terms of space and time were recast in a way that responded 
to changes out there in physics or philosophy. It was a counterfeit of such a description—
an imagining of what kind of things might happen to the means of Western painting if 
such a new description arose. And a thriving on that imagining: thriving here simply 
meaning an immense, unstoppable relish at putting the means of illusionism through their 
paces, making them generate impossible objects, pressing them on to further and further 
feats of intimation and nuance […]208 
 
 
Varèse’s sound projections were nothing if not these impossible objects created out of an 
“immense, unstoppable relish at putting the means of illusionism through their paces,” even if 
that relish resulted only in a “counterfeit description.”  
But were they means of carving out the eternal within the transient? Had they anything to 
do with Baudelaire’s artistic transcendence of time by way of time? We will need to wait to fully 
answer. But let us foreshadow the ending here and simply say here that in its failings, Varèse’s 
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art will assert less an eternity, magically conjured by way of the miracle of form, and more a 
horizon past which that eternity might one day be realized.  
 
For the time being, however, let us back up. Art had aligned itself explicitly with 
science—at least to the extent that it now took the latter as a model of inspirational revelatory 
power. And yet an important consequence emerges: what is certain is that, by aligning itself 
explicitly with science, art had implicitly acknowledged what could only be the greatest 
embarrassment to anything with eyes on the eternal: that it existed largely to be surpassed, that 
whatever world it created would exist only to be supplanted. If Baudelaire’s art had seized upon 
the transient only to draw a frame around it so that, within that hollowed out symbolic space, it 
could entertain dreams of eternity, it was an eternity that for Varèse was now in lockstep with 
science and thus destined to be replaced by another.    
Now to be sure, this entire problematic is one synonymous with the question of 
modernism itself. As we have in many ways already seen, art is always at once the absolutely 
modern act of making in the present, and also always an already made thing that, like the ashes 
left behind by the flames of De Man’s creative fire, is little more than the corpse of a decayed 
present that must again be renewed.
209
 It was out of this awareness of meaning’s inevitable 
decay—of the mortality of nature in the wake of history—that Baudelaire had formed his 
historical theory of beauty in the first place. What is of interest to us in Apollinaire and Varèse’s 
writings is the way they call attention to this paradox, to the inevitable entwinement of art with 
the very temporality it attempts to overcome. In the face of such a heightened consciousness of 
time, art comes to identify with its aggressor, seeking an end in what by definition could never 
deliver it.   
                                                 
209
 De Man, “Literary History and Literary Modernity,” 389. 
110 
 
In an unpublished lecture on Busoni, Varèse put it this way: “art like science can 
only live in a state of perpetual unrest and revolution.” 210 Hardly just a one off remark, it 
was a rhetoric that appeared elsewhere:   
Music must submit itself to the rigors of creative anxiety and to the discipline of constant 
tension. It must rediscover its normal state of permanent revolution together with its 
desire to be different from what it has been in the masters of the past. […the] most 
important element in a work of art is its newness.
211
 
  
“Unrest,” “revolution,” “tension”—none of this is the language of an aesthetic that has 
any pretense of having extricated itself from time. But then suddenly, neither does the 
restlessness of science seem to account for this language either. What will be helpful at this 
point—even if it initially strikes one as far-fetched—is to consider how this interminable 
revolutionizing, this newness for the sake of itself, elides with the rhetoric of capitalism. Almost 
imperceptibly, the rhetoric of reimagining, of the creation of new worlds, and of the need for 
constantly renewed scientific and artistic wonder has begun to blur together with that of 
commodity production. Capitalism abhors stasis; it must reproduce or it dies. If it produces 
useful things, it does so not necessarily as ends in themselves but only insofar as they encourage 
further exchange and with that exchange, further production. This is to say that the products—in 
the case of art, the artworks—are less important than the circulation that their constant 
production and consumption encourages. I would argue that we find something of this in 
Varèse’s rhetoric of revolution: a shift from product to process, from the work as an endpoint—
the eternal in the transient, extracted from the circuit of constant exchange—to the work as a 
mere point in a chain of endless production. In a sense, then, Varèse’s obsession with science 
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only strengthens this complicity. Connected only dubiously now to notions of progress and yet 
still charged with the task of constantly creating the new, science comes to reinforce the 
injunction of capitalism, whose task is to blindly create that new at whatever cost.   
 What do we make of this capitulation to capitalist time? What does it mean that 
the lifeblood of art is now in its constant effacement? In 1922, shortly after Varèse arrived in 
America, Max Weber asked a similar question in regards to science: 
“Every scientific ‘fulfillment’ […] asks to be ‘surpassed’ and outdated. In principle this 
progress goes on ad infinitum. And with this we come to inquire into the meaning of 
science. For, after all, it is not self-evident that something subordinate to such a law is 
sensible and meaningful in itself. Why does one engage in doing something that in realty 
never comes, and never can come, to an end?
 212
 
 
Historically, what could come to an end was the artwork, whose role had been less to constantly 
upend the world as it had been to create, by way of its peculiar hermetic language, a definitively 
new one. Baudelaire’s task of finding the eternal in the transient was nothing if not precisely 
this—the end-ness of art, the delineation of a world within and yet outside of time. For the latter, 
it is as though the artwork participated in the new only insofar as it drew a frame around it to 
allow for a kind of intimate nearness to a present that was otherwise unobtainable.  Now, 
however, it is as though the eternal was losing out to the mere task of keeping up. Weber had 
inquired into the meaning of what could never come to an end. And yet in the face of the 
disorienting experience of time unique to the early 20
th
 century, we are led to wonder instead 
how the finality of the artwork—the seeming completeness of its formal principle—could ever 
stand a chance against a social experience so defined by constant change.  
 What I want to propose is that these different manifestations of the artwork—the work as 
the “eternal within the transient” and the work as its own constant displacement—ultimately 
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correspond to two distinct levels of experience, which change in their relative proportions as the 
experience of time changes through history. Here, I want to once again invoke the distinction we 
made above between art’s imaginative kinship with the discoveries of scientific modernity and 
its nature as a private act within and in response to the temporality generated therein. I will argue 
that these in turn correspond to the competing temporalities we invoked in chapter one—the 
more linear time of the metropolis and more circular time of the village—whose violent 
juxtaposition was so crucial to the particularly vivid experience of time for early modernism. 
What emerges between these is, I think, what we can roughly understand to be a general time of 
the subject (a subjected time, we might say), and a time of the individual, respectively. Our goal 
will be to see how the artwork responds to both at once—to the former, as something that obeys 
the injunction to be constantly new, and to the latter as something that, even as it is obeying this 
injunction, establishes a more intimate relationship to the Baudelairian eternity that otherwise 
seems to have been occluded from experience.
213
   
 
In our first chapter, we discussed the way that the time of the city—the linear time of 
clocks, progress, and discovery—could contrast so violently  in the early twentieth century (to 
such a greater extent than today) with the still-pervasive ritualistic, circular time of the village. It 
was that contrast, I argued, that lent the experience of the former its shock-like character, its 
alienating otherness, as individuals such as Varèse encountered it for the first time as they moved 
from rural settings to new jobs in cities such as Paris and New York. What I want to do now is 
lend a psychoanalytic dimension to that otherness and consider the ways it might have imposed 
itself as a kind of social injunction to which the individual had no choice but to submit. Indeed, 
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we remember that for Varèse, music was to do no less than “submit itself to the rigors of creative 
anxiety [emphasis mine]” to “rediscover its state of permanent revolution.”214 And we cannot 
forget another passage from above, worth revisiting in full:  
At a time when the very newness of the mechanism of life is forcing our activities and 
our forms of human association to break with the traditions and the methods of the past in 
the effort to adapt themselves to circumstances, the urgent choices which we have to 
make are concerned not with the past but with the future. We cannot, even if we would, 
live much longer by tradition. The world is changing, and we change with it. The more 
we allow our minds the romantic luxury of treasuring the past in memory, the less able 
we become to face the future and to determine the new values which can be created in it 
[emphasis mine].
215
 
 
What is crucial about this passage is the way it allows us to read modernism’s abandonment of 
tradition as occurring not because of some giddy fetishism of the new but rather as the result of 
this social-capitalist injunction in the face of which the individual has little control.
216
 Moreover, 
we see it as an injunction that is in many ways ideological because of the way it is misrecognized 
as an objective necessity. This is what Adorno means when he writes that  
the authority of the new is that of the historically inevitable. To this extent it implies 
objective criticism of the individual, the vehicle of the new: In the new the knot is tied 
aesthetically between individual and society.
217 
  
The new exerts its power precisely by seeming unavoidable, as not a choice among others 
but as a given, and one the individual buys into in a manner that both perpetuates the new and its 
subjection. As we will come to see, this entire process bears more than a little resemblance to the 
individual’s original subjection to language where, faced with the overwhelming presence of the 
father, it is forced to abandon a more immediately meaningful kind of experience (tradition, in a 
sense) for one mediated through the forms of the other (the new, the modern). The substitute 
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pleasures of the signifier become the ill-fitting means by which the subject must try to recognize 
itself, and yet the inadequacy of those means assures that that recognition will not happen 
without a corresponding sense of loss or castration. 
Turning to art proper, we find in Marx a very similar language that allows us to 
understand a related process of alienation in the artwork’s turn towards the new.218 There is on 
the one hand what we might call the ideal relationship of the subject to art, one in which the 
work is first and foremost a special type of labor through which the subject contemplates his 
“species being” by, to repeat Hegel’s words, “strip[ping] the external world of its inflexible 
foreignness […] to enjoy in the shape of things only an external realization of himself.”219 It is a 
way, in other words, of feeling at home in the world and at home in nature, of creating an image 
of the world that appears inherently meaningful because one can recognize oneself concretely in 
it. If such an art is an example of what Marx called free production, then the moment of 
subjection to the new is the moment when this production becomes, like the desire of the 
linguistic subject, mediated through the other, alienated production from which a certain value or 
degree of recognition has been extracted. If in language, that sense of loss is an effect of the 
signifier’s inadequacy, in art, we might say that it is caused by abstraction, that quotient of the 
work in which the subject can no longer concretely recognize himself. 
Now to be sure—and we will touch on this more below—newness need not necessarily 
be synonymous with abstraction or alienation, and we need only look to the majority of art 
before modernism to see exactly how. But at the same time, we should be careful to not assume 
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that this same art is not still in some way subjugated to the new. If Marx’s free production is not 
yet abstract, it is potentially only because “production [in the name of the new] has not yet 
outstripped consumption,” so to speak. That is, despite its subjection to the new, the subject is 
still able to recognize itself and its concrete needs in what it produces. What is significant about 
modernism is that, as what we might call a more advanced stage of production, it can be 
interpreted as revealing what we might call the truth of the new insofar as the new in modernity 
is increasingly tied to capitalism. Simply put, the truth of the new is revealed to be the command, 
the fact that “one must be absolutely modern” despite all, the new for the sake of only itself. The 
production of the new arises, that is, not out of some socially articulated need but rather merely 
for the sake of its own impulsion, its own “permanent revolution,” its need to innovate at all 
costs.
220
 Contrary to more traditional modes, then, modernism would represent a situation in 
which production had outstripped consumption to reveal its relative indifference towards the 
latter.
221
  
We see then how it is in the work’s abstraction that this newness-as-command reveals 
itself: abstraction betrays that degree of freedom robbed from the production process, that ability 
to feel fully at home in the work’s concretion.222 What is just as important to emphasize here, 
however, is how this notion of deprivation via abstraction, while qualitatively unique to 
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modernism, has its roots in the inaugural command of modernity in general. As we said above, 
modernity in general begins with an injunction to turn away from the past. Baudelaire’s search 
for poetry within the ephemeral, the fugitive, and the contingent was nothing if not a search for 
meaning in the wake of the limiting conditions established by that command. As such, modernity 
must turn towards a present that is now emptied of a priori meaning,
223
 a blank space from which 
all significance has been robbed. It is thus in this turn towards the future that the present 
embodies another kind of abstraction in that its value has yet to be concretized, a space in which 
the possibility of being at home in the world is in no way guaranteed, and upon which the subject 
must once again labor in order to try to realize that “external realization of himself.” Art in 
modernity is every bit a form of this laboring, this tireless homebuilding or constant testing to 
see what—if any—meaning can be created out of that present. In this sense, every turn towards a 
new present initially brings with it an experience of alienation similar to the experience of 
abstraction before the modernist work. Or let us put it this way: the experience of abstraction 
before the modernist work gives synchronic expression to the diachronic experience of 
modernity in general.  
 But what is most important is the way both of these experiences bring with them an 
intensified sense of futurity. Meaning has gone from being an always-available condition 
(tradition) to being something that, now tied inextricably to the new, is either just over the 
horizon or abstract once it finally arrives. What Nietzsche referred to as the “loss of the mythical 
home” is precisely this displacement of significance from the presence and onto an indeterminate 
future, significance as that ever-elusive God “who is coming.”224 
Adorno puts it this way: “Itself unattainable,”  
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newness installs itself in the place of overthrown divinity [disenchantment, the loss of the 
“mythical home”] amidst the first consciousness of the decay of experience. But its 
concept remains chained to that sickness, as its abstraction attests, impotently reaching 
for a receding concreteness.”225 
 
What Adorno is describing here is a situation of diminishing returns whereby meaning 
must be sought in the new even as it is increasingly the new that causes a steady impoverishment 
of the quality of that meaning. This is once again because the experience of the new as 
something produced solely for the sake of itself eventually comes to displace whatever it might 
be able to offer in the way of concrete meaningfulness. We find then a continuum of sorts over 
which the gloomy truth of this solipsistic production gradually reveals itself, beginning with 
modernity’s inaugural turn towards the new and culminating in modernism’s potentially dark 
caricature of it.  
But curiously, we might just as productively put this in the language of desire. What, 
after all, does this nagging sense of futurity, this “God who is coming,” and this impotent reach 
for a “receding concreteness” attest to if not that? We were already nearing this realm when, 
regarding Baudelaire, we spoke of the incessant decay and renewal of those artistic moments so 
pregnant with life. Disenchantment was all about this battle to try and maintain some sort of 
contact with meaning in the wake of time. In many ways, what we find in Varèse’s rhetoric is an 
intensification of this experience to the point where the engagement with artworks begins to take 
on the character of desire proper—the experience of the present, that is, less as a relatively stable 
moment of created meaning and more the site of pure difference, the mere “vacuum through 
which other such moments may metonymically rush, each casually effacing itself for the 
next.”226 Whether our paradigm here is the signifier-to-signifier movement of a properly 
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psychoanalytic desire or the “permanent revolution” of commodity production, what we must see 
in the breathless displacement of one new work with another is this implicit sense of a “not yet” 
to the concretion of meaning, a sense that meaning is always coming, and one that abstractions of 
modernism only exacerbate.  
We will say more about this “not yet” shortly. But let us bracket this discussion for now 
in order to say something about that other level of artistic experience we mentioned above: the 
level not of the subject and subjection to the new but of the individual. If the former represented 
an experience of the artwork as a kind of command-induced constant production for the other, 
then the latter would involve the experience of art less as this compromised social production 
and more as a private act within and through that production. It would be the level upon which 
art, by way of its peculiar way of participating in the new, at once removes the individual from 
the “tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow” of permanent revolution in order to establish a 
more intimate relationship with the more concrete meaning that it excludes.  
Now to be sure, we just finished discussing how nothing is quite so tied to the new as is 
modernism. And so we hardly need mention again that, insofar as modernism is an art about the 
consequences of modernity, about the erosion of inherited meaning (Adorno’s “decay of 
experience”) and the need to create it anew around every turn, it not only participates in but is in 
many ways about the new. Its great subject is the new. To cite T.J. Clark once more, it is a 
putting to the test of the representational practices of an era to see what concrete meaning can be 
wrought from those practices’ limiting conditions.  
What is potentially different about those representational practices as filtered through the 
artwork, however, is once again their scope, and it is here that we finally return to our 
Baudelairean reading of Varèse and see how the concreteness we discussed might still be 
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applicable.  By way of the handmade labor that results in art, those otherwise abstract 
representational practices—in Varèse, the fourth dimension is a perfect example—are brought 
down to the level of an objective totality in which the individual can finally find himself 
reflected, if only because it is his/her hand that wrought it. That is, in its ideal form the artwork 
represents a world, wrought from the abstract real world, in which the individual can feel at 
home because he recognizes himself and his hand in it. This is what concretion means: the 
feeling of situatedness and being at home in the world, the sense of a “harmony with external 
existence…displayed as originating from human activity and as produced thereby.”227  
But when we talk about individual artworks in this manner, we do nothing to answer the 
question of what happens when one home has to be abandoned for another, so to speak. How, in 
other words, do we reconcile the individual’s experience of the singular work with the 
inevitability of its displacement with another? Or put yet another way, how do we reconcile this 
private individual with the social necessity of the subject? This is, of course, as much a question 
for Baudelaire as it is for Varèse, and the answer will once again have to do with that notion of 
the eternal within the transient, although with the exception that here the eternal will be 
something gratified across artworks rather than located within singular examples. In other words, 
we find ourselves once again back in the realm of desire, which we can define here more 
specifically as the metonymic movement from art object to art object around a central, and very 
much absent, object/cause. What we must see is how desire represents a compromise of sorts 
between the level of the subject/subjection and the individual in that it is precisely desire that 
keeps the subject chained to the continued production of the new, but only insofar as that 
production in turn maintains an oblique relationship to (the memory of) a more original, non-
alienated kind of gratification. Varèse’s desire for constant artistic revolution would represent 
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this necessary movement from work to work which, at the same time, revolves silently around 
that more original experience that cannot be accounted for in the works themselves.
228
 We can 
think of this non-alienated experience as being exemplified by Marx’s free production in which 
what one finds in the work is not alienated production (production for the other, from which that 
crucial quota of “enjoyment” has been removed) but rather a (Hegelian, not Lukacsian) second 
nature in which the subject can feel at home because it is an objectification of his actions as a 
free species being.
229
 But psychoanalytic and Marxian minutia aside, the important point is that 
as the artwork is increasingly produced out of the injunction to be new at all costs, it begins to 
become detached from its own ideal and to enter into an oblique relationship with its non-
alienated double, evoking in effigy what it would truly like to be. “Art,” Adorno writes as though 
channeling Baudelaire, “is not identical to its empiria,” and nowhere more so than in 
modernism.
230
  
It is this oblique relationship that will concern us as we turn back to a discussion of 
Varèse proper and bring this chapter to a close. As we do so, it will help to remember that our 
desirous composer-subject, chained to the constant production of the new while “impotently 
reaching for a receding concreteness,” is all a more abstract way of describing what we earlier 
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put in simpler terms: the increasingly futile attempt, made through the artwork, to feel at home in 
a world increasingly marked by a radically disorienting experience of time. It has been a question 
of finding meaning in a present whose window has begun contracting to the point where, 
transformed into the pure negativity of time itself, it appears to close altogether.  
 
The Threshold 
 
 
What can be the status of the artwork in such a situation? If the present has ceased to be a 
fleeting moment of being in which the artwork can secure and confer its tenuous meaning, then 
how could it be anything but a kind of doomed allegory of the present whose assertions of the 
limits of experience are just as much those of a promissory future?
231
 I would argue that the 
artwork comes to have precisely this status in Varèse, the status of a kind of threshold whose 
reason for existence is to be crossed. 
 The word “threshold” is, of course, Varèse’s own, which we have already encountered 
once before. It was “at the threshold of beauty,” we remember, “that science and art collaborate.” 
Explaining this earlier by way of Baudelaire, we said that science defined a threshold in the 
sense that it represented the present at its most transient, which, as only one half of beauty, 
needed the eternal “something more” of art to make that beauty whole.232 Science “asks to be 
surpassed,” Weber wrote, as though a significant portion of its being were in its own negation, 
with every discovery being at once a symbol of presence and a profane allegory of the greater 
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things sure to come.
233
 What we must wonder, then, is whether an art based more and more on 
this increasingly disorienting temporality of science wouldn’t itself ultimately “ask” to be 
surpassed—if the entire work itself wouldn’t come to define the threshold whose claims on the 
present served as much to define an oblique relationship to that “god who is coming” out of the 
promissory future.  
What we are asking, in other words, is the place and function of the work in relation to 
the desire that exceeds it. We asked a version of this question in chapter one, in which desire was 
implicated at the threshold at which the clumsy signifiers of the musical symbolic (the tempered 
scale) strained asymptotically towards the “infinite gradations” (Busoni, etc.) of the musical real. 
But we also encounter it in Varèse’s continuation of  a quote we examined above: 
truth exists only insofar as art gives it a meaning. The joy of the artist is in the hunt…For 
my part, I cannot resist that burning desire to go beyond the limits [emphasis mine].
234
  
 
The artwork’s job was to seize the contingent, infinite becoming of truth and impose some sort 
of meaning on it by way of its peculiar form of objectification. Yet that objectification, as at once 
a kind of petrification of meaning, could not help but articulate yet another limit that merely 
created the desire to be crossed. Every work, it seems, is destined to become a new threshold 
traced by De Man’s “ashes left behind by the uniquely shaped flames of a fire.”235 Varèse’s 
“burning” desire to cross the limit is precisely that fire whose cathexis at once initiates the rapid 
decay of its own material support, creating the need for another in the new, and on and on.  
 Something of this objectless desire is implied by the epigraph, oft quoted by Varèse, 
from Busoni’s Enwurf, in which the “known” and “unknown” define the place of the threshold:   
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What seek you? Say! And what do you expect?”— 
I know not what; the Unknown I would have!  
What's known to me, is endless; I would go 
Beyond the known: The last word still is wanting.”236 
  
The last word is still wanting, the mythical and concrete home as infinitely receding as the 
boundary of knowledge itself. Varèse and Busoni are essentially blind seekers in the night for 
whom all that can be said of the object of artistic desire is that it is, quite simply, elsewhere. We 
see this oblique relationship even more vividly in a lecture Varèse once gave in which he cited 
Pascal, stating that “the more we enlarge the sphere of our knowledge, the more we augment our 
point of contact with the unknown.”237  There couldn’t be a better image for the allegorical 
modernist work than this. Now cheek to cheek with scientific discovery, the work accomplishes 
a certain type of meaningful intimacy (“contact,” in Varèse’s word)—but not, it turns out, with 
anything objectified or immanent within the work itself. Rather, it is an intimacy with the pure 
negativity of the unknown, a kind of torturous, asymptotic nearness to what wasn’t but could one 
day possibly be.  
There forever stands a contradiction, then, between the seemingly infinite search for the 
unknown and the sense of finality offered by individual works. Art’s object-ness, its implicit 
sense of completion, cannot help but represent the desire for something decidedly outside of the 
endless quest for the unknown. The task, then, is to somehow take Varèse at his word that the 
“joy of the artist is in the hunt,” but also account for his somewhat contradictory claim that “truth 
exists only insofar as art gives it meaning.” In other words, we must account for the pleasure in 
the search itself, but also for the residual meanings that accrue in the form of works produced in 
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the process. Meaning demands a structure, a network of relations, some degree of permanence. 
This is what art gives to truth: that objectification seemingly standing outside of time.
238
 The 
question, then, becomes the following: even though these residual meanings, these art objects, 
seem destined to disenchantment, what positive content can we nonetheless ascribe to them? 
Adorno is once again of help:  
The relation to the new [or, to what lies across Varèse’s limit, the unknown, etc.] is 
modeled on a child at the piano searching for a chord never previously heard. This chord, 
however, was always there; the possible combinations are limited and actually everything 
that can be played on it is implicitly given in the keyboard. The new is the longing for the 
new, not the new itself: That is what everything new suffers from. What takes itself to be 
Utopia remains the negation of what exists and is obedient to it.
239
 
 
Here, Adorno is distinguishing two types of newness: the “chord never previously heard,” which 
would be a newness ultimately traceable back to the old (the 88 keys of the keyboard), and the 
truly new, which cannot be objectively accounted for. Art in the age of disenchantment has only 
the former out of which to conjure some intimation of the latter. That is, it has only the paltry 88 
keys of Baudelaire’s “incoherent heap of raw materials” to use as a means of creating some 
semblance of a meaningful, if not necessarily objectively accountable, world (for Varèse, this is 
the meaning art gives to truth). If art at times seems to have created this alternative in the form of 
a nature reconciled with the subject, then lest it become ideology, that alternative must ultimately 
be traced back to the very profane conditions it was trying to transcend.  
And yet this is also a moment at which a certain ontology or positive content can be 
ascribed to the artwork, if only in the form of negativity itself: an ontology of longing, to use 
Adorno’s word, the artwork as a kind of representation of a lack. Yes, art is deception, Adorno 
seems to say elsewhere. Yes, it is a kind of lie. But what remains once this critique has done its 
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work; what still stands once the fire has been lit, lingered, and died to ash; is the one aspect of art 
that—within modernism in particular—we must allow a degree of objective reality: 
possibility.
240
 “The reality of artworks,” writes Adorno, “testifies to the possibility of the 
possible.”241 Artworks not only create the semblance of a different world; they represent, by way 
of the modicum of human freedom that brings them into being, the possibility of one day 
actually achieving it.
242
  
Adorno is not writing in a vacuum here; his ontology of possibility has early modernist 
precedents. In his important “Salon of 1859,” Baudelaire wrote that the artwork “produces the 
sensation of newness [emphasis mine],” in a sense denying, much as Adorno did, that newness 
any sort of objective reality. But it was precisely that “sensation,” illusive or not, that was 
perhaps what was most real in the artwork. “The imagination,” Baudelaire went on, “is the queen 
of truth, and the possible is one of the provinces of truth. It has a positive relationship with the 
infinite."
243
 Possibility also occupied an important place for Breton in his surrealist manifesto, 
writing that “imagination alone offers me some intimation of what can be [emphasis mine]”244 
And there is even some degree to which Apollinaire’s high valuation of the notion of “surprise” 
in art largely concerned possibility insofar as it was based in the sense that the “unnatural” could 
arise out of the “natural,” a sign that some semblance of renewed meaning could still be wrought 
from a world constantly decaying into petrified forms.   
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What is important for this chapter, then, is the question of how we might situate this 
sense of possibility within a certain historical experience of modernity and its consequent 
temporality. T.J. Clark describes modernism as something “caught interminably between horror 
and elation at the forces driving it,”245 at once terrified by the implications of a world in which 
God is dead (Baudelaire’s contingency) and giddy with hope that technology, socialism, or other 
some other development might somehow take his place. Varèse’s impassioned, breathless 
rhetoric, we suggested, was evidence of an attempt to cope with this period of uncertainty, a 
commitment to the coming future as exciting as it was terrifying. We must situate Varèse’s 
rhetoric of possibility in this exact same place, within a historically locatable “modernist 
window” in which the alternatives to recently ousted social and cultural orders had yet to congeal 
into anything definitive. This is once again that transitional period of “incomplete 
modernization” in which the consequences of modernization—the replacement of myth with 
rationality, the sacred with the secular, or more concretely, the ancien règime with bourgeoisie 
democracy—had yet to colonize all aspects of daily life and thus close the window of hope in 
regards to what of modernity’s promise of a better world it might be able to deliver in the near 
future. 
246
 It was uncertain, for example,  whether socialism or (what we know today to be) a 
radicalized capitalism would come out of the Russian Revolution of 1905-7, an uncertainty that 
was only perpetuated by the revolution that followed shortly before Varèse’s move to America.   
But in any event, all of these developments—whether they be political or artistic—
contributed to a palpable sense of uncertainty and hope in the air, made possible by a particular 
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historical juncture. It is what Perry Anderson, in the context of precisely this modernist window, 
has called the “imaginative proximity of social revolution.”247 By revolution, Anderson is 
referring to both the general sense of anticipation and anxiety in the face of impending change as 
well as to the proximity of revolution proper. And as we began to see above, revolution had no 
so small a place in the creative imagination of Varèse himself. Though somewhat politically 
ambivalent,
248
 he had met both Lenin and Trotsky with great enthusiasm and was at times 
enamored with the revolutionary sentiment pervading Russia. Louise recalls:  
[Varèse]  believed that the old Russian bear with its new revolutionary physiognomy, 
which Varèse did not yet recognize as a false face, would receive him and his music with 
one of those warm Russian embraces he knew so well. For many years, for many of us, 
the Russian revolution was a fresh scintillating faith. We believed no bad of it, explained 
away all criticism. Both Varèse and Suzanne [Bing, his ex-wife] had frequented the 
Russian refugee milieu in Paris before World War I, and, as I have already mentioned, 
Varèse met Lenin. There, Varèse’s own idealization of revolution had lent Lenin a halo 
and his ruthless regime an aura of sanctity.
249
 
 
We see here two things: the first is the aforementioned sense of anticipation that pervaded the 
modernist window, a “revolutionary physiognomy” that had yet to reveal its “false face.” But we 
also see a close association of this physiognomy with Varèse’s own music. Heightening this 
connection is the fact that, in his personal copy of Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism, Varèse routinely underlined the phrase “raw materials,” which was one that he often 
used to describe sound in its function as a building block in his own music.
250
  
This is important. We noted earlier how one of the important ways various modernisms 
created meaning was by bringing the abstractions of modernity down to the level of the 
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individual’s concrete artistic labor, a labor that was meaningful because, unlike the world itself, 
the artist could discern his or her reflection in it. What we see here is not only another potential 
example of that tendency, but also a simple example of how world-historical, scientific, and 
private-artistic ideas alike could potentially elide together in the same imaginative space. In a 
letter written to Carlos Salzedo, sent shortly after Varèse had arrived in Paris, we get a sense of 
the meaningfulness produced by this comingling of scientific abstraction and artistic activity: 
Here I am installed in my new boutique for the last two weeks. You’d love it. And you 
would be pleased with my progress. I have the most beautiful entourage of the real 
young, and several pupils of talent. I am well known and liked in scientific circles: 
physic—mathematical—philosophical. I live in an atmosphere of spirituality very 
favorable to creation and my development. It’s magnificent. The new tendency of science 
is even freeing it from materialism and is becoming pure and luminous. One feels it 
reflected in the works of Einstein, Jeans, Eddington—and among not a few Americans—
and all this is consoling and gives strength.
251
 
 
Art has become a crucial mediator between modernity at its most abstract and concrete 
emotional, even spiritual, experience. Moreover, it has become infused with a sense of 
revolutionary possibility whose realization, if just beyond the threshold of the new, 
nonetheless seems immanent.  
 
Louise Varèse once noted that what captivated Varèse about science was its 
“tantalizing, continuously withdrawn, and renewed promise of revelation.” We would be 
remiss if we did not somehow connect this incessantly deferred satisfaction to the related 
promise that Stendhal (and by way of him, Baudelaire) saw in art: its promesse de 
bonheur. Within the coordinates of the modernist window, “revelation” comes to be only 
a few steps from its unlikely cousin, revolution. Both imply the truly new, the God—
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however secular—who is coming out of the promissory future. Modernism and Varèse 
both must be understood precisely here. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Varèse, Contact, Sound 
 
“Music is expressive, carrying us out of ourselves and beyond ourselves, into impersonal 
regions, into the stream of things; permitting us to feel the conditions under which objects 
exist, the forces playing upon human life. To live, to merge with the stream and become 
part of forces larger than ourselves, is to feel, to know something about the entire world; 
music lets us share in a great man’s absorption: at least to the degree to which we are 
capable of being lost to ourselves.” –Paul Rosenfeld 
 
 
What would it mean to touch one’s time? To make contact with the new? The question 
inevitably follows from Rimbaud’s injunction, made in the 1870s and so crucial to the 
modernism of Varèse and others, that one must “be absolutely modern."252 One must immerse 
one’s entire being in the stuff of the present, the poet seems to say, or risk being defined as little 
more than an “uninterrupted pastness,” tragically contingent upon a spent being found outside of 
oneself.
253
 If Rimbaud’s dream was in the end a dream of immediacy—of transcending the 
interminable stream of history to achieve some sort of pure presence—then it also betrayed an 
awareness, however latent, of the source of its own impossibility: of the incessant deferral of 
time from which any dream of presence must draw its breath. To touch one’s time, then, with all 
the unmediated certitude of felt contact: could there be a better symbol—or in some ways, a 
better mockery—of modernism’s utopian aspirations than that? 
 I offer this question as a way to begin thinking about a number of things: about the 
persistent rhetoric of contact that pervades both Varèse’s writings and the philosophical critique 
of modernity in general; about the place of that rhetoric of contact within the vivid experience of 
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time and disenchantment we have henceforth discussed; and ultimately, about the relationship of 
Varèse’s uniquely physical conception of sound to both. To be sure, several of the themes we 
will touch upon here will be familiar to us from previous chapters, particularly the last, which 
was in many ways its own take on this problem of maintaining contact with the “absolutely 
modern” in the context of a heightened consciousness of time. It was there that Rimbaud’s 
injunction surfaced in Varèse’s own writings, taking on the form of a command that could be 
obeyed in part through art’s collusion with science.254 But whereas there, the command was to be 
heeded for the sake of something beyond it—the stable sense of meaning constantly denied by 
the demand for newness, or the sense of possibility the new promised but could never deliver—
here, that command will be something heeded for its own sake insofar as it will come to be heard 
as issuing from nothing less than the life force itself.
255
 The mere act of obeying the command, 
of being absolutely modern in art, in other words, will at once be an act of maintaining a kind of 
life-perpetuating contact with the vital stream of modernity apart from which art could only, as 
Varèse put it, “begin to die.”256 What we find with even the most cursory glance at Varèse’s 
prose are precisely these fantasies of contact with modernity’s vital stream—fantasies of life-
stifling boundaries breached, of sounds freed from formal prisons to touch other sounds, and of a 
general condition of sonic and social intimacy associated with the unimpeded flow of the élan 
vital. What will ultimately interest us here is the particularly tactile nature of these fantasies as 
well as the way they relate not merely to the generic dreams of transcendence common to so 
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many aesthetics across historical boundaries, but also to a specific form of intimacy born from 
the acute sense of separation unique to the period we associate with modernism. In other words, I 
am interested in the way Varèse’s dreams of contact live in modernity’s condition of diremption, 
in that feeling or fear, expressed by so many post-war artists and thinkers, of somehow being cut 
off from or left behind by modernity’s vertiginous temporality. It is a feeling that is intimately 
related to the increasingly bureaucratic, specialized, and differentiated nature of a society in 
whose ever-changing structures the individual struggles increasingly to recognize itself, and in 
which the resultant quality of experience—its capacity for generating meaning—is atrophied 
from felt participation to distanced contemplation.  
It is tempting to find in this scenario a description of modernity as fitting for our own 
time as it is for Varèse’s, an image so familiar, admittedly clichéd, and applicable to a now 
centuries-old social experience as to seem almost meaningless. But while we can certainly 
characterize our own present as an intensification and continuation of these tendencies towards a 
disconnected and atomized social experience—a playing out of the “consequences of 
modernity,” to use Anthony Giddens’ phrase257—to assume that this experience is comparable in 
intensity to that of Varèse’s generation is to forget that modernity’s reach was once not so 
pervasive and thus potentially much more disorienting when finally encountered. What we 
discussed in the first chapter as modernity’s “incomplete” nature will nowhere be more 
applicable than here. The metropolis, we remember, could take on its shock-like character for the 
WWI generation because of the way it contrasted so violently with a still-pervasive, alternate 
temporality of the rural—that is, with a more circular sense of time based in ritual and tradition 
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as opposed to the linear, irreversible time of development and progress.
258
 For Varèse, that 
alternate temporality was the Burgundian countryside of his childhood, which was no doubt the 
backdrop against which the shocks of both the war and of city life could register with such 
intensity.
259
 But this is all merely to say that the particular urgency of Varèse’s rhetoric of 
contact—and of the utopian leanings of modernism in general—have little to do with a time such 
as our own in which the constant displacement generated by capitalism and innovation have 
grown so ubiquitous as to be virtually invisible. They have to do, rather, with the existential 
feelings generated by an acute awareness of this disorienting temporality as it emerged out of a 
historically localizable older order.  
We find a breathtaking description of this type of transitional experience in an anecdote 
from Mexican poet Octavio Paz, himself an astute theoretician of modernity.  Describing the 
richly collected, imaginative sense of time that characterized his childhood, Paz writes: 
All time, past or future, real or imaginary, was pure presence. Space transformed itself 
ceaselessly. The beyond was here, all was here: a valley, a mountain, a distant country, 
the neighbours’ patio. Books with pictures, especially history books, eagerly leafed 
through, supplied images of deserts and jungles, palaces and hovels, warriors and 
princesses, beggars and kings. […] The world was limitless yet it was always within 
reach; time was a pliable substance that weaved an unbroken present.
260
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Here, time is a totality gathered together in a meaningful whole, one which renders the 
remotest things and memories seemingly near. But it is an experience that would soon be 
shattered by the simple occasion of seeing a photograph of soldiers returning home from the 
war.
261
 If before, the experience of that event had remained largely within the cohesive inner life 
of the imagination, it was now torn from that protected space and externalized in all its brute 
realness as a distant, more authentic temporality from which one had been violently expelled:  
From [that moment of seeing the photograph,] time began to fracture more and more. 
And there was a plurality of spaces. The experience repeated itself more and more 
frequently. Any piece of news, a harmless phrase, the headline in a newspaper: 
everything proved the outside world’s existence and my own unreality. I felt that the 
world was splitting and that I did not inhabit the present. My present was disintegrating: 
real time was somewhere else. My time, the time of the garden, the fig tree, the games 
with friends, the drowsiness among the plants at three in the afternoon under the sun, a 
fig torn open […]: this was a fictitious time. In spite of what my senses told me, the time 
from over there, belonging to the others, was the real one, the time of the real present. I 
accepted the inevitable: I became an adult. That was how my expulsion from the present 
began.
262
 
 
In a single moment of undoing, time has become spatialized, removed from the private 
durée of collected inner life and externalized as something to experience from without. Like an 
interminable pageant in which the line between spectator and participant has been sharply 
defined, the authentic present was now an object unto itself, always elsewhere, and able to be 
perceived as such only because of one’s expulsion from it. 
For a different, less anecdotal account of the emergence of this “modernist time 
sensibility,” we can look to the work of historian Peter Galison, who has discussed it in relation 
to more practical, material concerns: the need to synchronize clocks and time zones in order to 
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accommodate the increasingly transnational nature of the railroads.
263
  Of the late nineteenth 
century, he writes:  
Train lines had altered the experience of time across Europe and North America; more 
than that, for an ever-growing portion of the population, railroad schedules had come to 
define time, instantiate synchronicity.Indeed, without the quintessentially modern trains 
and telegraphs, the temporal structure of the world would, for most people, drift from its 
moorings.
264
 
 
It is interesting to note that railway time throughout Varèse’s France wasn’t fixed to a single 
locale until 1888—five years after his birth—and that it wasn’t until the 1870s and 1880s that 
clocks around Paris were synchronized for the first time. The alternate temporality of the urban 
was thus hardly just a matter for introspective poets; it was a material reality manifested daily in 
the marvel of the new steam-powered clock faces that would have reminded passers-by—
especially those coming from rural settings such as Varèse—of its newly externalized, 
standardized, reified status. Time, in short, had become an other, a former seat of subjective 
experience rendered abject and uncanny. 
As a way to begin situating this reality in a critical light, it will help to remember that the 
myriad descriptions of time we find throughout the philosophical discourse of modernity—and 
we can include here Baudelaire’s “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent” from the last 
chapter—are nothing if not responses to this emergent and seemingly inassimilable temporality. 
We will remember that what Baudelaire desired was just such a comingling of the subject and 
nature, itself an implicit critique of an alienated modernity whose best spokesman was Kant. 
Having defined experience in terms of dirempt subjects and objects, Kantian epistemology gave 
philosophical expression to the very real sense of separation experienced by those for whom 
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having mere knowledge of the world was not the same as living meaningfully within it.
265
 Thus, 
for Baudelaire, the “duality of art” was “a fatal consequence of the duality of man,” a condition 
which art was to nonetheless rectify through the “creation of an evocative magic, containing at 
once subject and object.” 266 We find related discourses on contact elsewhere, such as in 
Bergson, for whom the time of modernity was something most authentically experienced from 
within, rather than through the ready-made filters of spatial concepts, from without. The mimetic 
theories of Adorno and Benjamin, to name yet another example, were no less concerned with 
retrieving their own kind of contact between subjective experience and the world,  intent on 
rescuing what of that  “nonsensous similarity” had been repressed in the disenchantment of 
language.
267
 The philosophical discourse of modernity has itself, in other words, always been a 
discourse about contact, operating under the presumptions that modernity embodies a condition 
of diremption to be overcome; and alternately, that to experience the world uncoercively and 
meaningfully is in some sense to touch it. 
This, at any rate, will be our basic point of departure for coming to grips with Varèse’s 
own tactile fantasies. It is also the perspective that will enable us to interpret those fantasties as 
implying a desire for a kind of participation in time that will resonate strongly with the 
existential choice Bergson seems to offer between merely knowing time in a spatial sense or 
actually living it as durée.
268
 The consequences of choosing the former, of being a mere spectator 
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of modernity, are perhaps nowhere better captured than in a dramatic passage we have already 
encountered from Varèse’s good friend Apollinaire:  
The rainbow is bent, the seasons quiver, the crowds push on to death, science undoes and 
remakes what already exists, whole worlds disappear forever from our understanding, our 
mobile images repeat themselves, or revive their vagueness, and the colors, the odors, 
and the sounds to which we are sensitive astonish us, then disappear from nature—all to 
no purpose.
269
 
 
Beneath Apollinaire’s bent rainbow, quivering with the crowds, Rimbaud’s insistence on 
being “absolutely modern” seems less the fickle whim of an aesthete or dandy who fears falling 
out of fashion and more the injunction of someone who, toeing the fringes of nihilism, senses 
that nothing less than meaning is at stake.
270
 We have already spoken in other chapters of how 
this high valuation of the “absolutely modern” is intimately related to the erosion of the past as a 
guarantor of meaning in the present, and also to the disappearance of tradition as a source from 
which the now might draw its self-understanding.
271
 It is my contention that the particular 
urgency of Varèse’s rhetoric of contact cannot be understood apart from this very real and 
sobering consequence of modernity’s heightened consciousness of time. To put this differently, I 
believe that modernism’s hyperbolic language, its charged if sometimes forced excitement about 
its own procedures and possibilities, stems in large part from the simultaneous exhilaration and 
terror that comes from sensing the contingency behind those procedures, from the awareness that 
to participate in modernity is to take what is at root a very personal risk: a risk of throwing 
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oneself into artistic gestures or ways of living whose meaning can in no way be guaranteed by 
tradition but that must instead be obtained by the fact of their newness alone.
272
 
But participation in modernity nonetheless demands precisely this act of throwing, and 
perhaps even regardless of what meaning it produces. What will concern us in this chapter in 
distinction to the last, then, is in part Varèse’s high valuation of that mere impulse, that mere 
gesture of the new, one unmediated by ready-made cultural forms borrowed from the past, as the 
ultimate gesture of solidarity with modernity’s own tireless production. Modernity here will be 
less something to make sense of through the evocative magic offered by particular artworks and 
more something to be, something to almost perform by way of a complete devotion to the 
constant self-refashioning inherent in modernity itself. To maintain contact with the vital stream 
will thus be to contribute to it, not as any sort of being imposed on becoming but through that 
creative impulse that brings being into its own in the first place.
273
  
And yet at its most extreme, it will come in the form of simulating, or even inducing, the 
abandonment of being altogether in favor of the constant self-overcoming implicit in time itself. 
Contact can be spiritual. It can be an interpersonal kind of intimacy based in recognition or 
empathy, a kind of spatialized sense of being-with wholly indifferent to time. But contact can 
also be literal, a matter for the skin and not the mind, blind to everything but the incandescent 
moment in which it is initiated. We have already encountered one scenario which will both 
complicate and provide clues as to which of these Varèse might have preferred. If it was 
participation via contact that he might have wanted, then one could hardly have participated 
more intimately with their modernity than did Varèse with his siren, as we saw in our first 
chapter. It was precisely contact that was decisive in that definitively modern scenario, provided 
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by a siren which, irrespective of subjective or domestic bounds, inscribed itself into the 
composer’s subconscious. In such a position of vulnerability, we can only imagine that time 
seemed less like Paz’s object to witness from a distance and more like an engulfing maelstrom in 
which one was caught and helplessly jostled. Whether Varèse’s art was meant to redeem that 
experience through a form of contact of its own will be the subject of the following pages. 
 
Nietzsche, Varèse, Forgetting 
 
 In the last chapter, we introduced the notion of the “eternal in the transient” as a 
way to think about the artwork’s relationship to the present in modernity. We considered the idea 
of the artwork as a site of world creation intent on crystallizing, by way of the most current codes 
of representation, the stable forms of meaning or concretion that modernity was otherwise 
without. It was a “creation from the created,” intent on hollowing out from within time the 
faintest meaning outside of time. But as we began to consider Varèse’s modernism more closely, 
a modernism so beholden to the unceasing cravings of a science which, in Max Weber’s words, 
existed only to be surpassed, this reading became increasingly difficult to sustain. Artworks 
seemed to be less about what they actually manifested in the way of the eternal by way of their 
form and more about their mere successive acts, collectively realizing what Varèse called their 
necessary state of “permanent revolution.”  They manifested a kind of temporal ambivalence in 
which there was always a question of whether they were to stop time within the bounds of their 
form, or were actually to assert it as tokens of mere successive difference. Ultimately, the work 
could do little more than define a limit, establishing a relationship to the concrete somewhere in 
the promissory future.  The revolution loomed large in recent memory; the push of modernity 
had to be headed somewhere, after all. 
140 
 
 But there is also the possibility that the push itself was the point. At the root of 
Varèse’s notion of the artwork as “permanent revolution,” in other words, it is possible to detect 
the elevation of the transient itself to a kind of ontological status, sanctioned no doubt by the 
seeming ubiquity of both scientific and capitalist change, and more importantly, by the 
conflation of those things into what we might call a more general discourse of life. We could see 
it as an ideologically conceived vitalism, in other words, embraced by artists as a kind of 
capitulation to what was, from the perspective of the last chapter’s conception of the work, the 
enemy. In one sense, life is the very thing that destroys the work, what ages it and causes its 
meaning to fade. But it is also what creates the work, not to mention what flows through and 
serves as its very support. The question, then, becomes not how the work stops time within time 
in order to create meaning within it, but rather how the work manifests and even enhances the 
time of which it is inevitably a part.  
It is thus not as much Baudelaire’s notion of the eternal in the transient that will be 
helpful here as much as a peculiarly related idea: Nietzsche’s notion of imposing being on 
becoming. Like Baudelaire, Nietzsche saw the artwork as having a privileged relationship to the 
eternal in the sense that it achieved the status of the supra-historical, to use Nietzsche’s word.274 
But whereas Baudelaire was mostly concerned with the products of this “forced idealization” of 
the present, the actual artworks, Nietzsche was just as much concerned with the mere act of 
creation itself, an act which contained the seeds of the constant self-overcoming and beginning-
again necessary for sustaining life—and we might say modernity insofar as it was often 
identified with life—itself.275 The urgency of this creative action was intimately tied to the 
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possibility of nihilism in the face of time, and relatedly, to the question of how one is to live 
urgently and meaningfully in the present in the face of what Nietzsche felt to be the contingent 
nature of all values. If history were largely a record of the devaluation of those values—of nature 
become transient, of withered truths—then any existence mediated through history’s recalcitrant 
forms—memory, past experience, or even knowledge itself as an inevitable product of past 
experience—would be an impoverished existence. It would be a sublimated, internalized 
existence experienced though the filter of petrified thoughts rather than externalized through the 
direct participation in the present afforded by action.
276
 If the reality of truth were actually its 
creative, subjective nature, then to truly live was to embrace one’s status as a creator of history 
rather than an observer of it, breaking through the mediated cocoons of memory and knowledge 
in order to actually participate in the world’s perpetual creation and destruction.277   
 We can think of life in Nietzsche, then, as a kind of repetition-avoiding direct contact 
maintained with the history-creating stream of modernity, one of the most important aspects of 
which was a radical forgetting. To create in the present was for Nietzsche unthinkable without 
some degree of willed ignorance of the past.
278
 Without forgetting, man would be “condemned to 
see everywhere a state of becoming” and would “no longer believe in his own being, […] would 
see everything flowing asunder in moving points and would lose himself in this stream.”279 To 
overcome this nihilism; to participate in this stream rather than merely be carried along by it, the 
subject imposed an artificial horizon of experience on becoming, enclosing himself in a kind of 
framed present within which he could engage with the creation of new culture largely 
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unmediated by the past.
280
 No artist, Nietzsche insisted, could ever create without desiring this 
ahistorical condition.
281
  
We cannot help but recall here the disorienting time consciousness discussed in the last 
chapter, engendered largely by the upheavals of the new physics to which Varèse was so attuned, 
and exemplified by Apollinaire’s description from above in which science “undoes and remakes 
what already exists” and “whole worlds disappear forever from our understanding,” “all to no 
purpose.” And it is as read through this specifically Nietzschean lens—of creation and 
destruction elevated to a general principle of life, of forgetting as essential to maintaining 
unmediated contact with that life—that a related discourse begins to emerge in Varèse. In 
numerous places, we find a similar correlation, for example, between life and the necessity of 
maintaining a kind of unmediated, boundary-defying contact with the incessant stream of 
modernity.  Similar to Nietzsche, Varèse’s obsession with the unmediated present stemmed from 
a disdain for what he saw to be a rampant and debilitating historical sensibility that insulated 
people from a real engagement with the present. Not surprisingly, an inability to forget was 
partly to blame. In a July 1924 article in the Musical Standard, Varèse accused the bourgeoisie 
of being educated solely in terms of memory, having ceased to learn or to experience anything 
authentically new.
282
 It was a sentiment he later put in more explicitly Nietzschean terms in the 
journal Possibilities, where he accused composers themselves of being “incapable of 
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forgetting.”283 They would do well, he suggested, to take as their model Jean Christophe, the 
titular composer-hero of Romain Rolland’s novel, who had made the discovery that  
none of the ancient molds were suited to them; if he wished to fix his visions with fidelity 
he had to begin by forgetting all the music he had heard, all that he had written, to make a 
clean slate of all the formalism he had learned, of traditional technique, to throw away 
those crutches of impotency, that bed, all prepared for the laziness of those who, fleeing 
the fatigue of thinking for themselves, lie down in other men’s thoughts.284 
 
Modernity never stopped to rest. It was virile and unrelenting, and the image of lazing 
about in bed—one that would return elsewhere in Varèse’s writings—was perhaps its most 
antithetical metaphor. If the past was to be consulted at all, it was to be in the Nietzschean guise 
of informing action in the present: “great examples of the past should serve as spring boards 
from which [artists] may leap free into [their] own future.”285 “WE contain the past,” Varèse 
wrote, as though to turn the composer-subject into the living embodiment of duration—the past 
gathered into the present in the service of a pure agency in the now.
286
 
It is no coincidence that Varèse’s chosen place to exercise this forgetting was in America, 
a so-called “new world” with limited history to impede its burgeoning modernity. America 
represented immediacy for Varèse. Its deserts and its skies—two elements Varèse referenced 
almost obsessively throughout his career—were its essence, no doubt partly because they were 
things that could themselves bear no trace of a past. If sky and desert were symbols of the pure 
possibility discussed in the last chapter, then they were also symbols of what we might here call 
the Nietzschean “new beginning” of history-creating life, exemplified by the situation of Varèse 
himself, we must remember, who had supposedly lost all of his pre-America works in a 
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warehouse fire. This was all to be contrasted with Paris, which was obsessed with history and 
hardly conducive to his work as a result. To Carlos Salzedo, he wrote:    
 
It’s hard getting readjusted to Paris—I like the intelligent minority—unique in the 
world—but the city less and less—I’[m] fed up both with the Gothic and the 18th 
century—I have a horror of cemeteries—and I don’t give a damn about past traditions—
It’s like too many truffles—fine for those who eat them, but I refuse to be the one who 
has to belch them without having shared the feast. I am going to cut loose in my next 
work and give myself the luxury of living in the year 3000.
287  
 
The past was a dead weight on Varèse’s back. When reading him, one cannot help but 
want to shake it off just as badly as he did. What we must be careful to avoid here, though, is the 
attribution of all of this to yet another modernist case of ancestry repudiation. To be sure, Varèse 
was never quick to claim his stylistic precursors. But what I am more interested in than any one 
oedipal swerve is how this need for absolute newness might have arisen from a certain 
historically unique experience of modernity and temporality, one in which the existential 
consequences of not being new might have seemed particularly dire. As such, I wonder if we 
can’t view Varèse’s embrace of the discourses of vitalism and contact as a way of coming to 
terms with, and to some extent even owning, modernity’s otherwise disorienting and alienating 
temporality.  To contribute to the creation of the absolutely new while seeing modernity as the 
sum total of all of those creations was in some sense to be modernity, to contribute to the very 
thing that pushes it forward. To refuse this was not only to declare oneself the other of modernity 
but also to be left behind by it. And so, in the wake of the upheavals of the new physics, which 
posed such challenges to dependably meaningful conceptions of the natural world; and in the 
context of an experience in which “whole worlds disappear forever from our understanding,” “all 
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to no purpose,” can we not see the embrace of modernity as a kind of identification with the 
aggressor? Or at least an assumption of the aggressor’s place?   
We will return to this idea later. For now, I want merely to propose that this purported 
identification with modernity—and I mean this in the explicitly psychoanalytic sense—was 
evidenced by an intense desire for some sort of intimate congress or comingling with the real 
identified with the maelstrom of modernity itself. We see this desire in Varèse’s frustration with 
all sorts of mediated forms of experience, of which an inability to forget was always at least a 
latent part. Everywhere, it seemed, the present was encountered not in its raw newness, not 
directly, but mediated through pre-established historical or political forms, which could take the 
shape of anything from outworn musical styles to the artificial barriers imposed by the nation 
state. We get an early inkling of the latter, albeit in a positive spin, in an early New York Times 
editorial from 1919, in which Varèse declares that 
in art as well as in politics, we have been jarred out of our traditional isolation. And the result will 
be good. The contact, the emulation, the competition will spur us to greater accomplishment.
288 
 
The élan of modernity knew no political barriers. The nation state was its very anathema, 
a symbol of the same fatal conservatism by which individuals closed themselves off from contact 
with the new in order preserve the cherished bourgeoise interieur. The nation state was about 
stasis, separation, protection. Modernity was about movement, collision, stimulation. Apropo of 
our first chapter, it was about sirens breaching the comforts of both domesticity and ego alike to 
productively problematize the boundaries between self and other. Once again, it was a fantasy of 
comingling, constant interchange, and contact.
289
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national[ism] where everything is in communication,” Varèse scribbled on a random piece of 
stationary. He continued: 
radio, television / transportation means universalization [sic] of human consciousness 
through interpenetration of various cultures and peoples. Through wide spread inter[?] 
travels—interchanges, social—intercourse, commerce—exchange—[?] all continents—
blending all ways of life and customs / a change from particularities [-ism?] […] 
provincialism to universalism
290
 
 
Everything was part of the same vital stream, and nothing more so than science and art. 
On another piece of stationary, Varèse registered Goethe’s endorsement—“Science and art 
belong to the whole world, and the barriers of nationality vanish before them”291—then 
paraphrased it in an essay on Scriabin: “modernity is not in the confines of any one Nationality 
[…] this adventurous spirit has always been present in music and will always be the spark that 
makes for vitality and progress in all the arts and sciences alike.”292 The vitalism of modernity 
inhered in music, and, as such, existed on a much more fundamental level of experience than the 
spatial conceits of nationalism. The nation state was an island impeding the stream; the real of 
modernity as manifested in music, the tireless temporal flux of history, was the stream itself.  
We have begun to move into a discussion of art and music proper, but before we 
continue, I want to take a moment to recall the large issue that is at stake. The frustration Varèse 
so clearly felt in the face of a mediated, history-obsessed culture was surely an idiosyncrasy of 
the individual Varèse, born in 1881 and into a particular psychology. But we must also see it as 
resonating with a more general existential conundrum which is at the heart of the disenchanted 
project of modernity itself: the fact that, without inherited tradition, the subject is in no way 
guaranteed a meaningful place in or sense of connectivity to the larger social fabric. If before, 
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that sense of connected meaning came from the assumption of an allotted place in the universal 
order of things, inherited from the past under the guise of necessity; if it came, in other words, 
from a world that seemed largely to prefigure the subject, it must now come from the labor and 
free productive capacity of that subject itself, a newly autonomous subject who must somehow 
create this meaningful place by means of its own work. This is what disenchantment is all about: 
the reality of being cut off from God-created nature, and the resultant need to labor on the world 
to create another, second nature in which to finally feel at home in the world.  
Art enters as this second nature par excellence. As we know well at this point,  truth 
exists only insofar as art gives it a meaning. It is what arises, as Hegel wrote, from man’s 
“rational need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in 
which he recognizes again his own self.”293 And what is recognition if not another form of 
contact, albeit decidedly spiritual?  A question we can begin to ask is what exactly it was within 
himself Varèse—seeking to secure this sense of being at home in or contact with the world—
might have wanted to recognize. We know that for Hegel, recognition was first and foremost 
about transcending contingency; an individual overcame its particularity by finding in another 
the image of itself. It was about that aforementioned labor on the world (in Hegel’s case, the 
“labor of the concept”) as an act of home-making, of overcoming one’s parochial, nature-
alienated status through the realization of (or seeing oneself in) the universal.  
What we find in Varèse is a similar if less abstractly articulated preoccupation with this 
problem of contingency. When he spoke of his desire for the “universalization [sic] of human 
consciousness through [the] interpenetration of various cultures and peoples,” the “blending of 
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all ways of life,” and for being “jarred out of our traditional isolation,” he was speaking of a 
desire to transcend the status of the mere arbitrary individual in order to somehow make contact 
with a greater whole. Like Octavio Paz above, for whom modernity always threatened to be 
happening elsewhere or leaving one behind, he was betraying a fear of provincialism, of being 
cut off from the universal, bereft of contact with modernity’s supposed life-giving élan.  
But if art was to be the means through which this sense of provincialism was overcome, 
then it also had to overcome that sense of provincialism itself. Because art in modernity is no 
longer a kind of Pythagorean mirror of a well-ordered, God-created cosmos but is rather a 
profane act of labor by the contingent creator-individual, it risks representing a truth no more 
universal than that individual’s own provincial experience.294 It risks representing the contingent 
Varèse of the French countryside we spoke of above, shut off from modernity’s greater elan. As 
such, we might say that what Varèse needed to recognize in art was not so much any one 
provincial world as much as the much more universal impulse of creation itself, prior to 
individuation.
295
 Only as such could Varèse, speaking of musical worlds so completely alien to 
his own, say that while “listening to music by Perotin, Machaut, Monteverdi, Bach, or 
Beethoven, we are conscious of living substances” that “are ‘alive in the present’”296 What made 
this music alive was clearly not the way it reflected that present—Perotin had little to do with 
quantum physics—but rather the way it still bore a trace of the world-creating vital impulse 
responsible for creating its own present—however long past—and all presents throughout history 
in the first place. Even works from the 13
th
 century could be seen to embody the life principle 
that brought them into being, one hardly different from that of the modern project in general. 
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“Music,” Varèse echoed, “has always contained that adventurous spirit of modernity as a 
whole.”297 
But in terms of Varèse’s own present, the particular present of which, we are 
conjecturing, he wanted to feel a part, those older forms would not do. If they embodied 
moments in the history of that indivisible vital impetus—Bergson might have called them 
“eddies in the stream”—then Varèse could participate in and carry on that impetus only by the 
creation of the new. One simply had to keep going. “Art is subject to the same laws as life,” 
Varèse wrote. “Life is effort, movement, progress. For the mind as for the body, to cease 
struggling is to begin to die.”298 
We are now in a better position to see how this high valuation of the artistic impulse of 
creation could elide so well with something such as Varèse’s views on insular, life-stifling 
effects of the nation state. Art ceased struggling (Varèse’s word, we remember) precisely when it 
traded its blind embrace of new techniques for the safe and anachronistic use of pre-fabricated 
musical forms, forms which Varèse—once again using the language of separation and 
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mediation—called a “protection against the adventure of living.” For art to recreate rather than 
create was quite simply akin to its self-alienation from its own principle. And insofar as it ceased 
at that point to participate in the very vital stream that was its essence, so too did the composer or 
spectator whose own “vital impulse” could no longer, to use critic Paul Rosenfeld’s expression, 
merge with a larger stream. It was as though, when cordoned off into those conceptual ready-
mades, detached from any sort of direct participation in the novelty of the new moment, life 
could only spin in place, stagnate, and ultimately die, robbed of the friction it needed to continue 
on its vector, making and remaking itself in becoming. “Music written in the manner of another 
century is the result of culture,” wrote Varèse, “and, desirable and comfortable as culture may 
be, an artist should not lie down in it.”299  
That these processes of making and remaking, of struggling and steaming ahead in 
solidarity with modernity, played themselves out in the measure-to-measure dramas of Varèse’s 
scores should be obvious to anyone who has had even the most superficial listen. Hardly ever is 
there a moment of rest or reduction of musical tension. Huge sonic gestures surge ahead, 
colliding with one another as though to enact their own merging with the stream. And rare is the 
moment when the listener can “lie down” in the easy comfort of a straightforward repetition or 
other mediated encounter with the new. In a rhapsodic passage, saturated with the language of 
contact and boundary-breaking we have been examining, critic Paul Rosenfeld put it this way: 
One feels the force which thrusts up towers of steel and stone to scrape the clouds, and 
creates new instruments and combinations, and forms new field theories, seeking, on 
many fronts, here, there, again and again, to break through the hopelessly dirty crust of 
life into new clean regions. Balked, it persistently returns to the breach; till at last a new 
light, a new constellation, a new god, answers its wild penetrations from afar.
300
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It was in Varèse’s Espace manifesto, we will remember, that this same notion of breaking 
through crusts appeared, and we see Rosenfeld here affirming in Varèse’s music so much of 
what the composer would have wanted: a resistance to musical inertia and the “dirty” (read: old 
and overused) sedimentations of tradition, coupled with the revelation of a fundamental vital 
force flowing through and making possible the stuff of the modern.   
We would be relatively safe in assuming that the musical structures responsible for these 
“wild penetrations” into the vital stream were those frequent moments of violent culmination in 
Varèse’s large orchestral works in which pitches pile mercilessly atop one another to form 
towering dissonances. And it is in Arcana specifically that these culminations “persistently 
return to the breach,” enacting what Rosenfeld elsewhere identified as a kind of passacaglia in 
which the culminations surge upwards before returning to a series of continuously varied bass 
ostinatos, which in turn catalyze the process anew. What this stream of ostinato-culmination 
combinations brings to mind is a series of musical science experiments in which the composer 
places a select group of volatile pitches into intimate proximity before standing back to watch 
their explosive interaction. They enact a sort of musical heuristic, in other words, a process of 
feeling around in the dark that we could see as the ultimate means of maintaining a kind of 
unmediated—and strikingly vulnerable—type of contact with the new.301  
We should note that, more often than not, these dense passages involved the use of all 
twelve notes. In chapter one, we discussed Varèse’s use of that saturated technique, coupled with 
the music’s articulation of diverse interval spans, as his way of inching closer to the gapless 
continuum of the musical real, and it is perhaps not difficult to see how that notion might elide in 
a composer’s creative imagination with the idea of the similarly unbroken vital stream. But more 
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important, I think, than any sort of continuity and contact internal to these isolated passages is a 
contact and continuity that existed between them. Varèse often referred to “sound masses” in his 
music, and passages such as these culminations were undoubtedly what he had in mind. We can 
see the use of all twelve-tones therein, then, as an attempt at a certain density, possessive of a 
kind of musical mass, whose resultant forms could then set in motion to collide and make contact 
with other masses:    
When these sound-masses collide, the phenomena of penetration or repulsion will seem 
to occur. Certain transmutations taking place on certain planes will seem to be projected 
onto other planes, moving at different speeds and at different angles. There will no longer 
be the old conception of melody or interplay of melodies. The entire work will be a 
melodic totality. The entire work will flow as a river flows.
302 
 
The “entire work will flow as a river flows,” that is, as the élan vital flows. No wonder 
that Varèse equated Schoenberg’s version of the twelve-tone method as a “hardening of the 
arteries.”303 In the latter’s music, in which each instance of a row brought with it a sense of self-
enclosed and self-sufficient completion, Varèse must have sensed the kind of suffocating stasis 
that would inevitably snuff out the life impulse rather than perpetuate it. What’s more, the notion 
of the “unity of musical space” must have seemed to neutralize all directionality, mass, and 
momentum in music (“there is no absolute down, no right or left, forward or backward”), a 
thought that could not be more antithetical to the hurling sound masses and heaving vectors 
evoked by Varèse’s scores.304 Thus, rather than comprising self-enclosed entities whose sonic 
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existence was “independent from directions or planes,” to use Schoenberg’s phrase, Varèse’s 
twelve-tone sound masses were volatile agglomerations of musical matter that repeatedly 
collided with and broke open adjacent masses in a spectacular transfer of sonic energy. We can 
see an example of these colliding sound masses in mm.34—37 of Arcana (Example 3.1). At 
m.34, the English horns and horns signal the beginning of a new culmination with their repeated 
Cs. Both instruments then surge upwards to a D5 as the other instruments come in with staggered 
entrances, quickly filling the space with all twelve notes, which form a tall block of sound. In 
m.36, however, another sound mass seems to emerge from the sustained tones, announced by the 
repeated A in the trumpets, which, like the horns before, initiates its own twelve-tone 
culmination, completed by m.39.  
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Example 3.1: Colliding twelve-tone sound masses in mm.34-39 of Arcana. Dashed lines indicate 
sustained notes 
 
This is not the musical equivalent of a “protection against the adventure of living.” 
Rather, it is the enactment of that adventure itself, one in which the new is engaged with head-on 
and life is spurred continuously onwards, invigorated by each new encounter. 
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The Diabolical Parsifal: Contact on the Skin 
 
 
Until now, we have been speaking of this vital push of modernity as a kind of 
disembodied force, sensed much more than seen, and very much in line with the kind of 
Bergsonian metaphysics that was all the rage at the beginning of the century.
305
 We talked about 
making contact with that force, yet largely in the figurative sense of a kind of post-national 
comingling of peoples, of the vicarious experience of past modernities in older yet still vital 
works, or of the visceral yet largely intangible experience of the new coursing through new 
works in solidarity with the larger stream. Art in this conception took on its meaning as mere 
gesture, in both imagined and real solidarity with the creative destruction of modernity. But this 
disembodied notion of contact, it turns out, can only get us so far in an age in which contact was 
just as likely to take the form of sirens etching themselves directly into a composer’s 
subconscious or of the much more darkly literal forms of contact implied by the devastating 
global conflict that was World War I. I will say briefly that this uncomfortable proximity of 
metaphysical-mythological conceptions of contact with their brutally literal equivalents must 
have something to do with the dilemma Marx posed in the Grundrisse, in which it was asked:  if 
in older art, it is by way of mythology that man masters nature, then what can become of myth 
(and thus art) once man’s mastery of nature becomes, through technological domination and 
instrumental rationality, real?
306
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This conundrum is best understood, I think, if we take Marx’s question to be about the 
fate of meaning. As a vestige of myth, art has traditionally been a site in which the subject can 
imagine its reconciliation with nature, or at least come to understand how it fits into the latter. 
This would again be that process whereby the non-alienated participation in the world is 
confirmed by the spiritual process of recognizing oneself in another, whether that other is person 
or work of art.  But the question we will need to ask is what then happens to meaning once a 
composer begins speaking of contact not as spiritual recognition but as an actual physical 
experience of sound on skin? Let us leave it at that for now and return to our discussion Varèse 
himself to consider a slightly different form of contact than we have considered before. 
 
When Varèse spoke glowingly above about being “jarred out of our traditional isolation” 
in both art and politics, he did so, strikingly, in the context of the war. The year was 1919, and 
that “traditional isolation” he referred to was Europe prior to the sublime, never-before-seen 
spectacle of armies spilling across political borders across the whole of the continent and into 
battle. Ironically, it was the war for Varèse that had catalyzed a kind of healthy comingling of 
men across national boundaries, one that art would do well to emulate. It was thus in the same 
article that Varèse proposed a “League of Nations in Art” as an organization that could enable 
just that kind of transnational contact. It would be an international meeting place of art meant to 
encourage invention through reciprocal exchange and inspiration—through contact, in other 
words, of the conceptual kind.  
But the war metaphors did not stop there. Strikingly, Varèse expressed almost the exact 
same sentiments after the next world war, writing that “when the atomic bomb fell, nationalism 
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was wiped out. Today is one complete world, not individual countries barred from the rest.”307 
Fragments from the manifesto for Varèse’s unpublished work Espace continue this war-inspired 
narrative of breaking through the barriers of social mediation to achieve some sort of contact, 
professing an ecstatic vision of “humanity on the march,” of voices “penetrating each other, 
superimposing, repulsing […], colliding, crashing,” of “China, Russia, Spain, The Fascist States 
and the opposing democracies, all break [through] their paralyzing crusts” to comingle in a 
common spirit.
308
 If the pre-war sense of political isolation symbolized an impoverished, 
suffocating kind of experience, insulated from the life-giving contact with the new, then the clash 
of worlds during the war symbolized the kind of direct contact with modernity’s vital core that 
was the very essence of life itself. 
At this point, we are still in familiar territory. Even if Varèse’s fantasies of contact found 
resonance with something as unlikely as the war, then it was with the war as what we might call 
a cultural phenomenon, as unpalatable as that idea might be: the unimpeded exchange of ideas, 
the exposure of provincial souls to some greater onrush of humanity. We should note at this 
point that in 1915, Varèse himself served in the war. Working first as a bike messenger, he 
eventually asked to be transferred to the first machine gun battery but was refused the position 
because of issues related to his health. Though his tenure as a soldier was brief, that first-hand 
experience surely had a hand, for example, in his 1937 decision to organize a committee 
dedicated to raising money to buy an ambulance for the Spanish Republic, where it was reported 
that wounded soldiers were dying from a lack of proper care.
309
 This is all to say that we cannot 
explain away the place of the war within Varèse’s creative imagination as the mere romanticized 
construct of someone who had been spared its more gruesome realities. It would seem at this 
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point, rather, that what grabbed Varèse about the war was war at its most abstract. Or rather, war 
as a mere symptom of a more fundamental vital tendency that could somehow be considered 
apart from its traumatic reality. The possibility of a kind of oneness with the current of life—a 
nascent, vaguely mystical globalization—had reared its head, if only by way of a dark parody of 
itself.  
But we cannot be satisfied with this still somewhat mystical notion of contact either. As it 
turns out, Varèse’s war rhetoric ran deeper still. “I imagined myself to be a diabolic Parisfal,” 
Varèse wrote, “searching not for the Holy Grail but for a bomb that would blow wide open the 
musical world and let in sounds—all sounds, at that time called “noise”—and sometimes even 
today.”310 To Varèse’s nationalism-destroying atomic bomb, he had added another—a purely 
musical bomb whose reach in its own realm would be equally absolute.  
What do we make of this? At this point, can we comfortably continue reading  Varèse’s 
rhetoric of war and contact as mere metaphor? I would say decisively not, and the reason has to 
do with one fact: the contact Varèse intended was in many ways meant to be literal. Of all the 
things Varèse valued about music, one of the most important for this chapter was its physical 
immediacy. Among the arts, it was the only one whose materials were seen to make actual 
contact with the listener’s body. We can trace this way of understanding sound to Varèse’s 
encounters with Herman von Helmholtz, particularly his influential treatise On the Sensations of 
Tone as a Psychological Basis for the Theory of Music, which Varèse had read and grown fond 
of by the time he began composing all of his major works. It was early on in that treatise that 
Varèse must have read about music as something that “stands in a much closer connection with 
pure sensation than the other arts,” and about how the experience of listening to music was not 
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“based on a conception but on the thing itself.”311 Channeling Helmholtz several years later, 
Varèse asked rhetorically, in a 1939 lecture given in New Mexico: “when you listen to music do 
you ever stop to realize that you are being subjected to a physical phenomenon?”312 Later, in the 
publication The Commonweal, he elaborated, speaking of how music’s “power of suggestion is 
more compelling than that of any of the other arts, since its actual physical attack is more 
difficult to escape and more all-pervading."
313
  
A “power of suggestion” based in a “physical attack” that was “difficult to escape”—
music here seems to have persuaded by physical force, and a musical bomb surely all the more 
so. In a dark inversion of Kant’s complaint, made in his Critique of Judgment, that music’s 
inescapability robbed the subject of its freedom, Varèse saw that very inescapability as one of 
music’s greatest virtues, the quality by which it assured that none of the confining boundaries we 
examined above would remain intact to inhibit the direct contact of subject and world.
314
 The 
subject was “subjected to a physical phenomenon,” which is to say, made into the physical 
phenomenon’s subject, violated, much like Varèse before the siren in chapter one, to the point of 
losing its autonomy.  Once more, we recall our original thesis: that all of this language of contact 
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and touching, of immediacy and absorption into the stream of life, ultimately betrays a desire to 
participate in modernity. We must turn our attention now to understanding how that desire might 
have been fulfilled by a solution so implicated in violence.  
To begin to answer, it will help to take a moment and situate Varèse’s rhetoric of contact 
historically. When we do, we quickly realize that it is only in recent history that the question of 
music’s materiality versus its immateriality, as well as the question of the subject’s separation 
from either, could have made any sense at all. For the Greeks, Platonic conceptions of the 
universe demanded that matter be seen as largely coextensive with disembodied spirit, even if it 
was the latter—as form, eidos—that was ultimately privileged. For Pythagoras and his later 
interlocutors, that immaterial spirit took the form of the pure abstractions of music’s numerical 
ratios, which were in turn thought to mirror those of the entire cosmos, allowing someone such 
as Aristides to see music as the paradigm of order for both soul and universe alike. We find 
similar understanding of music in the neo-platonic interpretations of the early modern period, in 
which music was seen to be a privileged substance serving as an intermediary in the great chain 
of similitudes that connected the airiest vapors and godly ideas to matter at its most dense. 
Though music traversed both material and immaterial realms, its function was to convey to the 
former the invisible bond it had with the more perfect latter, a kind of vessel binding together all 
things.
315
 
In other words, there was never a question of man’s lack of participation in or contact 
with the larger order of things; in the enchanted world, soul and cosmos forever resonated as one 
and the same music. “Man is intermediate between eternal things and generable and corruptible 
things,” said Pietro Pompanazzi, “and he is put in the middle not so that he may be excluded but 
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truly so that he may participate. Whence he may participate in all extremes [emphasis mine].”316 
In its immateriality, music helped this participation to happen, serving as the spiritual glue 
binding together soul and cosmos as one and the same.  
With the emergence of modernity, we can no longer speak of music’s relationship to the 
cosmos as involving the same sort of metonymic connectivity or resemblance to nature. If the 
musical “work”—inasmuch as it could be called that—was originally seen as a mere elaboration 
of the larger God-created “music of the spheres,” the modern work in its autonomy comes to be 
cut off from that chain of similitudes, enclosed now within a form which implicates human—not 
divine—creativity and which can alone determine its meaning.317 Nonetheless, in Hegel and well 
after, music remains a means by which that gap is bridged and the soul comes to resonate in 
harmony with the external world, even if it is a world that is now fully mediated by the subject. 
In the musical work, Hegel writes, “what comes before us is no longer the peaceful and material 
shape but the first and more ideal breath of soul.”318 This is not the place for a full account of the 
history of musical metaphysics. But suffice it to say that from Pythagoras well into the twentieth 
century, music continuously takes on this role of cosmic or spiritual binding agent, connecting all 
things and providing contact between subject and world.  
It would seem at first as though Varèse’s highly physical conception of sound changes all 
of this. Music here seems no longer to be made up of the disembodied ratios invisibly binding 
together the Pythagorean cosmos, nor is it the incarnation of incorporeal spirit that it was for 
Hegel. No longer is it valued precisely for its decisively non-physical character. Instead, we are 
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approaching something resembling Nietzsche’s aesthetics as “applied physiology” in which 
music’s effects can be spoken of only in materialist or biological terms.319 What for Hegel was 
the “formless breath of soul” has become for Varèse a “physical phenomenon” rooted in the 
“raw material of sound,” capable, in its most effective form, of nothing less than “hitting the 
hearer on the back of the neck.”320 Varèse’s connection to Helmholtz begs us to link this rhetoric 
with the scientific materialism that was so prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century in which 
metaphysics ceded to an empiricism based in purely material explanations of the physical 
world.
321
 “Music must live in sound,” Varèse said, as though to insist that music’s intangible, 
elusive characteristics could only be discussed as functions of the sober, circumscribed, and 
disenchanted material world.  
In terms of our subject of contact, then, what this would mean for listeners is that they 
could surely feel a sense of connectivity by way of music with the alienated modern world. But if 
earlier, that connectivity came from hearing one’s reflection in that world, or from resonating in 
sympathy with some sort of cosmic frequency, it would now come simply as a feeling registered 
on the skin. From such a reading, we might then entertain a kind of linear progression throughout 
history in which the perfectly disembodied Pythagorean ratios were over time profaned into their 
crudely physical equivalents, representing a change in the quality of contact emblematic of the 
increasingly impoverished social experiences we associate with the darker side of modernity. 
“You can have contact,” the Varèseian sonic seems to say at times, “but only via ‘imagination 
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not dependent on mythology,’ as Marx once described art in the age of science.322 Only as a 
brute literalism, shorn of its metaphysical content. 
But such a reading would in the end be insufficiently dialectical. It would ignore the 
degree to which narratives of disenchantment only tell one side of the story, and how the 
mythologies they seemingly displace so often return to the where they areleast expected. This 
reversal is indeed what seems to happen in Varèse. Sound was surely the “raw material” of 
music, but music, as it turns out, was also what he referred to as the “corporealization of the 
intelligence in sound.”323 In other words, if sound was the basic material out of which music was 
made, then that sound was not merely some crude, mute substance built up into something that 
could finally speak as “music,” but rather something that, in a peculiar way, already spoke, 
something that was already mediated by human intelligence and conceptual labor.
324
  
What “hit the hearer on the back of the head,” then, was perhaps less disenchanted than 
we have supposed. Though there was clearly a physical element to Varèse’s sonic intimacy (and 
one which we will discuss more below), we must also somehow account for the “intelligence in 
sound” as having no less a role to play in establishing the desired connectivity. As such, we are 
not as far from Hegel as we’d once thought. It should be admitted that to many, Hegel will seem 
out of place in this or any other discussion of modernism insofar as more than a century exists 
between him and Varèse, and nothing could seem further from the angular, severe world of the 
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latter’s music than Hegel’s lofty language of the spirit. But we must not forget that Hegel the 
idealist is merely the symptom of what is for us a more important Hegel: Hegel the philosopher 
of modernity, whose own struggle to situate musical meaning at a particular juncture of 
materiality and immateriality is still so relevant to someone like Varèse. It is in this light, then, 
that we can speak of a provocative resonance between Varèse’s aforementioned 
“corporealization of the intelligence in sound” and Hegel’s definition of art as the “sensuous 
appearing of the idea.”325 Both, it would seem, involve a material manifestation of immaterial 
human spirit or cognitive capability in the otherwise non-human material world. Let us stay with 
this Hegelian Varèse for a bit longer, then, to see how far he can take us. 
Leaving aside the matter of “corporealization” for a moment, we can assume that by 
“intelligence in sound,” Varèse meant the mathematical logic that underlay the natural overtone 
series, the calculable interaction of particular frequencies with one another, and other sonic 
phenomena with which he was so often consumed.
326
 In the language of Hegel, we could say that 
this “intelligence in sound” was the appearance in nature of the concept, a concept initially 
searched for out of that need, discussed above at length, for the subject to find itself reflected and 
feel at home in the world.
327
 This would be an intimacy with the world created out of a sense of 
spiritual participation, a bridging of subject and object by way of seeing some aspect of oneself 
in the materials of the work of art. 
Taking this Hegelian narrative a step further, Varèse’s subsequent “corporealization” of 
this intelligence in sound, this concept as found in nature, would be the stage of art proper, 
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created because the concept as found in nature is deemed to be inadequate. As the story goes, the 
ratios and mathematical laws found there cannot but remain dead abstractions, indifferent, as 
Hegel says, to their sensuous existence and to the dynamic life of the soul that they evoke. Art is 
summoned here to create a second nature in which the concept isn’t merely a frozen abstraction 
or immediacy but rather something concrete—something that presents itself as having come to 
be through practical, temporal activity. Put more simply, art for both is summoned to create a 
sense of meaning and recognition where it cannot otherwise be adequately discovered;
 328
 “truth 
exists,” we remember Varèse saying, “only insofar as art gives it a meaning [emphasis mine].”  
Finally, music proper would enter here much as it would for Hegel: as a particularly 
privileged form of that artistic truth, valued because of the inextricable relationship truth in 
modernity has to temporality. It should be no surprise to us that, for the most part, Varèse would 
have mostly agreed with Hegel that “sensuous existence was wholly evanescent,” that time was 
“the being of the conscious subject,” and it was only in music that the subject could experience 
the constant negation and becoming of identity that was the essence of the experience of 
modernity itself.
329
 It is in Hegel, after all, that the question with which we started this chapter—
namely, of how one can be absolutely modern—has its existential roots: time in Hegel is the site 
of the spirit’s alienation in history, the “destiny of the unfulfilled spirit,” which prevents 
experience from ever being grasped in an instant of its entirety.
330
 In music, however, the subject 
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could be filled with the temporal becoming of modernity, and, by being filled with it, participate 
in and make contact with it.
331
 
But we must nonetheless bracket this discussion of Hegel for now in order to begin 
seeing how his model, while useful as a point of departure, can only get us so far in 
understanding the much more fragmented and abrasive experience of modernity congealed 
within Varèse’s works. Though we can certainly speak of the Varèseian subject’s intimacy with 
some sort of temporally experienced intelligence in sound, for example, we must also account for 
the change in the quality of that intelligence that must inhere in the music of someone like 
Varèse, who was so preoccupied with the necessity of forgetting.  
Forgetting is not what the Hegelian subject would have experienced in music. Musical 
time (and the concept’s development therein) was the means by which the subject experienced its 
own constant negation, for sure, but a negation that was constantly reabsorbed into a persisting 
unity all the while. This would in part be because of the transparent nature of a musical motif’s 
development over time, enabling the subject to apprehend that development much as its own: as 
a past remembered, retained in, and constantly reabsorbed into a new present through an ever 
growing process of concretion.   
In Varèse, however, I would argue that the temporal life of music had become less the 
site of the subject’s experience of its own preservation over time and more the site of its pure 
dissolution into it, enabled by a process of forgetting congealed therein. If in Hegel, music 
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encouraged the self’s discovery of itself by way of the concept in sound, I want to suggest that in 
Varèse’s music, the listening process involves the discovery of the mere concept—irrespective of 
the self—in sound.332 It is the symbolic as untied from the imaginary, an encounter, in other 
words, with intelligence (or the concept) as something that was no longer threaded through the 
subjective place from which it had traditionally been viewed.  
We can see this as a difference in the abstract and the concrete. What the Hegelian 
subject recognized in the concept was its own coming to be. It recognized intelligence as its own 
intelligence, intelligence not as mere abstract information but as an intimately and concretely 
experienced state of the concept that was, in a sense, the subject’s own. But if we recall our 
Varèse from chapter one, however, we know that this subject-centered interpretation of 
intelligence is much harder to sustain. What was for Busoni a search for “nature mirrored and 
reflected in the human breast” had become for Varèse a search for a nature defined by those 
frequencies which exceeded human hearing, for example, and by incarnations of the musical real 
and other elements that were largely indifferent to any sort of humanism.
333
 It was a kind of 
intelligence which, when temporalized in music, could not as easily be experienced by the 
subject as its own dialectical coming to be. Instead, it was intelligence as something detached 
from subjective experience and immured within a life of its own—intelligence as a blindly 
moving, creative-destructive force, experienced in the pure presence of its pursuit of newness at 
any cost.  
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In Varèse’s music proper, we can see this in his treatment of the overtone series as such, 
and in how the temporal elaboration of that series seems to drive a relentless process of creation 
and destruction so indicative of that inassimilable modernity we have been describing. In 
Beethoven, we can speak of the presence of the overtone series, of course, but only as something 
filtered through and circumscribed by that subjective lens called tonality, that slice of the 
overtone series in which the subject can recognize itself. It is circumscribed not only in terms of 
the limited number of tones employed but also in the way that those tones venture out only so far 
within individual motives (repeated, of course, on the level of form) before returning home again 
and again (the opening of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony, for example, which returns to E-flat 
four times in the span of a single measure of its opening theme).  
In Varèse’s Arcana, however, it is as though that highly circumscribed overtone series, 
which in Beethoven had asserted itself almost circularly as that constant departure and return of a 
subject, has unfurled itself from that subjective container of tonality, no longer appearing in a 
manner conducive to the subject’s reflection but stretched out into its raw, unfiltered, towering 
self. The overtone series, in other words, appears not in an abbreviated, domesticated version but 
in the full light of its terrifyingly sublime fullness. In its moments of upwards-surging pitch 
culmination, it is as though, while not articulating the literal series, the music nonetheless mimics 
and temporalizes the piling up of partials that occurs therein, lurching upwards through the tones 
in such a way that there is no longer that Beethovenian circle of identity’s return but instead the 
infinite line along which intelligence, in the form of higher and higher partials, theoretically 
harder and harder to hear, ultimately leaves the subject behind. Moreover, it is a sense of 
leaving-behind that is only amplified by the way each culmination seems to bring about its own 
destruction, coursing upwards only to come crashing down to begin again. 
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As with the passage examined above, it takes no wild imagination to hear this as the 
music of modernity at its most sublime. We might take a step further and say that it is music in 
which the subject is forced to defend at all times against those Benjaminian shocks discussed in 
Chapter 1, shocks that kept the subject glued to the perpetual present with little recourse to 
memory. Adorno’s remark that Varèse “uses technology for effects of panic” perhaps says as 
much.
334
 But it is because modernism is always that Janus-faced thing, seemingly caught 
between horror and elation in the face of the impulses driving it, that we can just as easily talk 
about that other side of its dialectic: the surrender to this sublime creative-destructive force as a 
liberating radical forgetting. Music here embodied what modernity had raised to an ontological 
principle: modernity as a vital force, as constant “effort, movement, progress,” as a struggle 
without which “both the mind and the body” would “begin to die.”335 In this light, and in a 
manner fitting for a composer who, in his words, didn’t give a damn about the past, we can see 
this excerpt as almost euphorically demolishing its own past—demolishing the possibility of 
musical memory—for the sake of that perpetual newness, performing in sonic form— dare we 
say making contact with?—that sublime creation and destruction that was seen to comprise 
modernity’s core.   
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And as goes the music, so goes the person attending to it. What these passages enable in 
the listener is a feeling of connecting intimately with the becoming and constant creation-
destruction inherent in the stream.
336
 Rosenfeld, again, put it well. To repeat our epigraph:  
Music is expressive, carrying us out of ourselves and beyond ourselves, into impersonal 
regions, into the stream of things; permitting us to feel the conditions under which objects 
exist, the forces playing upon human life. To live, to merge with the stream and become 
part of forces larger than ourselves, is to feel, to know something about the entire world; 
music lets us share in a great man’s absorption: at least to the degree to which we are 
capable of being lost to ourselves.
337
 
 
Repeatedly, Varèse referenced music’s ability to do this better than any other art. It was a 
connectivity based in music’s peculiar physicality, which conveyed the changing nature of the 
physical world directly to the listener’s body. 
 
 
The Barriers of the Body 
 
 
My argument has been that Varèse’s rhetoric of immediacy and contact stems from what 
is at root a desire to participate in and somehow apprehend that elusive thing called modernity. 
We have seen how that desire translated into a pervasive disdain for any sort of mediated 
relationship to the present, whether in the guise of the use of outmoded musical forms or even of 
musical performers themselves, condemned by Varèse as irritating middle men that inhibited 
“direct contact with the public.” Most recently, we saw this in the way the abstract musical 
content itself seemed to encourage in the listener a kind of Nietzschean forgetting that kept the 
listener fully engaged with the fleeting moment.   
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But in all of Varèse’s talk about dispensing with barriers inhibiting the direct contact with 
the absolutely new; and at the most extreme reaches of his dream of pure temporal immediacy, 
unhindered by the inertia of the world, we cannot help but wonder whether the ultimate barriers 
to be dispensed with were those of the listening subject itself. There is a fine line, in other words, 
between merely participating in modernity and becoming one with it, and it is this line that will 
concern us from here on out.   
We know that music was privileged by Varèse for the way its temporal nature allowed 
the listener a sense of vivid intimacy with the creative-destructive becoming that characterized 
modernity. But what we cannot forget is the degree to which this intimacy was in many ways 
literal. If shortly above, we were concerned mainly with more metaphorical or cognitive kinds of 
intimacy based in recognition-like processes, here we must remember that those experiences 
relied for their intensity upon music’s peculiar physicality, which served to actually connect 
subjects and world to create that unique sense of linking up with the stream.  
But it is when we combine this embrace of music as a kind of conduit between listener 
and that temporal flux of modernity with Varèse’s understanding of the ideal listener as itself 
hardly more than that same temporal flux that we begin to see exactly what is going on here. In 
his unpublished lecture “Sound, the Raw Material of Music,” Varèse describes the way music is 
able to assert itself as purely immaterial existence before suggesting that it ultimately helps the 
listener to experience itself as the same: 
In music, the auditive sensations themselves form the matter of the art. We do not 
transform these sensations into symbolic objects of external phenomena. For example, 
when in concerts we notice especially certain sounds produced either by brass, woodwind 
or string instruments, our pleasurable sensation does not reside in the evocation or 
representation for us of the material existence of any of those instruments, but in the 
sensation of sound emanating from them. “The idea peculiar to music, and which music 
gives”, [Julien] Benda says, “and which other arts would be incapable of giving, is that of 
immaterial existence presenting, in short, the condition of being a being without being an 
object.” For this reason matter-of-fact persons whose musical enjoyment is limited to 
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tunes and who enjoy life from the hips down, are bored listening to music. Its abstraction 
seems a negation of concrete existence, and consequently of their own.
338
 
 
To truly merge with the stream of things, as Rosenfeld described the ideal experience of 
modernity, was here to experience the eclipse of everything in subjective life that tended towards 
the condition of the object. It was to experience a self-abandonment to modernity’s becoming 
that was directly opposed to the accrual of memory on the level of musical content, for example, 
or the petrified nature of anachronistic musical forms on another. As such, hips-down listeners 
were not wrong to experience music as a “negation of concrete existence.” They were wrong, 
rather, in understanding that negation as a bad thing. What I am suggesting is that for Varèse, to 
truly touch one’s time, to be “absolutely modern,” was in a sense to become time, abandoning 
the time by which one is constituted as a persisting and remembering subject to embrace time at 
its essence, time as pure becoming, creation, and destruction, time as the Dionysian.  
That music was to offer at the very least an ersatz version of this Dionysian experience is 
hinted at in the following excerpt from a New York Times editorial, in which the experience of 
music is once again compared directly to the experience of war. Varèse writes:  
At first war and its attendant dangers bring a new, overwhelming sensation of the 
uncertainty of life and the certainty of death, the energy and determination of a fighting 
army, the spirit of a great nation. All this inspired the soldier at the beginning. But soon 
the drudgery, dirt, monotony, horror, make everything commonplace. One seems to lose 
the power of new sensations. But the effect of music in mental stimulation is unfailing. I 
can awe us with the majesty of nature; make us laugh in the very joy of living, cry at the 
tragedy of life. It can today inspire us with a will to do the work of the world.
339
 
 
War, as that which makes apparent the “overwhelming sensation of the uncertainty of life 
and the certainty of death,” reveals to the subject an otherwise-concealed ontological truth: the 
basis of modernity in the experience of transience. Like something straight out of The Birth of 
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Tragedy, this “drudgery, dirt, monotony, [and] horror” ultimately numb the mind, robbing it of 
“new sensations,” whereupon art is summoned to redeem that experience, helping, as Nietzsche 
would say, to “save the eye from gazing into the horrors of night and to deliver the suspect by the 
healing balm of illusion from the spasms of the agitations of the will.” We should take Varèse’s 
recourse in the next two sentences to the decidedly un-modernist notions of laughter, tears, and 
inspiration with a grain of salt. As we have seen, if Varèse was concerned with anything, it 
wasn’t so much laughter and tears as it was the underlying force that could so quickly turn one 
into the other. And although art could reveal those same ontological truths only via illusion, its 
value here nonetheless lay in the closeness it allows the listener to those truths. “Art,” Varèse 
wrote later in the same editorial, “has brought us face to face with the real.”340  
 But in other ways, and as we already know, it could actually bring the listener much 
closer to the real than that. How does one remain face to face with music as it is, to paraphrase a 
later Varèse, striking them on the back of the head? How does one remain face to face with that 
“bomb that would blow wide open the musical world and let in sounds—all sounds, at that time 
called ‘noise’—and sometimes even today”? We are back, in other words, to Varèse as that 
“diabolical Parsifal,” writing in the wake of war, for whom music wasn’t so much a means of 
“mental stimulation” as it was a means of mental shock. Far from desiring the merely simulated 
dissolution of the listener in cases like this, Varèse seems to have wanted his sonic contact to 
achieve the real thing as well. 
Regarding Arcana, André Jolivet recalled how Varèse wanted sound to cause the listener 
to “cease to think of himself [by way of a] force which carries one away and leads to 
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dematerialization.”341 It is a scenario similar to the one Varèse imagined for his abandoned work 
The One All Alone, which was to use giant, blinding spotlights, among other things, to affect a 
kind of “apocalyptic unity” and “terror,” ultimately leading to the “transmutation of one form of 
matter into another.”342The scenario for the work was to involve an astronomer, inspired directly 
by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, whose fate was itself transmutation: being “decomposed, 
disintegrated, and absorbed into the Star.”343 Based around the ultimate being who was not also 
an object, it was a vision of immateriality that had its origins partly in a dream. As Louise 
recalls: 
[In the dream, Varèse] was in a telephone booth telephoning to me in Paris when 
one arm after the other seemed to evaporate and the next thing he knew he was with me 
in a hotel room in Paris, “reintegrated”—like a wireless photograph. So, he imagined his 
Nietzschean Astronomer escaping from a mad and murderous crowd, disintegrated and 
translated to the stars by Sirius and his companion the white Dwarf. It was by 
instantaneous radiation that the white dwarf signaled and that the Astronomer, a scientific 
uebermensch, caught them and signaled replies.
344
 
 
I cannot help but imagine the “mad and murderous crowd” here as being comprised of 
those recalcitrant bodies, so heavy with the inertia of tradition, that were seen by Varèse to 
oppose his vision of a perpetually “dematerialized” stream of modernity. The astronomer would 
be Varèse, searching into space for the unheard and the unfelt, the crowd would be the 
naysayers, protesting, as they do in The One All Alone, his insistence on moving forward at 
whatever cost, and the end result would be the liquidation of Varèse’s body by a beam of 
radiation into the pure, non-individuated immanence of the very becoming that the process of 
perpetual discovery symbolized. That this liquidation would have been a good thing is evidenced 
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by the fact that music was to contain “passages of ecstasy—terror—everything but a morbid 
decadent feeling.”345 In other words, the musical “apocalypse” was to be that Nietzschean 
beginning-again and self-overcoming that was to be embraced if life was to achieve the 
conditions necessary for it to live.  
We must see radiation here in the same way as sound. Both convey energy through space 
and eventually bring that energy into direct contact with a terminating surface. In the context of 
The One All Alone, then, Varèse’s comment about how music’s “physical attack is more difficult 
to escape and more all-pervading” makes us wonder whether the listener’s fate wasn’t ultimately 
to be that of the astronomers.  Sound and spotlight alike seem to be things intended to literally 
break open the recalcitrant shell of the listener’s subjectivity, annihilating the final barrier 
separating them from world to create the condition of the possibility for experiencing the new.  
Here, it is not so much Nietzsche who is Varèse’s model as Nietzsche’s disciple Artaud, 
with whom Varèse briefly collaborated and who spoke no less enthusiastically about the 
possibility of establishing a renewed contact between the public, art, and life. Varèse read 
Artaud’s The Theater and Its Double and would have no doubt encountered and identified with 
Artaud’s comment that “without an element of cruelty at the root of every spectacle, the theater 
is not possible. In our present state of degeneration it is through the skin that metaphysics must 
be made to re-enter our minds.”346 The skin, that is, as the site of pure, pre-cognitive immediacy, 
receptive to the shock of the new and yet immune to the identity-preserving tendency of the mind 
to parry new experiences by filtering them through the old.  
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Vitalism and Materialism: Towards a Reconciliation 
 
Artaud’s comment raises an interesting final issue. Can we speak of a strict delineation, 
or at least a similar coexistence, in Varèse’s rhetoric of something we might call the purely 
physical and something we might call the metaphysical? If so, might we be able to do as Artaud 
does and see one as the necessary condition of the other? Admittedly, this subject could fill a 
dissertation of its own, and so I will only gesture towards a possible answer here. It will lie in the 
clarification of a temporal ambivalence that has persisted in our discussions of the musical 
present thus far.  
At times, we have spoken of this present as a continuous flux and perpetual becoming, 
while at others, the discussion has tended more towards a specific moment in that becoming, one 
that we have described variously as an experience of panic or shock, as a theoretical moment of 
being absolutely modern, or otherwise. Bergson discussed the former in terms of duration, an 
authentic, non-spatialized experience of time in which the “continuous progress of the past […] 
gnaws into the future and […] swells as it advances.”347 For the most part, Varèse’s music 
embodies what we might call a highly contracted version of this duration insofar the degree of 
the past that bleeds into the present is minimized to maximize that coveted experience of the 
now.  What I want to propose is that we see works like Arcana, which also featured those 
periodic violent culminations of sound, as involving the occasional further contraction of that 
duration into moments approaching what Bergson called “pure presence,” initiated by the 
heightened sensation of making physical contact with sound. These moments would embody 
Jolivet’s sonic “force which carries one away and leads to dematerialization,”  comprised of 
moments in which the ear is struck by a heightened, almost traumatic physicality (because of 
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both volume and saturation of pitch space) in order to establish an opening of sorts through 
which metaphysics might be allowed its fragile connectivity. This would be that place, blown 
open by the musical bomb, which would allow “all sounds to come rushing in through the 
resulting breach.”   
Of the present, Bergson writes: 
  
My present consists in the consciousness I have of my body. […] In that continuity of 
becoming which is reality itself, the present moment is constituted by the quasi-
instantaneous cut effected by our perception in the flowing mass, and this section is 
precisely that which we call the material world. Our body occupies its center; it is, in this 
material world, that part of which we directly feel the flux in its actual state the actuality 
of our present lies. If matter, so far as extended in space, is to be defined (as we believe it 
must) as a present which is always beginning again, inversely, our present is the very 
materiality of our existence [emphasis mine].
348
 
 
Jolivet’s “force” here would be these “quasi-instantaneous cuts” in the listening subject’s 
flowing mass, moments of extremely contracted duration that foreground the experience of the 
memory-less (perhaps even traumatized) bodily present. The experience of matter without 
memory was for Bergson one of “pure perception,” an experience of the real in which matter was 
no longer seen as existing for (and thus apart from) a subject, sliced up into sections of differing 
usefulness as determined by past experience, but as a single “vibrating mass” that the subject, in 
Bergson’s words, “touched, penetrated, lived.”349 In Arcana, it is as though the listener 
experiences the constant contraction of duration into these penetrative, explosive moments—
moments that in effect open up the subject to an experience of object, sound, and modernity 
unmediated by memory—before that window of duration widens again, allowing the subject to 
experience itself as the time that it has always been. Varèse said that music must live in sound. 
Here, that sound has opened the door to music.  
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If formalism in music represented a “protection against the adventure of living,” as we 
remember Varèse calling it, then we can only assume that the truer experience of modernity and 
of any music created in its name was an intensely vulnerable one. It was an experience of 
hanging off the bow—not the back—of modernity’s careening ship, coursing through Rilke’s 
“night, when a wind full of infinite space gnaws at our faces.”350  
But that vulnerability was a fine price to pay to realize a dream of contact deeply 
connected to the related social dream of a world in which meaning is no longer contingent upon 
the mediation of signs and subjects but is immanent in the structures of society itself. If for 
Varèse and others, that dream takes on the guise of touching, it is because what is hoped for in 
the experience of modernity is a type of meaning rooted in the felt participation in one’s time—a 
kind of intuitive, bodily sense of belonging—rather than in the mere distanced contemplation of 
its relentless, inassimilable becoming. If the latter is an atrophied, castrated form of experience, 
one in which feeling has been removed from thought, then I think we can see music here an 
attempt to return to experience something of that affective dimension, an attempt to create a 
second-order modernity with a renewed sense of nearness to and felt participation in its 
disenchanted materials.  Forced to pass through the skin before arriving at the brain, sound both 
induces the shock indicative of modernity’s impoverished, inassimilable type of experience 
while at the same time opening up the subject to the possibility of something better. Music 
instigates a lifting of the subject’s leaden gates, suspending, if only in a flash, their self-policing, 
self-preserving boundaries in order to let in the breathless modern world.   
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